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Abstract
The Internet has proved its capacity to defy the nation-states’ traditional borders. Facing
this circumstance, governments became eager to control its infrastructure, as they did in the past
with other forms of communication and they have attempted to shut down the Internet in several
occasions. Academics and non-governmental organizations have focused their attention on
authoritarian regimes because of the impact of Internet shutdowns on human rights. However, this
extreme action of government control has also been part of the debate in non-authoritarian regimes.
Thus, this dissertation contributes to the academic debate by analyzing democratic and hybrid
regimes, their political discourse and concrete actions to shut down the Internet or to consider
doing it. This process starts by questioning the traditional belief that democratic governments, selfdefenders of the freedom as a human right, would not consider shutting down the Internet.
This dissertation is an exploratory study of the rhetoric and actual factors that enable
democratic and hybrid regimes to shut down the Internet or consider doing it as part of their
national security strategy. This project started by adopting a definition of what an Internet
shutdown is, the government attempt to stop all Internet activity within the borders of its nationstate, also known as "Internet Kill Switch". The research design for this project carries an online
data collection and a comparative case study to answer the research questions that drive this
dissertation. Data collection included reputable sources and a triangulation process for validity
purposes.
The process of online data collection started by developing an inclusion and exclusion
criteria to select the case studies. Using the theoretical framework of the Securitization theory of
the Copenhagen School, this study identified the arguments democratic, and hybrid regimes use to
justify shutting down the Internet. At the same time, this project determined the audiences they try

to address and what they understand as a national security situation. Case studies include three
well-consolidated democracies, U.S., U.K. and Australia, and two hybrid regimes, Russia and
Venezuela. These nation-states were involved in an Internet shutdown, or their governments
considered doing it under different circumstances.
To identify the political, legal and technical factors that enable a democratic and hybrid
regime to shut down the Internet, this project determined specific variables to analyze. For
comparative purposes, this project also incorporated two-young-democracies, Brazil and Mexico,
and one hybrid regime, Turkey. These last three governments never shut down the Internet and did
not consider doing it. From the comparison between regimes politically similar, this research
identified similarities and differences in the factors that enable a government to shut down the
Internet.
The second contribution comes from a conceptual point of view, by clarifying the
differences between terms. In this regard, this study challenges the assimilation of shutting down
the entire Internet with censorship episodes as if they were equal practices.
Finally, from an academic point of view, this dissertation determined that there are no
substantial differences between the rhetoric and political, legal and technical factors that enable
democratic and hybrid regimes to shut down the Internet.
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1. Introduction

In January 2011, the world witnessed how Egypt vanished from the global Internet for nine
days. Although this practice seemed at the time as a unique case, it was not. Since 2005, many
authoritarian regimes have executed this maneuver citing reasons of national security. As I will
explain later in this document, following the Egyptian events, many academics conducted studies
about authoritarian regimes that executed Internet shutdowns. At the same time, multiple sectors
of the civil society have paid attention to this problem and became active monitoring Internet
shutdowns in authoritarian regimes.

This research project has a different approach. It is my purpose to analyze the Internet
shutdown policy from the perspective of non-authoritarian regimes, democracies and hybrids,
because the issue also pertains to their agenda. Both, democratic and hybrid regimes have cited
reasons of national security to consider an Internet shutdown. However, their concepts of “national
security,” and when and under what circumstances it affects their citizens have different
connotations.
Moreover, despite the different views included in the debate, it is also important to note
that democratic and authoritarian regimes also have history exercising actions to control the
Internet (a practice that involves a broader scope that only Internet shutdowns). Between 1995 and
2011, there were 606 incidents of governmental control over their digital networks: 39% of the
events occurred in democratic regimes, 6% in emerging democracies, 52% in authoritarian
regimes, and 3% in fragile states1 (Howard et al, 2011). As national governments found ways to

1

Fragile nation-states are considered by having weak capacity to perform basic governance functions. They lack the
ability to develop constructive relations between government and society. Fragile nation-states are also more vulnerable to internal
and external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters. The World Bank defines a fragile state as one having weak
institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability (Klausen & Humphry, 2015; Woolcock, 2014)
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control, censor and govern the Internet, conceptions of a free and ungoverned Internet have been
challenged.
Thus, the first chapter of this document introduces the research problem of this study,
which is to investigate the causes that enable democracies and hybrid regimes to shut down the
Internet, or to consider doing so. This chapter also describes the addresses limitations in the
existing literature and presents the research goals, including the specific research questions this
dissertation answers. Next, it offers the research approach of the study, including the challenge of
a potential paradigm considering democratic systems and Internet freedom. Finally, this chapter
defines the core concepts that I will address throughout this dissertation, including technical
aspects and an overview of the governments that attempted shutting down the Internet.

1.1.

Problem Statement

Authoritarian regimes’ efforts to limit access to the Internet have captivated academic and
popular attention (Bowman & Camp, 2013; Dunn, 2011; Harlow & Johnson, 2011b). Especially
after the political process baptized as “Arab Spring,” when Egypt (alongside with other nationstates), digitally vanished from global Internet, academic and professional research addressed the
problem of the Internet shutdowns (Howard et al., 2011; ISOC, 2011; Vaughan-Nichols, 2011).
However, it is less known that there has been an ongoing legal debate in democratic and hybrid
regimes on the authority government leaders should have to execute an Internet shutdown in times
of crisis.
As established by the literature, there are three things a government needs to interfere with
communications: legal authority to act, technical capability and political power. Despite the type
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of regime, political power is required to force individuals or corporations to comply, or the ability
to direct forces to coerce compliance (Havyatt, 2011). In this research project, I will analyze these
three critical elements to understand why consolidated democracies and hybrid regimes have shut
down or have considered shutting down the Internet.
The research questions of this project address the need to understand and explain, why
democracies, mostly self-determined as defenders of Internet freedom, have used or considered
using mechanisms of governmental control that these governments criticized directly or indirectly
in their official policy discourse. This point is important because there may be a double discourse
produced by democratic regimes. On the one hand, they defend a free and open Internet, while on
the other hand, their real actions and debates aim to control the Internet infrastructure and the
access their citizens have to it (Crook, 2010; Harding, 2011; Opderbeck, 2012, 2013; Winder,
2011).
Acts of government control involve: (1) surveillance of specific websites or Internet users,
(2) banning encryption, (3) partially censoring Internet activity, and (4) disconnecting or trying to
disconnect Internet exchange points (IXPs). Democratic and non-democratic regimes have
performed actions of this nature (Giacomello, 2005; Howard et al., 2011; Howard & Hussain,
2013; Price, 2015). Although shutting down the Internet could be considered a “recent”
phenomenon in historical terms (since the earliest cases are from 2005), it is timely, and it seems
to be occurring more frequently.

1.2.

Research Questions

The specific research questions, which focus on democratic and hybrid governments, are:
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RQ1: What is the global scope of the Internet shut down phenomenon?
RQ2: What justifications do democratic and hybrid regimes use to shut down or to
consider shutting down the Internet?
RQ3: What are the political, legal and technical factors that enable a government to shut
down the Internet?
The first question addresses the global scope of the Internet shut down phenomenon, this
is, the list of nation-states that were involved in an Internet shutdown or had a debate on the subject.
Therefore, the list includes nation-states that shut down the Internet or considered doing so,
whether it was at a national level (in the entire territory of a nation-state) or a local (in a city or
province). Thus, this dissertation aims to provide a detailed, up-to-date accounting of efforts by
governments to shut down the Internet.
The second question focuses on understanding the broad and narrow arguments
governments make to justify a shutdown. Prior research indicates that the political discourse of
democratic regimes justifies government control over the Internet as necessary to protect what they
call the critical infrastructure and to fight against cybercrime, child pornography, and computer
frauds (Giacomello, 2005). Some governments also tried to explain their Internet shutdown
episodes claiming the existence of an accident, although the same justification repeats more than
once (Didymus, 2011; Espinoza, 2015; Gomez, 2013; Hunt, 2016).
The third research question looks closely at the structural factors that enable a shutdown or
the consideration of it in democratic and hybrid regimes. By examining the legal, political, and
technical forces that give rise to nation-states considering the exercise of full government control
over Internet access, it is expected to identify critical factors that might differentiate hybrid regimes
from democratic ones. This study also includes cases where governments have not considered or
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executed an Internet shutdown to better isolate key structural factors that distinguish regimes that
are inclined to exert the ultimate control of government authority as compared with those that are
not.
Shutting down the Internet has been considered a remedy for different situations that
threaten the national interest because the protection of the national interest guarantees the survival
of the nation-state (Richards, 2012). The aim of this dissertation is examining those arguments
since governments “construct” the concept of national interest and potential threats (Katzenstein,
2003). In doing a close analysis of the rhetoric produced by government leaders and policymakers,
we expect to determine differences between hybrid and democratic regimes in building their
arguments about national security.

1.3.

Definition of Terms

This chapter will present some fundamental concepts associated with the phenomenon
under study.

1.3.1. The Internet: A Network of Networks

Computers are frequently connected through networks to communicate among them and
to magnify their usefulness. The most widely defined example of a network is the Internet, which
is a diverse set of independent networks. In this regard, the Internet is a “network of networks,”
and the networks that compose the Internet share a standard architecture and protocols that allow
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communication within and among different constituent networks (Clark, Berson, & Lin, 2014; M
Mueller, 2010). In this network of networks, the disruption of data communication should not
happen, even if parts of the network go down (Subramanian, 2011).
The data that travels through the Internet breaks into small pieces called “packets”. The
Internet packets travel to their destination by routers and servers, using the “TCP/IP protocol”
(Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) suite. The IP protocol, in combination with
several routing protocols, provides the capabilities to deliver packets to their destination in a besteffort approach; however, each packet may take a different path through the Internet (See figure
01 and 02). It is not possible to determine in advance the particular sequence of routers that will
handle a packet (Clark et al., 2014)

Figure 01.-Example of an IPv4 Internet Data Packet
IP Header

(tutorialspoint, 2019, para.2)

7
The elements of the packet are the following ones:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Version: Version no. of Internet Protocol used (e.g. IPv4).
IHL: Internet Header Length;
DSCP: Differentiated Services Code Point (Type of Service).
ECN: Explicit Congestion Notification; It carries information about the congestion
in the route.
5. Total Length: Length of entire IP Packet
6. Identification: If IP packet is fragmented during the transmission, all the fragments
contain same identification number
7. Flags: As required by the network resources, if IP Packet is too large to handle,
these ‘flags’ tells if they can be fragmented or not.
8. Fragment Offset: This offset tells the exact position of the fragment in the original
IP Packet.
9. Time to Live: Every packet is sent with some TTL value set, which tells the network
how many routers (hops) this packet can cross.
10. Protocol: Tells the Network layer at the destination host, to which higher layer
Protocol this packet belongs to
11. Header Checksum: This field is used to keep checksum value of entire header which
is then used to check if the packet is received error-free.
12. Source Address: 32-bit address of the Sender (or source) of the packet for an IPv4
13. Destination Address: 32-bit address of the Receiver (or destination) of the packet
for an IPv4
(tutorialspoint, 2019, para.3)
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Figure 02.- Travel of Data Packets’ Path within the Internet2

Modified from Mathiason, p.8, 2009

If there is a disruption, data packets will find an alternate route and networks to reach their
destination (Subramanian, 2011). In what is known as “the open architecture design of the
Internet,” there is not a central node (a single connection point) that controls the entire Internet
infrastructure (Hiller, 2002; Mathiason, 2009; Mueller, 2002). Initially the Internet was conceived
as an open communications system without ties to any organization or hierarchical constraint
(Leiner et al., 1997; Subramanian, 2011). The beginning and ending points of data moving within
the Internet are computers or similar devices, which are connected to the Internet through Internet
service providers (ISPs) that handle the technical administrative and arrangements for
connectivity. The links and routers of the Internet provide the required critical connectivity
between source and destination (Clark et al., 2014).
The applications, packet-switching technology, and physical infrastructure are called
“layers” of the Internet’s architecture, and the most important characteristic is that different

2
In the next chapter, there will be a more detailed explanation about the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and its role
within the process of shutting down the Internet.
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stakeholders control different layers (Clark et al., 2014; Horvitz, 2013). The lack of a centralized
structure allowed the Internet “to be responsive to a very large unregulated constituency and
allowing explosive growth and with increasing usefulness to its users” (Horvitz, p.6, 2013).

1.3.2. Internet Shutdown, a.k.a. ‘Internet Kill Switch’

Although the lack of a centralized system of control is a resistant and resilient characteristic
of the Internet, there is no guarantee that governments (either democratic or not) or any other entity
won’t attempt to control it (Meinrath, Losey, & Pickard, 2011). A historical analysis of the world’s
telecommunications history shows that one of the factors for governmental control is the existence
of a national security problem, which is addressed differently in democratic and non-democratic
regimes (Howard et al., 2011). In this way, governments’ leaders are allowed to identify what a
matter of national security is, either an enemy nation-state, malicious hackers, authoritarian
regimes or human rights activists (Bobbitt, 2002; Giacomello, 2005).
When it comes specifically about an Internet shutdown, the academic literature defines this
form of government control as the attempt to stop all Internet activity within the borders of the
territory of a nation-state and, is colloquially known as an “Internet kill switch” (Opderbeck, 2012,
2013). The expression “kill switch” refers to an “emergency-stop switch” or just “E-Stop”. It also
implies the existence of a single shutoff device to stop one or many activities to ensure the safety
of people and machinery by delivering a concrete and predictable fail-safe response (Torzillo &
Scott, 2010).
In similar terms, the expression “Internet kill switch” has been defined as a unique point
of control to “shut down” the Internet and stop the transmission of the Internet packets (Economist,
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2011, 2013; M. Johnson, 2011). The idea of a “switch” suggests an on-or-off state, in which access
to the Internet either exists or not (Ford, 2014).
Academic and non-academic literature also define the shutting down of the Internet from
three different perspectives (Economist, 2011, 2013; M. Johnson, 2011; Thompson, 2012):
1. From a political point of view, as the government’s authority (or the president’s authority)
to disconnect commercial and private wireless networks (including both cell phones and
the Internet itself) when a nation-state faces a cyber-attack,
2. From a technical point of view, as the attempt to interrupt all Internet and cellular
communication activity in and out of the territory of a nation-state, when this one faces a
national security threat and,
3. From a cyber-security point of view, as a control mechanism to protect the critical
infrastructure when a nation-state faces a cyber-attack
Despite specific concerns about national security that governments have, and
independently from any definition, it must be clear that a “kill switch device” for the Internet does
not exist. This is an unrealistic vision of how government authorities could employ a physical
device to disconnect computers from the global Internet. In the next section, I will explain step by
step the process of how an Internet shutdown can be achieved and the elements and stakeholders
involved.
Internet shutdowns are also known as “Internet blackout,” “Internet outages,” “kill-the
Internet power” or “Internet cut off”. For this research, I will use the expression “Internet
shutdown,” because it is the most used in legal and technical documents. Any other phrase will be
used as part of a citation or quotation.
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1.3.3. Technical Components: Process to Shut Down the Internet

The technical process to attempt to stop the Internet is more complicated than just pressing
a button (a “switch”) and involves different stakeholders. Shutting down the Internet implies the
interruption of transference of data packets from sender to receiver, a process controlled by the
TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) Protocol Suite.
Of the TCP/IP protocol suite, the Internet Protocol (IP Protocol) provides end-to-end
connectivity and determines how data is formatted, addressed, routed, and received at the specified
destination. The functionality of the different protocols in the TCP/IP protocol suite is organized
into five abstraction layers: application, transport, Internet, network interface and physical (See
figure 03) (Wood, n.d.). The layers are used to sort all related protocols according to the scope of
networking involved.

Figure 03- The TCP/IP Model
The TCP/IP MODEL
Application
Transport
Internet
Network Interface
Physical

Source: (Wood, n.d.)
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The technical sector and the academic community also refer to a different model called
“OSI (Open System Interconnection) Reference Model,” or the “OSI 7-Layer Model” that is worth
to mention. This model defines seven layers that describe how applications communicate among
each other while running upon different networks. The model is a generic one and applies to all
network types, including (but not only) to TCP/IP, and all media types. Differently from the
TCP/IP model, the OSI model contains seven layers: physical, data link, network, transport,
session, presentation and application. To get a packet from an application running on device to an
application running on a different device, the packets descend and then re-ascend the layers. When
an application creates a packet of data to be sent; this process takes place at layer 7. As the packet
descends, it is wrapped in headers and trailers, as required by the various protocols, until it reaches
layer 1 and abandons the first device towards the second one. When the packet reaches second
device, it re-ascends the stack, until the application layer (Briscoe, 2000).
The OSI model and the TCP/IP model are different, but they share some differences as
well. The TCP/IP model is the current choice to achieve interoperability between different
networks of different technology, and communities of different administrations, but back in the
early 90s the academic community debated whether one model should prevail over the other one.
In this scenario, it is important to point out some of the differences and similarities between both
models: Both models are similar from the following points of view: Both models have a layered
architecture, perform similar functions, both are protocol stack and are reference models (Rose,
1990).
When it comes to the differences, both systems have their own peculiarities:
The OSI model is a generic one, a communication gateway between networks and endusers and the TCP/IP model is based on Internet standard protocols. The transportation layers in
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both models have different vulnerabilities: in the OSI model the transport layer guarantees the
delivery of the packets, while the TCP/IP model doesn’t provide any guarantee for the packets’
delivery. Additionally, the OSI model is a reference one around which all networks are built, while
the TCP/IP model is only a way of implementing the OSI model. In terms of protocols, the OSI
model can fit multiple protocols, while the TCP/IP does not fit any protocol; this last distinction
makes easy to replace protocols in the OSI model but in the TCP/IP model is a lot more complex
problem. In a few words, the OSI model is protocol independent, while the TCP/IP model is
protocol dependent (Briscoe, 2000; Rose, 1990).
Independently of the opinions of one model over the other, the TCP/IP model is the current
standard for computer communications when different vendors and networks are involved.
Whoever wants to alter the transmission of the Internet packets in a particular geographic
location must control at least five elements of the TCP/IP protocol: ISPS, IXPs, fiber-optic cables,
all of them elements of the physical layer and, the DNS and the BGP that belong to the application
layer (Beijnum, 2011; A. Chang, 2013; Eagleman, 2012; Medows, 2012). In the next paragraphs
I will provide an explanation about each one of these components.

1.3.3.1. Elements of the TCP/IP Model to be Controlled to Achieve an Internet Kill
Switch

The first three elements to explain belong to the physical layer of the TCP/IP model: ISPs,
IXPs and Internet cables. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are companies that connect end users
and businesses to the public Internet. Therefore, they are the first thing users have in mind when
they think of the Internet service. Although ISPs compete among each other, they also must

14
cooperate with each other to provide global Internet connectivity (W B Norton, 2001). ISPs
connect to one another by creating backbones, an infrastructure known as “highway of
communications”. Backbones allude to large pipes that aggregate a lot of traffic (M. Mueller,
personal communication, April 13, 2018).
These highways could be assimilated to the arteries of the human body that push a lot of
blood (data) to our blood arteries (cities). Subsequently, those arteries feed into blood vessels
(neighborhoods) and finally into tiny capillaries (individual facilities). In this way, ISPs bridge
distant locations among cities, states, and nation-states (Blockmon, 2018).
By changing the configuration of the Internet and stopping the service provided by one or
more ISPs, the population served by that specific ISP, which previously had Internet access, would
not have it anymore. When governments try to control the Internet, they only can control national
ISPs, but if an Internet user has access to a foreign connection, the national government has no
control over that service provider since it is subject to a different jurisdiction (Beijnum, 2011;
Medows, 2012).
In contrast, nation-states with highly interconnected networks formed by many
independent ISPs are resistant to disconnection. A single cyberattack or act of disruption cannot
affect at the same time the diversity of network configurations, the number of ISPs, and the number
of routes out of the nation-state territory (Hewitt, 2016).
The second element to explain are the Internet exchange points (IXPs). The function of an
IXP is to allow Internet networks to interconnect directly or exchange traffic between their
networks (this activity is known as “peering process”3). In that regard, IXPs are infrastructures that

3

Peering is a process by which two or more Internet networks connect and exchange traffic. Peering allows them to hand
off traffic between each other’s customers, without having to pay a third party to carry that traffic across the Internet for them.
Peering is the more usual way of connecting to the Internet, in which an end user or network operator pays another network operator
to carry all their traffic for them (Netnod, 2014, 2018).
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facilitate the exchange of information packets among ISPs. In this context, IXPs main customers
are often content providers who peer with ISPs to get their content to the Internet users. It is
important to clarify that IXPs don’t handle the Internet connectivity process completely and they
don’t provide Internet service as ISPs do. IXPs are just one of the building blocks around which
the Internet is built (Netnod, 2014).
Interrupting the normal functioning of an IXP has a direct impact on the connection among
ISPs and, therefore, it may slow down the Internet speed and eventually stop the Internet service
(Beijnum, 2011; Medows, 2012).
Technically speaking, an IXP is an Ethernet switch, like the ones that connect computers
in an office network. Each network connecting to an IXP connects one or more of its routers to
that IXP’s Ethernet switch, and they send traffic across the Ethernet switch to routers belonging to
other networks (Netnod, 2014; Norton, 2014).
Finally, the last element of the physical layer to explain is the Internet cables. Internet
cables transfer the Internet packets in and out of the territory of a nation-state. Although satellites
facilitate some Internet traffic, 97 percent of global web traffic is dependent on deep-sea networks
of fiber-optic cables and only 3% through satellite. Submarines cables (alongside with the Internet
Exchange Points (IXPs) play a critical role interconnecting national and international networks.
Currently there are approximately 213 cables all over the world, and most of them are privately
owned. Lately, companies that get a profit out of Internet content (f/e Google and Facebook) are
also investing in cables. However, if these companies can transport the data they produced, this
activity will have an impact on the international Internet traffic. This situation would be a challenge
to current governance models (Poznanski, Internet Without Borders, Blanc, Valente, & Vicentin,
2017).
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Cables are not exempt from disruptions; average reports talk about 300 incidents per year.
Submarine cables get cut regularly, and the cable repair industry has considerable experience
dealing with these situations. Nevertheless, most of these failures are the result of accidents
occurring in shallow water, and not due to deliberate actions. There is enormous capacity and
resiliency among the cables crossing the ocean. Therefore, to do significant damage, a saboteur
would need to take out numerous cables in short order (Madori, 2015).
Nevertheless, saboteurs do exist. The importance of the Internet cables became evident in
2008 when an unknown individual or entity cut cables that carry three-fourths of the
communications between the Middle East and Europe. Accidents and similar episodes occurred in
2011 and 2013 (A. Chang, 2013; S.-I. Chang, Wu, & Cho, 2011; Eagleman, 2012). Satellites
cannot replace the capacity lost due to the sabotage of one or more major submarine cables. The
Internet may be able to route around breaks, but Internet routing cannot create additional capacity
where none exists (Madori, 2015).
The last two elements to explain belong to the application layer, the DNS and the BGP.
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical naming system that translates the host names
into Internet Protocol (IP) addresses4. In other words, the DNS translates human-readable domain
names like “something.com,” into an Internet Protocol (IP) address. The DNS exists because when
an Internet user wants to access a site, that person will remember “something.com,” instead of the
IP addresses 22.231.113.64 or 194.66.82.115. In this way, the Internet DNS is known as the “master
address list” of the Internet (Vaughan-Nichols, 2011; Wang, 2003).

4
An IP address is a number that indicates the location of a device on a network using the TCP/IP protocol. IP addresses
allow data to reach the intended destination on a network and the Internet (Postel, 1981).
5
These are examples of what is known as IPv4, IP addresses with four pairs of numbers separated by dots. Each pair is
a number that can have a value of 1 to 255. IPv4 supports a 32-bit address space (Postel, 1980). Facing the exhaustion of the IPv4
addresses, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) created the IPv6, which supports a 128-bit address space (Deering & Hinden,
1998).
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For the DNS to function correctly, so Internet users can connect to the site they wish, the
DNS must have the right address information. For this purpose, the configuration of the Internet
routers on the network must allow a DNS server to send and receive data from the high level “root
servers”6 coordinated by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and
the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). By removing access of a nation-state DNS to
the root servers, the DNS information will become outdated and gradually connectivity will erode
(M. Mueller, personal communication, April 13, 2018).
Finally, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the routing protocol that shares the master
routes of the Internet. In this way, the BGP makes it possible for ISPs to connect to each other and
for end-users to connect to more than one ISP. The BGP is the only protocol capable of connecting
multiple connections to unrelated routing domains. This is a critical operation for the Internet to
function (Dou, Li, Qin, Kim, & Zhong, 2007). The BGP is a potential target for a cyber-attack.
When the BGP does not provide routing information or does it incorrectly, the communication and
routing of packets among ISPs suffer. When this situation occurs, reports say that there is an
Internet shut down (Cowie, 2011a, 2011b).

6

The root zone is a network of hundreds of servers in many countries around the world. They are configured in the DNS
root zone as 13 named authorities (IANA, 2016):
a. Root-servers.net - 198.41.0.4, 2001:503:ba3e::2:30 - VeriSign, Inc.
b. Root-servers.net - 192.228.79.201, 2001:500:84::b - University of Southern California (ISI)
c. Root-servers.net - 192.33.4.12, 2001:500:2::c - Cogent Communications
d. Root-servers.net - 199.7.91.13, 2001:500:2d::d -University of Maryland
e. Root-servers.net - 192.203.230.10, 2001:500:a8::e - NASA (Ames Research Center)
f. Root-servers.net - 192.5.5.241, 2001:500:2f::f - Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.
g. Root-servers.net - 192.112.36.4 - US Department of Defense (NIC)
h. Root-servers.net - 198.97.190.53, 2001:500:1::53 - US Army (Research Lab)
i. Root-servers.net - 192.36.148.17, 2001:7fe::53 - Netnod
j. Root-servers.net - 192.58.128.30, 2001:503:c27::2:30 - VeriSign, Inc.
k. Root-servers.net - 193.0.14.129, 2001:7fd::1 - RIPE NCC
l. Root-servers.net - 199.7.83.42, 2001:500:9f::42 –ICANN
m. Root-servers.net - 202.12.27.33, 2001:dc3::35 - WIDE Project
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1.3.3.2. Feasibility

As demonstrated by the experiences in Egypt and Syria, when the governments of those
nation-states tried to shut down the Internet, the population found the way to regain access to the
international Internet again (Dunn, 2011). Therefore, a legitimate question to ask is whether it is
possible to shut down the Internet in a nation-state and thus to disconnect it from the global
Internet?
The answer remains as controversial as the question. We already mentioned that the
Internet is as a network of networks without a single point of control. This characteristic made the
Internet famous for being “resilient” and was supposed to survive the most extraordinary
circumstances (Dyn, 2014c, 2014b). Sir Tim Berners-Lee emphasized that there is not a switchoff-device for the Internet at a global level because the Internet is a decentralized system.
According to Sir Tim Berners-Lee, to create a “real kill-switch-off-device,” governments
should convert the Internet from a decentralized into a centralized system that they could control
at their discretion (Prigg, 2013). In similar terms, the technical and academic sector agree on the
fact that the key for the Internet to survive extreme situations is its decentralized system, which is
not uniform all over the world (Bowman & Camp, 2013).
“The internet by definition is a mesh of networks, so, like a leaky sieve, the bigger the
mesh the harder it is to isolate all the connections.” (Winder, para.4, 2011)

A decentralized system is not a characteristic for each nation-state; some nation-states have
their Internet service distributed among multiple private companies that sometimes even have
international partners (U.S., U.K., Germany f/e). Differently, in other nation-states, the service is
provided mostly by a government-owned-company (Cuba, Venezuela, f/e). For governments in
the second group (when a government-owned-company provides the Internet service), it is a lot
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easier to act over the Internet infrastructure and deprive of Internet access to their population (Dyn,
2012).
In any case, the Internet architecture was built to be as interchangeable and resilient as
possible. In consequence, Internet users can exchange information in different host nation-states
and circumvent an Internet shutdown. The quality of the Internet service may be affected but
getting Internet connection would be possible.
Here is where the answer to the question of feasibility faces a breaking point: although the
100% level of success shutting down the Internet may not be possible, depending on the
circumstances of the infrastructure in each nation-state, the level of success may be very close to
100%. It is not the same to attempt to shut down the Internet in Eritrea or Somalia, (where there is
a feeble, almost inexistent, Internet infrastructure) than to do it in a nation-state with a massive
communication infrastructure, such as the U.S. Therefore, the answer to the feasibility question
depends on the specific case.
While it may be easy to think that to shut down the Internet some governments would be
willing to shut off all the borders at the top level ISPs, they just won’t do that because they still
need to be connected to international financial systems and their armies need access to their
national systems (Subramanian, 2011).

1.3.4. Differences Between and ‘Internet Kill Switch’ and Censorship

An Internet shutdown, as described by this document and the academic literature is the
attempt to stop all Internet activity within the borders of the territory of a nation-state (Opderbeck,
2012, 2013). It is considered the most extreme form of control over the Internet infrastructure
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because government's’ actions purpose is to stop all Internet activity in a nation-state. However,
there are more usual and ordinary, less severe, forms of affecting the Internet, such as censorship.
The next paragraphs will include a short explanation of the differences between censorship and an
Internet shutdown. To explain these differences, I will define censorship and its types according
the OpenNet Initiative (ONI), a research project at the University of Toronto. This is one of the
most complex and reliable projects monitoring activities over the Internet infrastructure at a
worldwide level.
Censorship is one of the forms through which governments limit access to specific sources
of Internet content, rather than to stop all Internet activity and services that support Internet access.
The most common types of censorship are the following ones (ONI, 2014):
1. Technical Blocking: there are three commonly used techniques to block access to Internet
sites: Internet Protocol (IP) blocking, Domain Name Server (DNS) tampering, and URL
blocking. These techniques prevent access to specific web pages, domains, or IP addresses.
Authorities use these methods when they don’t have jurisdiction or control over the
websites they are interested in blocking. This scenario is the most common case of
censorship against social media (f/e Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, and YouTube).
2. Search Result Removals: this occurs when private companies that provide Internet search
services cooperate with governments to omit websites from search results upon the request
of those governments
3. Take Down: this situation occurs when regulators have legal jurisdiction over web content
hosts. The regulator only must demand the removal of the websites that according to its
criteria are inappropriate or illegal content.
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None of these censoring techniques is equivalent to what this dissertation defines as an
Internet shutdown. Targets of these types of technique are very specific, whether is a web page, an
IP address, a search result among others, but not the entire Internet. I will elaborate more on this
matter in the next paragraphs.
The Internet Society (ISOC) alongside with other actors of the civil society7 includes within
the term “Internet shutdown” episodes of censorship and attempts to stop all Internet activity.
ISOC defines Internet shutdowns from two perspectives:
1. “A total shutdown or blackout where all services on the Internet are blocked off,
targeting mobile Internet access and/or fixed lines, such that users in a country or region
are not able to access the Internet
2. A partial shutdown, where content blocking techniques are applied to restrict access to
websites or applications, very often to block people from communicating or sharing
information amongst them” (ISOC, 2017b, para.5)

In this regard, the definition of this dissertation, about what an Internet shutdown is, agrees
with the first approach of ISOC, named “a total shutdown,” but does not agree with the second
one named “a partial shutdown”. In my opinion, a partial shutdown that targets specific
websites or applications is a case of censorship and not an Internet shutdown. As I will explain
later in this document, most legal documents of the debate in the U.S. between 2009 and 2011,
the episodes in Nepal, Myanmar and during the Arab Spring, refer to the term “Internet
shutdown” as the government attempt to stop all Internet activity and not to target specific
applications.
In my opinion, the distinction between both terms is not only necessary for academic
purposes, when clear conceptual definitions are required. The distinction is also critical

7
The referred project is known as #KeepItOn and is run by accessnow, a civil society organization:
https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/

22
because when policy makers, academics and other stakeholder discuss these forms of control
over the Internet, their acceptance most likely will be different when facing an Internet
shutdown than when they face a censorship. It is also important to say that, just like in the
academic environment, clear definitions are required to create legislation and potential
exceptions included in the law.
I will explain later in this document how advocacy groups and non-governmental
organizations use all the terms previously described indistinctively or as synonyms of an
Internet shutdown (accessnow, 2017; West, 2016).

1.3.5. DNS Poisoning

Although the TCP/IP model has five layers, average Internet users constantly interact only
with the application layer, which allows writing postings in social networks, uploading pictures
and performing primary activities on the Internet. Nevertheless, the application layer is only one,
the highest one in the model8.
The remaining three layers go down to the wires and cables that allow the communication,
by addressing (identifying devices), routing (moving the information from one point to another)
and naming (giving human-readable names to the IP addresses, also known as DNS) (Dyn, 2014c,
2014b).
Governments assume that if they “remove” one layer, everything below falls apart.
Following this logic, governments believe that if they poison the DNS or remove it, the application
layer will fail, and in that way, the Internet will be shut down. In this regard, DNS cache poisoning,

8

This is the reason why some techniques call it the “penthouse suite” of the TCP/IP protocol.
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also known as DNS spoofing, is an attack that exploits vulnerabilities in the DNS to redirect the
Internet traffic away from legitimate servers towards fake ones. If an attacker gets control of a
DNS server and changes some of the information on it, that DNS server would tell its users to look
for something.com at the wrong address (Hoffman, 2016).
If various ISPs get their DNS information from the compromised server, the poisoned DNS
entry will spread to the ISPs and be cached there. Then, it will spread to home routers (Hoffman,
2016; Mitchell, 2017). In 2010, a DNS poisoning event resulted in the Great Firewall of China
temporarily going through China’s national borders. This event ended censoring the Internet in the
USA until the problem got fixed (Hoffman, 2016; Mitchell, 2017).
Poisoning the DNS slows down or prevents the access to web pages and services. Most
likely mail, remote file systems and network printing may be inaccessible; everything that implies
an external communication is at risk when the DNS does not work correctly (Lehtinen, Russell, &
Gangemi Sr., 2012).
Another example of DNS poisoning affecting DNS resolvers like those of Google occurred
during the anti-government protests from March 2014 in Turkey. Under normal circumstances,
such queries would go to servers out of Turkish territory, which is how Turkish Internet users
could circumvent the ban on YouTube imposed at the time. As a result of the DNS poisoning, local
users of these DNS services were redirected to alternate providers controlled by Turk Telekom,
the Turkish regulator (Zmijewski, 2014). In other words, Internet users believed that they were
accessing Google’s webpage for Turkey, but they were redirected to a space created by the Turkish
government. When Google realized this situation, they made available the company’s public
address, so that people would type the IP address number instead of the webpage name
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“google.com.tr”. In this way, Internet users would have access to the real Google’s webpage
(Carstensen, 2014; Zmijewski, 2014).
A more recent example of DNS poisoning occurred in Venezuela in January 2019. Mr.
Juan Guaido, President of the National Assembly, proclaimed himself as the interim President of
Venezuela. This crisis catapulted a wave of Internet censorship activities such as blocking and
filtering. While thousands of volunteers move to help with the distribution of humanitarian help
that other nation-states sent to Venezuela, the Venezuela government started a phishing campaign
driven by the major ISP owned by the government, CANTV. On February 12 all outgoing DNS
traffic in and out of the IP address associated with voluntariosxvenezuela.com was returned with
the IP address of a malicious site,159.65.65.194, which does not match the real site of the
organization. The IP address of the malicious site is also returned by the DNS servers of CANTV
(Azpura, Guerra, & Rivas, 2019)

1.3.6. The Internet: Decentralized System and Diversity in the ISPs

Because the decentralized Internet system is not uniform across the world, for some
governments making a phone call and turning off power in a few central facilities is enough to
disconnect the domestic Internet from the global Internet. This type of infrastructure also makes it
harder for the government to defend the nation state’s Internet infrastructure against an opponent
who knows that targeting a few strategic points is enough. Facing this context, during the last ten
years most nation-states have intended to achieve more diversity in their Internet infrastructure
(Dyn, 2012; Ward, 2014).
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In this regard, a study elaborated by Dyn (2012) explained the feasibility of shutting down
the Internet according to the number of ISPs with international connections. ISPs with multiple
international connections are the ones that purchased connectivity from another ISP outside of the
nation-state territory where those ISPs are located. When more ISPs have access to global
connectivity it is more difficult for a government to shut down the Internet (see table 01).

Table 01.- International Connectivity and Risk of Internet Disconnection

Nation-States with
ISPs with one or two International
Connections
ISPs with fewer than ten International
Connections
ISPs with at least ten internationallyconnected service providers, but no more
than 40
ISPs with over 40 internationallyconnected service providers

Level of Potential Disconnection
Severe risk of Internet disconnection
Significant risk of Internet disconnection
Risk of disconnection fairly low

Extremely resistant to Internet
disconnection

1.3.7. Rigorous Control

The more control a government exercises over the Internet infrastructure, the more difficult
it is to circumvent the restrictions over the layers of the TCP/IP protocol. The level of success
controlling the Internet infrastructure is the reason why some governments may be closer to
achieve a full Internet shut down than other ones. A centralized system is the most convenient for
regimes that wish to keep an active control over the Internet infrastructure, but many governments
moved towards a decentralized system to protect their economic growth and market forces.
In successful decentralization cases, the government regulator facilitates the formation of
several direct connections to international providers. If the regulator does not provide adequate
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legal guidance, the diversification process will be slow in small markets, and the national
incumbent provider (usually the traditional government telephone company) remains strong (Dyn,
2012; Ward, 2014).

1.3.8. Actors Involved: Some Facts

When in January 2011 Egypt digitally vanished from the international Internet traffic, this
was the first time the entire world became aware of an Internet shutdown. However, shutting down
the Internet is a practice dated back to 2005 and 2007, when the first episodes occurred in Nepal
and Myanmar (former Burma) (K. Jones, 2005; OpenNet, 2006; Thompson, 2012).
Since then, different dictatorial and non-dictatorial regimes have tried to shut down the
Internet. The empirical evidence suggests there are four different potential scenarios for Internet
shutdowns:
1. Governments shut down the Internet within their territory.
The first examples of this situation occurred, as mentioned previously, in Nepal and
Myanmar in 2005 and 2007 respectively, and during the Arab Spring between 2010 and
2011 (in Egypt, Libya, and Syria) (Dunn, 2011; Streitfeld, 2013; Thompson, 2012). Similar
cases occurred more recently in 2016 in Iraq, Bahrain, Ethiopia, Gabon and Cameroon
(Billington, 2016; Karanja, Xynou, & Filasto, 2016; Ogundeji, 2017; Toor, 2016; Waddell,
2016a). This practice continues until 2018.
2. Governments shut down the Internet in other territories, as a cyberwarfare weapon.
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The concept of cyberwarfare has been defined as the group of actions taken by a nationstate or international organization to attack and attempt to damage another nation-state's
computers or information networks (RAND, 2017).
One alleged case of an Internet shutdown as a cyberwarfare weapon involved North Korea
in 2014. On November 24, 2014, a hacker group "Guardians of Peace" (GOP) leaked
confidential data from the Sony Pictures. The GOP used a variant of the Shamoon wiper
malware to erase Sony's computer infrastructure and demanded that Sony withdraw its film
“The Interview,” a comedy about a plot to assassinate North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
Sony canceled the film's formal premiere and the U.S. government and intelligence
officials claimed that the attack was sponsored by North Korea. However, North Korea
denied any responsibility (Peterson, 2014).
On December 22, 2014, the Internet in North Korea went down after being unstable for
two days. At the time, North Korea had 1,024 official Internet protocol addresses
approximately and had only one government owned ISP, Star Joint Ventures. This ISP
depends on China Unicom, China’s government‑owned telecommunications company.
The North Korean Internet shutdown occurred just after President Obama claimed the U.S.
would send a “proportional response” to what he called an act of “cybervandalism” against
Sony Pictures. President Obama also blamed the North Korean government for the
cyberattack Sony suffered. At the same time, the North Korean government blamed the
U.S. for the Internet shutdown (Cheng & Nam, 2014).
U.S. officials described they were focused on the North Korea’s telecommunications
connections through China. They also claimed that they asked the Chinese government for
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help in cutting off the North’s ability to execute cyberattacks, but also denied to explain
any further involvement (Cheng & Nam, 2014; Perlroth & Sanger, 2014).
3. Actors cut Internet fiber optic cables. There are at least two alleged cases of a ship cutting
the Internet fiber optic cables. None of these cases offered evidence that cables were
affected. However, it is important to mention that both episodes refer to the same ship: the
Russian vessel Yantar (AIS Marine Traffic, 2017). Yantar was spotted in front of U.S.
coasts in October 2015, and national security agencies manifested their concern of possible
activities of this ship over the U.S. cables. The same ship was spotted in front of Syrian
coasts in October 2016 and its presence occurred at the same time that an Internet shutdown
occurred in that nation-state (Belson, 2016; CircleID, 2016; Sanger & Schmitt, 2015;
Sullivan, 2016).
4. Actors considered “anonymous organizations,” may have tried to shut down the Internet in
the territory of a nation-state. A situation of this kind occurred in 2013 when the hackers
group Anonymous threatened Israel that they would shut down the Internet in that nationstate if the government shuts down the Internet in Gaza (Moore, 2015; RT, 2013a). Had
Anonymous being successful, this would be a concrete possibility of a non-governmental
actor shutting down the Internet.
The empirical evidence also suggests that governments’ attempts to shut down the Internet
may be restricted only to a city, region or facility, instead of the entire territory of a nation-state.
Examples of this capability occurred in: (1) the province of Xinjiang, China in 2009 (Economist,
2013; MacKinnon, 2012), (2) the city of San Cristobal in Venezuela in 2014 (Obrien, 2014), (3)
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eleven states in India between 2015 and 2016 (CCG-NLU, 2016; Pahwa, 2015, 2016) and, (4) at
to some extent the BART9 San Francisco episode within U.S. territory. (BART, 2011; Bell, 2011).

1.3.9.

National

Security:

The Arrangements

between

Governments

and

Geopolitics

As I previously mentioned, the main reason why governments interfere with Internet
service is the existence of what they declare is a national security situation. This section will try to
explain what national security means from a conceptual point of view to the life and survival of
nation-states.
Nation-states, as entities, create a state with the purpose of providing benefit to the nation
it governs; however, the goal of the state is also to guarantee the survival of the nation-state itself
as the central entity of international law. Within this context, nation-states also created the concept
of national security (Bobbitt, 2002). In this line, and following the tradition in political science
research, national security refers to the safety of the territory and population of a nation-state and
by extension to the policies adopted by its preservation (Paleri, 2008).
For some academics, national security is a “constructed concept” for any nation-state at
any given time. Multiple factors, like political priorities and the media, will play a role securitizing
specific issues known as “security priorities” (Richards, 2012). Security priorities, thinking in

9
Bay Area Rapid Transit -BART- is rapid transit system serving San Francisco Bay Area. A government company, the
San Francisco Bay Area Transit District is BART’s operator. In August 2011, BART interrupted cell phone service on its platforms;
according the company, they did this to prevent a possible protest. A month before, on July 3, 2011, a man was killed during a
confrontation with transit police. The company interrupted the service in specific BART stations. Activists criticized BART’s
actions because they consider them as a violation of the First Amendment. During the BART episode, the DHS took responsibility
for shutting down the mobile service during a protest in the transit system serving San Francisco Bay Area (BART, 2011; Bell,
2011).
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global terms, change over time. Examples to be cited are periods like World War I, World War II,
the interwar, the cold war and the period after. Securitized issues and the actors involved changed;
new security actors and dimensions that moved beyond the traditional military sphere into civil,
commercial and private aspects replaced them. To be more specific, it is important to mention that
the concept of national security (in contraposition of the general concept of security) depends
explicitly upon the priorities of each nation-state (Richards, 2012).
Because of such a broad definition and different priorities all over the world, many
governments have justified their actions on the grounds of national security. This point is important
because national security defines a particular concept, a specific set of security priorities and
concerns determined by political leaders of a nation-state (Paleri, 2008). That set of priorities and
concerns is known as the “national interest”. The national interest will define the way nation-states
act in particular circumstances (Richards, 2012).
Generally, in democracies, the definition of national interest and national priorities is
subject to debate. Depending upon the specific circumstances, the definition of national security
shall be the result of “permanent necessities of geopolitical position” or the requirements of
external conflicts when the nation-state faces a war in the classical sense. In non-democratic
regimes, the national interest is subject to the elite and the political leader of the government
(Bobbitt, 2002; Richards, 2012).

1.4.

Governments’ Regimes Classification

One of the core elements of this project is the idea that shutting down the Internet is a
governmental action (or at least there is some level of government involvement) that involves not
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only authoritarian but also democratic and hybrid regimes. This section clarifies the differences
between these concepts.
Traditional classifications established a dichotomy between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian regimes, and the fundamental distinction has been the way how their rulers achieve
power (Morlino, 2008, 2009). Democratic governments are supposed to gain power through
national elections, and authoritarian regimes usually get to power through a coup d’état or another
illegitimate mechanism. However, the traditional dichotomy has been replaced by new and
different categories.
Government regimes are the conjunction of government institutions and rules that are
“either formalized or are informally recognized as existing in a given territory and with respect to
a given population” (Morlino, p.3, 2008). For this research, I will use the government regimes
classification of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) measure of democracy from the Economist
group.
I chose this classification for two reasons:
1. It includes different variables to evaluate a regime, other than the traditional division based
on the electoral vote.
2. The traditional dichotomy of considering only democratic and non-democratic regimes has
been replaced by a classification that includes the possibility of varying degrees of
democracy. This classification provides a wide range of scores, including developed and
developing nation-states.
The EIU index of democracy is the result of the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in five
categories: (1) electoral process and pluralism, (2) civil liberties, (3) the functioning of
government, (4) political participation and (5) political culture. The result is built according to the
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average of these categories (EIU, 2008). From the EIU perspective, nation-states belong to one out
of four types of regime, such as “full democracies,” “flawed democracies,” “hybrid regimes” and
“authoritarian regimes” (EIU, 2008). This research will use the same parameters as the EIU
classification, but will use the terms “consolidated democracies,” (instead of full democracies)
“young democracies” (instead of flawed democracies) and “hybrid regimes” (Please see figure
04).

Figure 04.- Types of Government Regimes

This dissertation will focus in two types of non-authoritarian regimes, consolidated
democracies and hybrid regimes. This classification follows specific factors related to the political
context of the cases under study; therefore, this is a political classification. I preferred this
classification over economic, geographical, technical or economic for the following reasons:
1. This dissertation starts from a presumption that I intent to challenge: that well
consolidated democracies don’t shut down the Internet and never consider doing so.
This challenge started as a motivation after reviewing that most of the academic
literature studied Internet shutdowns as an effective way to control the flow of
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information in authoritarian regimes. This is the reason why I selected consolidated
democracies as case studies. Hybrid regimes were the next complementary group, as
these are not considered authoritarian regimes either.
2. The political assumption that shutting down the Internet was an extreme policy
executed only for authoritarian regimes has no parallel in economic or technical terms.
This means that there are no studies or assumptions that conclude that developing
nation-states have tendency to shut down the Internet and that developed nation-states
do not. Same reasoning applies to nation-states with a least developed Internet
infrastructure.
3. In geographical terms, Internet shutdowns are worldwide spread. Whether they
effectively occurred or political administrations conducted a debate on the subject, I
found them all over the world. It is important to clarify that the American continent
remains as the one with the least number of debates on the subject and with only one
episode on the subject. This is the reason why at least two of the cases I selected belong
to the Americas.

1.4.1. Consolidated Democracies

The definition of what a democracy is and how to measure is an ongoing debate. The
concept itself has a long history; something similar to what today is known as democracy, existed
in classical Greece, but the concept is not the same (Carpizo, 2007).
According to some academics, a consolidated democratic regime shall be characterized by:
(1) a government based on majority rule, (2) the consent of the governed, (3) the existence of free
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and fair elections, (4) the protection of minorities, (5) respect for basic human rights, (6) equality
before the law, (7) due process of law and (8) political pluralism (Morlino, 2008).
Therefore, a definition of democracy should at least include the following characteristics:
(1) universal suffrage independently of gender, (2) free, competitive, recurrent and fair elections,
(3) more than one party, as an expression of political pluralism and (4) different and alternative
media sources (Dahl, 2005; Morlino, 2008).
Free elections and clean electoral processes, alongside with respect to civil liberties or
constitutional rights, are required and basic conditions to achieve democratic regimes. However,
they are not enough to have a consolidated democracy (EIU, 2007). “Alternation” in power is also
necessary because it creates a presumption about democracy, although, that is not a necessary precondition (Sartori, p.p.199-200, 1974, as cited by Linz, 2000).
According to the EIU criteria, the first steps to identify a regime as democratic or not are
the following critical areas: (1) whether national elections are free and fair, (2) the security of
voters, (3) the influence of foreign powers on government, (4) the capability of the civil service to
implement policies and, (5) the presence of different media sources belonging to different
proprietors. Although a perfect democracy is unlikely to exist, any regime that fulfills the previous
critical areas may be considered a consolidated democracy. If one of these requirements is not met,
or at some point ceases to be so, the regime in question is no longer a consolidated democracy
(EIU, 2007).
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1.4.2. Young Democracies

Young democracies do not fulfill one or more of the requirements to be a consolidated one.
Their main characteristics are (EIU, 2008): (1) deficient levels of political participation, (2) weak
democratic cultures and (3) backsliding in media freedoms.
Young democracies have free and fair elections, but empirical evidence shows that even
though these regimes face political problems, like infringements on media freedom, fundamental
civil liberties or constitutional rights are usually respected. At the same time, these regimes face
significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, mainly governance problems (most likely
week institutions), underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation (EIU,
2011).

1.4.3. Hybrid Regimes
Hybrid regimes are also known as “transitional regimes” or “trapped regimes” because
they are between a non-democratic set of practices (like traditional, authoritarian and posttotalitarian regimes) and a democratic one (mainly a young democracy). Therefore, hybrid regimes
are those that have in parallel some of the representative institutions and procedures of democratic
systems and some authoritarian or traditional features (Morlino, 2008). Hybrid regimes resemble
democratic ones, mainly because they celebrate multi-party elections, but lack other characteristics
of democracy. Hybrid regimes don’t oversee a peaceful transition of power between parties
through the electoral defeat of the incumbent, and lack of free press and insurance for political and
civil rights (Alexander, 2008).
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In the specific case of hybrid regimes, there are three possible hypotheses for their
existence (Morlino, 2008): (1) the regime is borne out of an authoritarian regime, (2) the regime
is borne out of a decolonization process from a traditional regime, such as a monarchy and (3) the
regime is borne from the crisis of a previous democracy (usually a young one). Most cases in the
last decades belong to the first category, nation-states in transit from an authoritarian regime. The
main characteristics of hybrid regimes are (EIU, 2007; Morlino, 2008):
1. Groups of the opposition are formally allowed to participate in the political process, but
have little possibility of governing,
2. There is one hegemonic and dominant party, inside of which there may be competition
among the leading candidates,
3. Although there is some degree of real participation, it is usually minimal and limited to the
election period, with the possibility of having contested elections and fraud allegations
4. There is little institutionalization in the army forces, and they maintain an evident political
role, although it is not explicit and direct.

1.4.4. Authoritarian Regimes

Authoritarian regimes are those in which the ruling authority keeps itself in the highest
political position, mainly because of “a combination of appeals to traditional legitimacy, patronclient ties, and repression” (Linz, 1975, p.252 as cited by Inkeles, 1991). An apparatus of personal
loyalties close to the ruling authority carries all of it. Authoritarian regimes have been the norm
for much of the human history at least until the 1970s. Until 2010, about one-third of the world’s
nation-states were considered authoritarian regimes (Frantz, 2011; Inkeles, 1991).
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In the beginning, during the “foundational moments” of the authoritarian regime, the way
decisions shall be made remains as an uncertain and unclear process, even for direct participants.
Although there is usually a citizen coalition supporting the seizure of power, only a few of those
citizens will be able to influence government decisions (Geddes, 2004).
Another characteristic of authoritarian regimes is that they impose de-facto-limits on
minorities’ freedoms and also establish a legal framework for those limits, assigning the
interpretation of that legal framework to the rulers themselves, instead of to independent and
objective legal bodies (Linz, 2000). In the political realm, politics is in a constant interplay between
two actors: elite and political leader(s). These actors are in continuous conflict, elites compete
against a dictator and also against each other; while the antagonism prevails, authoritarian
institutions frame the rules or dynamics of this struggle (Frantz, 2011).
Professionalized military or a political party are usually the ones that govern an
authoritarian regime (Linz, 2000). When the regime becomes stronger and more confident, there
is an increase in government control and repression of any independent media and increasing
attacks on independent journalists (EIU, 2007). Government control and repression of any
independent press is a characteristic of an authoritarian regime, and it tends to become worse,
mostly attacking independent journalists (EIU, 2008).
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2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

This chapter provides a review of relevant legal analysis and social science literature
related to government control over telecommunications, such as the Internet, and it is composed
of four parts. First, it examines the conflict between nation states’ traditional jurisdiction concept
and the Internet open architecture design. Second, this chapter addresses the complicated situation
of the governmental control over the Internet infrastructure in authoritarian and democratic
regimes. I will take as examples the Arab spring and administrative control over the
telecommunications in the U.S. When providing a technical overview, I will mention some of the
concepts introduced in the first chapter. The third part of this chapter presents an overview of the
gaps in the current literature, which offered opportunities for an exploratory study about the
process of shutting down of the Internet, as a form of government control. Finally, the last part of
this chapter presents an overview of President's power to execute the laws, known as the unitary
executive theory, and the chosen theoretical framework for the proposed study, the securitization
theory of the Copenhagen school.

2.1.

The Internet and the Nation-States’ Traditional Boundaries

This chapter will address the conflict between the classic nation-states’ sovereignty model,
territorially based, and the Internet, a technology that does not recognize traditional territorial
borders or any governmental authority (Mueller, 2010; Rosenne & Hague Academy of
International Law, 2004).
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For most part of the twentieth century, nation-states have been the primary source of (1)
law, (2) policies and regulations and (3) constructions of national security (Bobbitt, 2002; Slapper
& Kelly, 2008). In such condition, and because their governments can execute their laws within
their territorial boundaries, nation-states have created different regulations over the Internet
infrastructure located within their sovereignty. This characteristic makes nation-states powerful
actors when talking about Internet regulation. This chapter will define why nation-states are
considered the primary entities in the international realm and why the Internet challenges one of
their more essential elements, their sovereignty.
Legally speaking, and in according to the classic legal literature, nation-states are
considered the main subjects of international law. They are entities that possess international rights
and obligations, a condition known as “international personality.” Nation-states, in particular, have
the following capacities (Brownlie, 2003):
1. Maintain its powers by making international claims
2. Negotiate and sign treaties and agreements valid at an international level
3. Enjoy privileges and immunities from national jurisdiction
The last capacity of nation-states, the enjoyment of national jurisdiction, is subordinated to
the existence of territorial borders, as nation-states only can exercise jurisdiction within the
boundaries of their territory (Kulesza, 2012).
Additionally, according to the declarative theory of statehood, every nation-state must have
the following qualifications, also known as “statehood elements” (J. Crawford, 2013):
1. Population: a stable community of people;
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2. Territory: physical basis for the existence of a state; a reasonably stable political
community must be in control of a certain physical area (a strictly defined frontier is not
required). A state’s territory also includes its appurtenances, airspaces and territorial sea;
3. A Government: a legal order for a political community established in a certain area; and
4. Independence: capacity to establish relations with other nation-states
The legal competence of nation-states depends on the existence of a stable delimited
homeland (Benadava, 1982). The main elements of legal competence are sovereignty and
jurisdiction (Brownlie, 2003). In this way, the general principle of the international law reads that
nation-states are entities with the capacity to exercise jurisdiction through the actions of their
governments over the population within the borders of their territory (Brownlie, 2003; J. Crawford,
2013). In this way, jurisdiction is the capacity to apply the national legislation within nation-states’
boundaries without the interference of foreign power (Benadava, 1982).
The Internet is a challenge to the traditional concept of one nation-state jurisdiction because
it may present a criminal case with multiple domains involved: a victim, a criminal and the material
qualified as “corpus delicti,” all of them could be in different territories. In this example, there is
a problem with a “triple” jurisdiction, which is the rule (and not the exception) when criminal
activity on the Internet is involved (Rosenne & Hague Academy of International Law, 2004).
Attached to the concept of jurisdiction is the idea of government control within some
specific territorial borders. Therefore, the Internet challenges both, the conventional concept of the
nation-state and the Westphalian model of sovereignty. This controversial characteristic of the
Internet is the reason why many legal scholars consider the Internet a “perplexity” of the modern
international law (Kulesza, 2012; Rosenne & Hague Academy of International Law, 2004).
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From a social sciences perspective, nation-states are defined as strong institutions and the
leading suppliers of public governance (Mueller, 2010). Nation-states’ main strength is the
exercise of their control (their coercive capacity) by creating institutions, rules, and regulations
based on the traditional claim of guaranteeing their survival. As it was in past centuries, nationstates still make decisions according to their interests and the position of power they have in the
international community (Bobbitt, 2002; Khan, 2007). Their way to act in the international realm
reflects a strategic approach usually based on the use of force as the chief arbiter of foreign affairs
(Bobbitt, 2002).
This realist approach from international relations established after World War II enabled
transnational corporations to increase their activities beyond the borders of nation-states’
territories. However, nation-states did not disappear, and they changed to survive and reasserted
their strength following three steps (Braman, 2006):
1. Nation-states learned to use the same type of “informational power” that private
corporations and other non-state actors used to challenge the strengths of different
geopolitical entities.
2. Nation-states developed techniques to extend the participation of private sector entities as
regulatory agents, “turning private centers of power to state purposes” (Braman, 2006,
p.34). A widespread example is the involvement of Internet service providers (ISPs) in
helping governments to monitor the Internet for security purposes and intellectual property
rights abuses.
3. Nation-states main characteristic is that they are “networked” because of the way they
relate to other nation-states and non-state actors. By changing according to the demands of
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the new century, nation-states remain as the primary dominant political actors in the
international community (Bobbitt, 2002; Braman, 2006).
It is important to point out that, despite the nation-state’s predominant role, they must share
the international realm with non-state entities. In 1949, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)10,
the international court that solves issues when multiple jurisdictions are involved, opened the door
for new interpretations about what international legal personality means.
After the assassination of a Swedish diplomat, the Count Folke Bernadotte, the ICJ
established in an advisory opinion that the United Nations (UN) had “international personality” as
a nation-state would have. Therefore, the ICJ then acknowledged the existence of other actors with
the capacity to act in the international realm, besides the classic nation-states.
The central question the ICJ analyzed was whether the “capacity to bring an international
claim” is an attribute only from nation-states, or also an attribute of international organizations.
The court stressed that although the UN international legal personality is not identical to that of a
nation-state, the organization was “capable of possessing international rights and duties” and had
“capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims” (ICJ, 1949, p.1).
Today, besides nation-states, the ICJ recognizes as subjects of international law non-state
actors such as individuals, international organizations, multinational companies, international nongovernmental organizations, cover states, entities legally proximate to states, entities recognized
as belligerents and international administration of territories before independence (Brownlie,
2012).

10

The International Court of Justice is the main judicial organ of the UN. It was created in 1945 by the UN Charter and
began working in April 1946 (ICJ, 2017). It is also known as the World Court and is based in the Peace Palace in The Hague,
Netherlands. The main function of the Court is to solve disputes among nation-states, and to provide authoritative and influential
advisory opinions on issues referred by international organizations, agencies and the General Assembly (Kolb, 2013).
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Forty years later, since the early 1990s, the dominant view in the international realm was
the transformation of the world through non-state actors, a process known as “globalization.” New
technologies, in particular, a non-territorial new medium, like the Internet, were supposed to
supersede nation-states’ old institutions and create new and more efficient ones. However, these
hopes may have underestimated the nation-states’ role and its institutions, and the difficulty of
replacing them. The current world financial and migratory crisis discredited the position of the
market and called again for the restoration of the nation-state power (Grygiel, 2016; Mazower,
2014).

2.1.1.

The Internet: A Challenge to the Nation-States’ Sovereignty

Jurisdiction is the exercise of sovereignty, and government control exists because
governments are sovereign within their territorial borders. As established previously,
governments, as administrative entities of nation-states, enforce laws and regulations within the
limits of their territory (Braman, 2010; Kulesza, 2012). Therefore, to be a nation-state,
independence is required from any external authority or force to administer the law; this is the
most basic definition of the classic sovereignty (Kulesza, 2012).
The Internet represents a problem for government sovereignty and jurisdiction because the
Internet is global and activities within the Internet domain involve multiple jurisdictions, and
therefore many sovereignties and many nation-states. In this sense, the Internet challenges
governments’ traditional authority to regulate social and international relations based on territory
and the conventional concept of sovereignty (Braman, 2010; Kulesza, 2012; Rosenne & Hague
Academy of International Law, 2004).
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This conflict between Internet and nation-states is based on the fact that nation-states’
sovereignty is “territorially bounded” and the space created between networked computers is a
non-territorial space (Mueller, 2010). Facing this situation, the idea of controlling the Internet
represents a new challenge for governments all over the world, whether they are democratic or
non-democratic regimes.
We can find an example of this jurisdictional and sovereignty problem when the Internet
is involved in the “Ligue contre le racisme et l'antisémitisme et Union des étudiants juifs de France
c. Yahoo! Inc. et Société Yahoo! France (LICRA c. Yahoo!),” known as the Yahoo case. The
Yahoo case is initiated by a French citizen, Marc Knobel, fighting against neo-Nazi propaganda
he discovered on a Yahoo!’s auction website. The propaganda violated French law which banned
the trafficking of Nazi goods in France. Mr. Knobel argued that that France had the right to defend
itself from any illegal sale from the U.S. and, his lawyers demanded Yahoo about why that
company should be exempt from French law (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).
Yahoo’s defense was that the French website, www.yahoo.fr could complied with French
law, but the U.S. website, which did not have to complied with French law and could still be visited
by French citizens. Since Yahoo could not identify the location of the users accessing the Nazi
propaganda, compliance with French law would require removal of all Nazi items from the U.S.
website. Yahoo refused to accept French law as “the effective rule for the world” (Goldsmith &
Wu, 2006, p.5).
The French court ruled against Yahoo and ordered the company to take all provisions to
make impossible visits by French web surfers to the illegal Yahoo sites. Yahoo contested the
jurisdiction of the French court, but the court rejected this petition claiming jurisdiction on the
theory that Yahoo's conduct caused harm in France (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).
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On the other hand, Yahoo started proceedings in a U.S. court and the outcome was a ruling
in favor of the company. The ruling of the U.S. court adopted the position of the company that the
French law was not applicable to a company with headquarters in the U.S. and that imposing
geolocation components to identify the whereabouts of those who want to access the Yahoo
website was a first amendment violation. From the U.S. perspective, the First Amendment protects
a broad spectrum of hate speech, while there is a different set of limits applies to the speech in
other nation-states, including France. This difference was what created the dispute in the LICRA
v. Yahoo! case (Greenber, 2003).
Then the contentious issues here are: “(1) whether Yahoo may be prosecuted in France
under French law for maintaining both auction sites that sell Nazi-related items and information
sites promoting Nazi doctrine and (2) whether U.S. courts should enforce the resulting judgment”
(Greenber, 2003, p.1191).
Although at the beginning Yahoo didn’t comply with the French ruling, after warnings
from the French court that it would issue fines up to $13,000 a day, Yahoo agreed to take down all
Nazi memorabilia from its various auction sites (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).
As mentioned before, the Internet is not supposed to recognize territorial borders because
of its open design. One of the challenges of the Internet is how to solve a problem by applying
existing legal principals to the digital world or if new legal doctrine is required. Nevertheless,
governments (on behalf of their nation-states) defined as very important sources of public
governance keep imposing (or at least trying to) their jurisdiction and therefore they try to extend
their sovereignty (Mueller, 2010).
Although the builders of the Internet tried to create a “root system” that would allow them
to create a sort of “independent territory” of the governments by using “domain names” and
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“Internet Address), this tactic has not been clearly successful as governments interfere and try to
take control over the root zone (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).
The Yahoo case was a success from the point of view of the nation-states where they use
their coercive capacity to execute its local legislation. This matter was one of the earliest cases that
put on the table the issue of why the Internet is called a “perplexity” for the international law where
traditional mechanisms to solve a controversy are not applicable.
Up to today the question of whether litigation in multiple courts all over the world is the
best way to resolve the Internet international disputes remains a controversy. In any case national
governments try to take control of the Internet by using any coercion capacity within the borders
of their territory, before trying to take any measure in the outside borders.

2.1.2. The Complexity of the Internet

The Internet has been considered one of the new communication media that governments
cannot control. Facing this circumstance, the concept of the Internet has evolved to be more than
just a communication technology tool. The term to explain this condition is “complexity”
(Giacomello, 2005) and in the next paragraphs, I will describe what it means.
Complexity is one of the essential characteristics of the Internet. The Internet’s
architectural design, implemented by packet switching, is well known for its efficiency, flexibility,
resilience, and lack of a single node or centralized control (Horvitz, 2013). The complexity lays in
the fact that the Internet is formed by networks that decide when and how to interconnect with
each other without any additional control (Faratin et al., 2007). According to the academic
literature, the complexity of the Internet is the result of three factors:
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1. The Internet is an “infrastructure” (an actual computer network) that allows the functioning
of other distribution networks, like water, gas, energy, and economics. (Clavio, 2008;
Giacomello, 2005).
2. The “multiple jurisdictions” of the Internet. There are national and international authorities,
but there is no entitled or competent authority to regulate, monitor and maintain the Internet
(Braman, 2006).
3. The multiplicity of stakeholders involved, such as national governments, the private sector,
and non-governmental organizations. All individual actors from the three groups at some
point may form an alliance to increase or to resist control over the Internet (Nye &
Donahue, 2000).
From a technical point of view, the complexity of the Internet implies that there is no
central node (as a connection point) and therefore, its management structure is limited to a few
internal functions. The lack of a centralized structure allowed the Internet “to be responsive to a
very large unregulated constituency and allowing explosive growth and with increasing usefulness
to its users” (Horvitz, p.6, 2013).
Facing the possibility of losing control over the telecommunications within their territories,
governments provide different reasons about why they are (or would be) compelled to act on the
Internet information flow. According to the academic literature and political news, this study has
identified the following reasons as the most common:
1. To protect the critical infrastructure, a vital element for the survival of nation-states, and
therefore, an integral part of the national security policy (Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs Committee, 2010; Radvanovsky & McDougall, 2009),
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2. To keep social control, which is vital for all types of regimes, because of the potential
impact over civil liberties (Arnaudo, Alva, Wood, & Whittington, 2013; Bowman & Camp,
2013; Dunn, 2011; Giacomello, 2005),
3. To perform an “upgrade” over the Internet infrastructure. In Algeria in 2015, the new
Minister of Information and Communication technology pointed out that the main ISP had
to implement a better infrastructure to conduct a “digital transition” (Farid, 2015),
4. To avoid school students cheating on their examinations. Although this explanation may
seem absurd, this is what happened in Iraq in May in 2015 and 2016. May is the time of
placement exams for sixth-year-school-kids and, as human rights groups were informed,
the government ordered Iraqi telecom companies to slow down the Internet service and
later on, to shut down it down to prevent cheating (Waddell, 2016a, 2016b). Syria and
Ethiopia used a similar justification between May and June 2017. Syria even schedules
more than one shutdown for this purpose (Dyn, 2017; Ismail, 2017; IT News Africa, 2017;
Latif Dahir, 2017).
Different regimes, democratic or non-democratic, address the problem of the complexity
of the Internet and the government control over the Internet infrastructure differently (BarnardWills & Ashenden, 2012). However, in general, national security is the most symbolic act of
governments’ authority, because each government decides what national security is for its own
nation-state (Paleri, 2008; Richards, 2012). Two perspectives of this problem, for non-democratic
and democratic regimes, alongside with the international standards established by CCPR will be
explained next.
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2.1.3. International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

ICCPR is a multilateral agreement that represents a worldwide effort to achieve consensus
in the treatment of civil and political rights. This international agreement was adopted by the UN
in 1966 and opened for signature the same year. ICCPR got in force on March 23, 1976, and
currently, 168 nation-states have ratified the treaty (UNTC, 2016). The primary purpose of ICCPR
is the protection of fundamental rights like political participation, due process, non-discrimination,
freedom of expression, assembly and religious freedom in particular (Cole, 2011). To achieve this
goal, ICCPR requires nation-state members to make reports of their progress in working towards
the achievement of the rights contained in the treaty (Keith, 1999).
Like other human rights agreements, ICCPR regulates how governments behave towards
their citizens, instead of regulating the behavior among nation-states, which is a constant
characteristic from other international treaties. ICCPR represents a final negotiation among almost
all nation-states of the world, and it covers, to the extent possible, all views about civil and political
rights of the nation-states that subscribed and ratified the treaty (Cole, 2011; Keith, 1999).
As any other treaty, ICCPR cannot be imposed to a nation-state; as sovereign entities of
international law, nation-states decide if they will submit their local jurisdiction or not to the
international order. The execution of ICCPR is subordinated to the government behavior within
the borders of its nation-state territory (Forrest Martin, Schnably, Wilson, Simon, & Tushnet,
2006; Mathiason, 2009). Nation-states that ratified ICCPR assume the obligation of ensuring the
right of freedom of expression (Mathiason, 2009). Nevertheless, ICCPR also allows for situations
when the power can be restricted, as stated in section 19 (3.2) of the treaty:
“International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).-”
“Article 19.”
“1.Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.”
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“2.Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression [bold added]; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art,
or through any other media [bold added] of his choice.”
“3.The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions [bold added], but these shall only be such as are provided by law
and are necessary:”
“(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;”
“(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public),
or of public health or morals.”
Regarding the pertaining to a “state of emergency” or a “national security threat,” the ICJ
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) define a “state of emergency” as the
consequence of a threat of war or a public emergency threatening the life of a nation-state (Andrew
Murray, 2003; D. Murray, 2009). ICCPR does not include a definition of “national security,” and
there is not yet a definition for this concept in any other international agreement (Mathiason, 2009).
To explain the limitations to the right of freedom of expression, ECHR established that
such restrictions must be subject to very particular and rigorous requirements. Those requirements
include a test of necessity and proportionality to be “constructed strictly” and “established
convincingly” (European Court of Human Rights, Surek and Ozdemir v. Thrkey, 23927/94 and
24277/94, para 46(i), as cited by D. Murray, 2009).

2.1.4. Non-Democratic Regimes

Authoritarian regimes claim that they must control the Internet to fight against cyberattacks and terrorism, but also to protect their critical infrastructure. Nevertheless, for these
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regimes controlling the Internet content is more important than managing the critical infrastructure
(Gibbs, 2004).
Another characteristic of authoritarian regimes is that they coerce the private sector to
participate according to their needs in their national security policies; they do not see the private
sector as a partner but as a source of information (Boas, 2006; Giacomello, 2005).

2.1.4.1. Historical Context: The Arab Spring

On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a young Tunisian street vendor, set himself
on fire after trying to fight against an inspection fee. Bouazizi appealed to the police, then to
municipal authorities and even to the region’s governor. Following every appeal, security officials
beat Mohamed (Howard & Hussain, 2013). After being humiliated constantly by the Tunisian
security apparatus, Bouazizi set himself on fire and several days later died on January 4, 2011
(Abouzeid, 2011).
The state-run and traditional media did not cover Bouazizi’s death, so people spread the
word through blogs and text messages. In that way, many people sympathetic towards Bouazizi
noticed that they shared similar problems. By the time Bouazizi died, national protests were spread
all over Tunisian territory (Howard & Hussain, 2013).
Since 1995, the Tunisian government had interfered with digital networks for political
reasons more than any other state, but after Bouazizi’s death, the government tried to ban
Facebook, Twitter, and video sites, but revolutionaries found their way around the ban. Ben Ali’s
regime (the Tunisian President) fell apart very quickly, and he abandoned Tunisia on January 14,
2011. In this way, traditional political structures in the Middle East and North Africa (region

52
known as the Arab world) were challenged, and revolts in Tunisia and Egypt encouraged young
people across the region creating massive demonstrations in the streets (Asseburg, 2012; Howard
& Hussain, 2013).
This uprising would be the beginning of what it is known as the “Arab Spring” (Abouzeid,
2011). After the Tunisian case, other nation-states of the Arab world would face national uprisings
and demands for political changes, such as Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria (currently embedded
in a civil war) (Asseburg, 2012; Barnard & Mackey, 2012; Slim, 2016).

2.1.4.2. The Arab Spring: Two Points of View

The Arab Spring phenomenon attracted commentators who emphasized the role of social
media, and therefore the Internet, to define the Arab Spring as a “social media revolution,” by
focusing on its organization aspects and information spread (Comunello, 2012). In this scenario,
academics and non-academics credited the Internet with a crucial role in the political process of
the Arab Spring (Auer, 2011). However, the academic literature is divided about this fact. The
main reason for such division is that democratization movements existed long before the Arab
Spring and certainly before mobile phones and Internet, which makes it difficult to conclude if
their existence and use were the reason for the success of the Arab Spring in many nation-states
(Howard & Hussain, 2013).
For those academics who consider the Internet as a catalyst for the events of the Arab
Spring, to mobilize pro-democracy and lead a revolution, the Internet became a massive media
tool for activists (Harlow & Johnson, 2011b; Lotan & Graeff, 2011).
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On the other hand, others minimized the role of the digital technology claiming that only a
minority of people had Internet access and that similar “revolutionary” processes in the Arab
World happened before the Internet existed (Anderson, 2011). For these academics, the most
important aspect of the Arab spring was not how activists used technology to share ideas and
tactics, but how and why activists’ ambitions and techniques influenced local contexts at the point
of organizing a revolution. That influence took place in traditional settings, such homes, and
mosques, and not in the social network platforms (Anderson, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012).
They reminded us how very similar historical contexts had taken place before:
“In Tunisia, protesters escalated calls for the restoration of the country's suspended
constitution. Meanwhile, Egyptians rose in revolt as strikes across the country brought
daily life to a halt and toppled the government. In Libya, provincial leaders worked
feverishly to strengthen their newly independent republic.
It was 1919” (Anderson, p.1, 2011)

According to Harlow & Johnson (2011), during the Arab Spring, coverage in traditional
media did not explain the core problem that generated the massive nationwide protests. On the
contrary, general press in Egypt and Tunisia focused more on the drama and violence of the
protests. Complaints of the protesters regarding Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak’s thirty-yearadministration were minimized to one or two sentences and were presented as part of the spectacle
(Harlow & Johnson, 2011a, 2011b; Howard & Hussain, 2013).
When the Egyptian government shut down the Internet on January 25, 2011, Egyptian
citizens and hackers all over the world worked together to restore the Internet access. The
interruption of Internet service had the opposite effect of what the Egyptian government expected.
Far from generating isolation and separation, more people came together in Tahrir Square to
protest for democratic changes. Protesters included Internet connectivity as one of their more
critical demands (Andrews, 2012; Thompson, 2012), and they found creative ways to bring the
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Internet service back using fax machines, old dial-up modems, and landlines to call Internet service
providers in neighbor states for the cost of a long distance phone call (Andrews, 2012; McDowell,
2011).
Egyptian protesters located themselves close to the Egyptian land borders, and there they
were able to use cell phone service from the nearest nation-states (e.g., Israel) (Andrews, 2012).
When the Internet service in Egypt was interrupted, Egyptians all over the world created an island
called Egypt in Second Life, a 3D virtual world, where they included avatars carrying signs
supporting Egyptian protesters (Andrews, 2012).
When the Internet got restored in Egypt, activists around the world helped Egyptian
citizens to cover their Internet activity and physical location to avoid retaliation of the Egyptian
government (A. Russell, 2011). The use of the Internet by journalists, news organizations, and
individuals created a networked system that allowed social awareness of what was happening
during the Arab Spring (Papacharissi & de Fatima Oliveira, 2012). Social media became a
coordinating tool for several world political movements to capitalize and organize political action,
and this is the reason why authoritarian regimes try to limit populations’ access to it (Howard &
Hussain, 2013; Shirky, 2011).

2.1.4.3. An Overview of the Internet Shutdown during the Arab Spring
This subchapter provides an overview of the attempts to shut down the Internet in three
nation-states part of the Arab Spring: Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Although first attempts to shut down
the Internet occurred in Nepal and Myanmar (2005-2007), these two nation-states had an Internet
penetration rate of barely one percent. In 2009, China concentrated its efforts only on one province,
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Xixiang, while claiming reasons of national security (Economist, 2013). It was not until the
shutting down of the Internet in Egypt that the world realized that the Internet from a nation-state
could be separated from the global Internet (Thompson, 2012). Libyan and Syrian governments
would shut down the Internet to prevent the downfall of their political leaders, despite the fact that
the Internet penetration rate was lower than in the Egyptian case and that the Internet infrastructure
was less developed (OpenNet, 2013).

2.1.4.3.1. Egypt

The Arab Spring showed to the entire world how vulnerable the Internet infrastructure is
in authoritarian regimes. Shortly after midnight, January 27, 2011, the Mubarak administration
cut-off internal access to the Internet and connectivity from the global Internet traffic into Egypt.
The purpose of the government was to stop the communication among activists who demanded
political changes (Bowman & Camp, 2013). Similar situations occurred in Libya and Uganda also
in 2011 and Syria between 2011 and 2013.
By January 29, 2011, 91% of Egypt’s Internet was down (ISOC, 2011). As mentioned
before, to get access to the global Internet, the local ISPs needed a gateway, which is a link to other
ISPs outside of Egypt. Initially, the Egyptian government ordered the local ISPs to disconnect their
services from all international connections to the Internet; otherwise, they would face commercial
and personal risk. Events unfolded as described below (Cowie, 2011a):
1.

Telecom Egypt (AS8452), the national incumbent, starts the process at 22:12:43.

2.

Raya joins in a minute later, at 22:13:26.

3.

Link Egypt (AS24863) begins taking themselves down 4 minutes later, at 22:17:10.
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4.

Etisalat Misr (AS32992) goes two minutes later, at 22:19:02

5.

Internet Egypt (AS5536) goes six minutes later, at 22:25:10.

This sequence shows that few ISPs with unique Autonomous System numbers (ASNs)
were being ordered to shut off all external activity. Once the “adjacent” autonomous systems (ASs)
border router noticed a lack of action from the Egyptian ISPs, it took the IP prefix off its BGP list.
In consequence, most internal networks in Egypt were disconnected, except one, Noor Group,
which was connected to Egypt’s financial market. This situation shows that in the case of smaller
territories with few ISPs, shutting down the Internet almost can be accomplished with some
planning (Subramanian, 2011). Vodafone, a mobile phone provider, resisted but finally was forced
to comply (Bowman & Camp, 2013). Finally, the only Egyptian IXP was disabled, which severely
damaged the Egyptian internal connectivity (Bowman & Camp, 2013; B. Johnson, 2011).

2.1.4.3.2. Libya

Demonstrations against Muammar El Qaddafi, the de facto ruler in Libya between 1981
and 2011, started in February 2011. By that year the Libyan government was in control of the
entire telecommunications infrastructure (Bowman & Camp, 2013; Hill, 2011).
On February 22, 2011 (almost one month after the Egyptian Internet shutdown), after
shooting two men in a rally, Internet activists called for a “day of rage” in Tripoli. The more Libyan
demonstrations expanded, the more Internet access was restricted (Gonzales & Harting, 2011). As
reported by Hill (2011), Qaddafi ordered the two mobile phone providers to disconnect their
services and later on, he ordered the government-run telecommunications company to physically
cut the backbone fiber optic cables that connected the east part of the Libyan territory with the
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west part of that nation-state. This last action was a desperate attempt to stop absolutely all Internet
connectivity.

2.1.4.3.3. Syria

In Syria, the outcome of the revolution started during the Arab Spring is still unknown as
the civil war continues, and Bashar al-Assad remains as head of the Executive branch. Bashar alAssad has been President from Syria since 2001, after receiving the government from his father,
Hafez al-Assad, who was a thirty-year-dictator (Bowman & Camp, 2013; Johnston, 2016). Protests
started in March 2011, and at that time the Syrian government controlled (and still does) the
Internet service. The Syrian Telecom Establishment, a government-run ISP, provides Internet
service for the Syrian territory (Cowie, 2014; Stack, 2011b, 2011a). However, instead of using the
same methods that the Egyptian or Libyan governments did, the Syrian government used a more
pervasive way to stop Internet activity by cutting off entirely electrical services (Preston, J., as
cited by Bowman & Camp, p.13, 2013).
On June 3, 2011, a national uprising attempted to force the resignation of President Bashar
al-Assad. In response, the government shut down the Internet. Similar actions would repeat on
December 1, 2012, and on May 7, 2013. From August 29 to October 10, 2013, the Internet was
down in the city of Aleppo (Cowie, 2014; Google, 2011). Besides cutting off electrical service,
Bashar al-Assad ordered the government-run ISP to interrupt the Internet service. Disruption in
the Syrian Internet traffic was more manageable than the Egyptian case because, just like Libya,
Syria does not have an IXP. As a result of this situation, Internet activists moved to the Turkish
borderline to get Internet access (Bowman & Camp, 2013).
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2.1.5. Democratic Regimes

For democratic regimes, it is more difficult to shut down the Internet because they must
balance the protection of the critical infrastructure, civil liberties and the exploitation of the
economic potentialities of new information and communication technology. Democratic regimes
must take into account a sum of interest aggregations, such as entrepreneurs, consumers, Internet
users and human right activists (Giacomello, 2005).
Having different stakeholders also means that they act differently based on their interests.
Therefore, besides the protection of the critical infrastructure, democratic regimes also justify their
control actions over the Internet by fighting against what the society considers illegal, such as
Internet fraud, identify theft, drug dealing and child pornography (Barth, 1997; Giacomello, 2005).
However, despite these considerations, democratic regimes also have adopted extreme policies for
Internet control without having evidence that they make critical infrastructure more secure
(Schneidewind, 2010; Schneier, 1996).

2.2.

Unitary Executive Theory

The U.S. Constitution created a single chief executive officer, the President, who is also
the head of the government. This is called a “unitary executive.” According to the defenders of the
unitary executive theory, the founding fathers intended for the president to have complete control
and authority over all aspects of the executive branch (S. G. Calabresi & Yoo, 2003; Waterman,
2009). As a matter of fact, as Waterman states, the theory’s central assumption is that:
“… any law passed by Congress that seeks to limit the president’s ability to communicate
or control executive branch relations is unconstitutional and therefore need not be enforced.
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The theory also posits that the president has the same authority as the courts to interpret
laws that relate to the executive branch.” (Waterman, 2009, p.8)

When it comes to officials appointed by the president, the theory establishes that: (1) The
president can remove subordinate policy-making officials at will, (2) The president can direct the
manner in which subordinate officials can exercise executive power and (3) The president can veto
officials’ exercises of discretionary executive power (S. Calabresi & Yoo, 1997).
Constitutional bases for such power are in the article two of the U.S. Constitution (See
Appendix 1). In this regard, according to the U.S. constitutional law provisions that refer to the
unitary executive theory, the president has the power to control the executive branch (Cannon,
Jordan, Keller, & Feeney, 2005). Moreover, the unitary executive theory establishes that the
president has, not only the power to control but also the responsibility for the maintenance of the
executive branch. At the same time, the executive branch must be responsible to its chief executive,
the president itself (Waterman, 2009).
This theory also claims that the president should be able to make the final decision
regarding any agency rules, even if the U.S. Congress assigned rulemaking activities to the
agencies. Although the Congress may have initial power to assign responsibilities to officers in
the executive branch, the president has the ultimate authority over the policies to be created
(Cannon et al., 2005).
The U.S. administration has used regularly the unitary executive theory to justify an
expansive presidential power, especially during the George W. Bush administration. However, the
use and existence of the unitary executive theory is controversial because of the boundaries of the
presidential power and Congress's ability to limit the presidential discretion (Waterman, 2009).
Some academics claim that the most difficult aspect of the unitary executive theory is not that the

60
president can claim exclusive presidential power, but that the president may argue that he has a
constitutional power that cannot be limited by the Congress (Ku, 2010).
On this regard, Calabresi and Yoo argue that “all of our nation’s presidents have believed
in the theory of the unitary executive” (S. G. Calabresi & Yoo, 2008, p.4). They go even further
by stating that: (1) the U.S. Constitution gives to presidents the power to control their subordinates
as they have the power of the U.S. president, (2) the executive branch carries the opposition to any
limits on the president’s authority to control and execute federal laws and, that (3) a ‘gloss’ of the
words ‘executive power’ has borne to allow the congress to create a “fourth” branch of the
government out of presidential control (S. G. Calabresi & Yoo, 2008).
The use of the unitary executive model was a characteristic of the Bush administration. In
2002, Vice President Richard Cheney at the time, claimed that the administration would be “…
dedicated to restoring the balance of powers in the system of separated powers to ensure that Bush
would be able to fully exercise his rightful authority” (Rozell & Sollenberger, 2013, p.37).
The executive privilege is the main element of the unitary executive theory and is the
defined as the power of the president and the high executive officers to withhold information and
testimony from Congress, the courts and the public. This is a long-time recognized principle,
established in constitutional theory, practice and legal documents and yet, not explicitly recognized
by the U.S. Constitution. Frequently, only those who have compulsory power (such as
congressional committees or special prosecutors) can set limits to the executive privilege (Rozell
& Sollenberger, 2013).
On November 1, 2001, former President George W. Bush issued Executive Order (EO)
13223 that expanded former President Reagan previous EO to expand the scope of executive
privileges to current and former presidents. Under Bush EO former presidents could assert
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executive privilege over their own documents, even if the incumbent president disagrees. At the
time, not even the Presidential Records Act of 1978 contained such a high standard. This action of
the Bush administration was the target of strong criticisms because ordinarily when a president
seeks secrecy under the terms of the executive privilege is because of reasons of national security,
and not just to cover documents of past administrations. Bush EO remained in the system until
2009, when President Obama reversed it (Barber & Fleming, 2011; Rozell & Sollenberger, 2015).
In 2008, when Obama was still a candidate, he criticized George W. Bush’s use of
executive power. Concretely, Obama criticized Bush for his policies over civil liberties of terrorist
suspects, for circumventing Congress authority and for centralizing power in the presidency.
However, when the time came, President Obama was also blamed of embracing unilateral actions
of his own (Barilleaux & Maxwell, 2017).

2.3.

Theoretical and Research Framework: the “Securitization Theory of the
Copenhagen School,” a.k.a. Securitization Theory

For this study, the theoretical framework to be used will be the “Securitization Theory of
the Copenhagen School,” also known as securitization theory. This theory, which originates from
international relations, assumes a constructivist approach. Securitization in international relations
is the process through which nation-state actors construct different subjects as issues of security.
As consequence, extraordinary means and a specific type of politics are used in the name of
security to act towards those subjects. Therefore, it is important to know who can securitize and
under what circumstances (Buzan, 1998). The basis of the Copenhagen school approach focuses
on the process of taking an issue from a politicized, or even non-politicized stage, into the security
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domain and considers the multiple factors surrounding the formation of the security policy (Buzan,
1998; Dunn Cavelty, 2008). The actual process of bringing an issue from a politicized space or
even a non-one into the security domain is known as “securitization” (Waever, 1995).
Regarding the theory itself “… the study of securitization aims to gain an understanding of
who securitizes (the actor) which issues (the threat subject), for whom or what (the referent object),
why (the intention and purposes), with what results (the outcome), and under what conditions (the
structure) (Buzan, 1998, p.32)”.
The Copenhagen school argues that a security speech is an act, through which a securitizing
agent creates one or more referent objects (related to the national interest). Governments must
protect referent objects because their protection is a matter of national security. For example, the
U.S. government cybersecurity policy is an example of an attempted securitization. Constantly
either the Pentagon or the Department of defense (DoD) securitizes the impact of hacking on
critical infrastructures, which are vital for the survival of the U.S. as a viable nation-state (Hansen,
2009). In this regard, the most referenced referent object is the nation-state itself, which in the
context of national security policies is threatened in its physical or ideational survival and,
therefore, has to be protected (Dunn Cavelty, 2008).
According to some academics, cyberspace has been securitized based on institutional
developments starting with the establishment of the Commission on Critical Infrastructure during
the Clinton Administration in 1996. The military refers to digital technologies as the “backbone”
of the Revolution in the military (Dunn Cavelty, 2008; Hansen, 2009).
Different government authorities have turned their speeches into security ones. Such
statements about securitization have been oriented to construct cyber issues as security problems,
rather than political, economic, legal or technical ones (Hansen, 2009). Members of the military
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and politicians tend to call something a cybersecurity problem because then that issue takes a
higher priority within the government security discourse. This practice seems to be a characteristic
and way of acting of all regimes, democratic and non-democratic (Hansen, 2009; Williams, 2003).
Following this tendency, since 1991 members of the U.S. military created the term “cyber
Pearl Harbor,” “first war in cyberspace” or “cyber 9/11” to refer to a massive and direct attack
against the critical infrastructure (Hansen, 2009; Lawson, 2016; Reuters, 2013). Members of the
press also use the term “cyber gathering storm” (Weinberger, 2013). Independently of the
opinions of members of the government about a potential cyber Pearl Harbor, its parameters, this
is what to damage precisely within the critical infrastructure and the extension of the damage
regarding time and quantity, have not been clarified (H. Farrell, 2013; Lawson, 2016).
Back in 2013, members of the U.S. national intelligence warned that there would be a major
cyber-attack against the U.S. critical infrastructure systems during the next two years that would
result in long-term, wide-scale disruption of services, such as a regional power outage. As they
referred, that event could be characterized as a “cyber Pearl-Harbor” (H. Farrell, 2013; Weinberger,
2013).
As far as this research was able to conclude, until the end of April 2018, (even after the DDos
attack on Dyn, the alleged Russian hacking of the Democrat party system and the WannaCry
ransomware cyber-attacks that affected 74 nation-states) (Bodkin, 2017; S. Jones, Sevastopulo, &
Hille, 2016; York, 2016), there has been no cyber-attack recognized as a “cyber Pearl-Harbor” by
members of the military or politicians in the U.S. or any other nation-state (Lawson, 2016). However,
members of the military do insist that, at least in the U.S., there will be one soon (Gurdus, 2016).
Government actors involved in the securitization process (usually policymakers or military
members), do not consider the potential consequences of labeling a wide range of issues as security

64
problems (Buzan, 1998). Even more, the existence of threats (real or not) may be used to justify
breaking the rule of law whether it is a democratic or non-democratic regime (Buzan, 1998;
Williams, 2003).

2.3.1. Units of Discourse in Securitization Arguments

The security-speech-act contains six elements involved in the actual security process
(Buzan, 1998; Dunn Cavelty, 2008; Rothe, 2015; Williams, 2003):
1. Securitizing actor: the individual or individuals who “securitize” something by declaring
it a “referent object”. A securitizing actor is either a person or group who performs the
security speech-act. These individuals share a set of basic beliefs and have resources to act.
However, a speech act only can be performed by an actor in a high position; usually,
government representatives in a position of authority who can create an argument about a
threat to the referent object. In this regard, a securitizing actor must:
a. Have both, authority and legitimacy to be heard and believed for the targeted
audience
b. Have the capacity to adopt measures to deal with the problem
These conditions limit potential candidates for securitizing actors to leading politicians,
bureaucrats, pressure groups and maybe scientific experts or technocrats.
2. Speech act or securitization speech: this is the “performative act” that creates a security
problem. Concretely this act creates a notion of security and includes an existential threat
to a referent object, a sense of urgency and a call for extraordinary measures to fight against
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a threat. The speech-act is directed to an audience that the securitizing agent must convince
to execute an extraordinary measure.
From now on, this dissertation will refer to the securitization speech as “security
discourse” to facilitate the analysis.
3. Referent object: “Things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a
legitimate claim to survive” (Buzan, p.36, 1998). There can be one or more referent objects;
the referent object is part of the national interest or is the national interest itself and,
therefore, its protection is part of national security strategies. The referent object may
change through the years and depend on each nation-state.
4. The Audience: Person or group of people who need to be convinced with the security
speech-act that there is a referent object (the things to protect to preserve the nation-state)
and that its protection is part of the national security strategy. To convince audience the
securitizing move creates a sense of urgency and legitimizes the adoption of a set of
exceptional or extraordinary measures to deal with the security problem. Additionally, to
convince an audience, the actor who performs the speech-act must be argumentatively
persuasive.
5. Extraordinary or exceptional measure: Actions out of the ordinary to protect the referent
object. Extraordinary measures depend on the context and are also very subjective.
According to the authors of the Copenhagen school, the process of “securitization” is
linked to a “speech-act”. This connection is the reason why some academics call this theory
“speech act theory”. The idea behind speech-act means that speakers use a type of language that
includes propositions and statements with content (that may be true or false), but more important
performances that conceptualize the notion of security beyond traditional points of view (Butler,
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2007; Rothe, 2015). “Speech acts follow a conventionalized script to which the speaker has to stick
and many are bound to the authorize position of certain speakers” (Rothe, 2015).
The distinguishing feature of the Securitization Theory is its rhetorical structure. In the
security discourse, an issue is “dramatized and presented as issue of supreme priority” (Buzan,
p.26, 1998); therefore, by labeling that specific issue as “from national security,” the agent claims
an extraordinary treatment for that issue (Williams, 2003).
By referring to the urgency of action posed by an existential threat, a securitizing actor can
transform an issue into one of security and can attempt to make anything a referent object.
Traditionally, the referent object is the nation-state, threatened to its “physical or ideational
survival,” and therefore, it is in need of protection (Hansen, 2009). However, the security discourse
may create different referent objects, other than nation-states and bring in other sectors than the
military.
The Copenhagen school states that there are two conditions to facilitate the securitization
process (Buzan, 1998):
1. The speech act follows the grammar of security, this means, it constructs a plot containing
an existential threat and makes an argument of no return and offers a ‘securitized’ way out
2. The securitizing agent holds a position that allows creating an authoritative claim about
security
Using the terms of the Copenhagen school, this study explores the circumstances different
regimes have used to justify shutting down the Internet as an “extreme measure” to protect what
they consider the “referent object”. In this regard, I will identify who the securitizing agents are,
why they say they want an Internet shutdown or why shut down the Internet, what the referent
object is and the audience they attempt to address (Please see figure 05).
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Figure 05.- Copenhagen School Securitization Theory Basic Diagram and the Internet Shutdown

Modified from Dunn Cavelty, p.28, 2008

2.4.

An Overview of the Literature and Opportunities for this Research

The academic literature divides current studies about attempts to shut down the Internet in
two types:
1. From a legal point of view, legal scholars analyze three bills proposed by U.S. Senators to
grant powers to the president to shut down the Internet within U.S. territory (Bambauer,
2011; E. Fischer, 2012; Medows, 2012; Ruggiero, 2012; P. Shane, 2012; Thompson, 2012).
The discussion focuses on whether section 606 of the Telecommunication Act of 1934
gives to the U.S. President the capacity to take over all telecommunications within U.S.
territory (Opderbeck, 2012, 2013). Some of these studies were enriched by performing a
historical analysis of the evolution of the telecommunication system in the U.S. and its
corresponding national security policy. These studies however, are limited to legal analysis
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of whether shutting down the Internet would be legal or not within the U.S. system. There
was no further research on the status of the Internet infrastructure or political reasons to
shut down the Internet. The analysis is also limited to the U.S. only and does not consider
other democratic or hybrid regimes.
2. From a social sciences and historical point of view, academics present as part of the context
about Internet shutdowns multiple studies about the Arab Spring cases, the case in Nepal
back in 2005 and the use of the Internet as a tool for political change. I will describe these
studies below, but it is essential to clarify that, although this study considers the Arab spring
as part of the global context when talking about Internet shutdowns, this political
phenomenon is not under analysis. Nation-states involved in the Arab spring, alongside
with Nepal, belong to the group of “authoritarian regimes,” which are not part of this study.
Literature about the Arab Spring cases (Egypt, Syria, and Libya) focus in the historical
aspects of the Internet shut down, precisely how the past events unfolded since the specific
circumstances that trigger national protests until the Internet was shut down and later restored.
Concretely the literature pays particular attention to two particular issues: 1) the efforts of the
population to bring the Internet service back (Andrews, 2012; Bowman & Camp, 2013; Dunn,
2011) and 2) the role of the social networks as a catalyst or strategic tool in the revolution that
overthrew Mubarak’s administration (Khondker, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012) (Harlow &
Johnson, 2011b; Howard & Hussain, 2013; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012).
In the specific case of Nepal, shutting down the Internet was included in a study as part of
the strategy of the government to stop all telecommunication activity and isolate Nepal from the
rest of the world in 2005 (Ang, 2012). The study concludes that shutting down the Internet in
Nepal, like in Egypt, did not only contribute to the purposes of the authoritarian regime but that it
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had the opposite effect. Those who were apolitical became political against the government, and
those who saw their business affected also turned against the authoritarian regime (Ang, 2012;
Hassanpour, 2014).
Finally, as mentioned before, when describing the Arab spring, a group of academics credit
the Internet with being the catalyst for political changes. For the events of the Arab Spring, they
conclude that the Internet became a tool to mobilize pro-democratic movements and lead a
revolution. According to this academic research, such events of mobilization and further
revolution, were possible thanks to the existence of significant communication platforms, such as
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (Harlow & Johnson, 2011b; Lotan & Graeff, 2011).
There is, however, another set of scholars for whom the Internet should not be credited
with the civil awakening of new generations. According to Anderson (2011) political movements
like the Arab Spring happened before at the beginning of the twentieth century when the Internet
did not exist. For Anderson, what is required to conduct a revolution like the Arab Spring is the
way organizers influence the local contexts at the point of organizing an uprising by using any
means to their disposal, either the Internet or traditional word of mouth in homes and mosques
(Anderson, 2011; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012).
So far, all these studies address the Internet shut down in these conditions:
1. Legal

studies

in

one

consolidated

democratic

regime

(U.S.)11

analyzing

telecommunications statute and bills drafted within the legislative branch.
2. Political studies about the role of the Internet in the development of a revolutionary process
such as the Arab spring

11
By the beginning of 2017, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) reclassified the U.S. from being a consolidated
democracy into a “flawed” one and Russia was reclassified from being a hybrid regime into an authoritarian one (EIU, 2017)
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3. Political studies that focus on authoritarian regimes, not only the ones included in the Arab
spring but also the earliest Internet shut down, Nepal. These studies analyzed the role and
participation of the government trying to control the Internet infrastructure, but do not
study other potential participants such as civil society, the private sector or the population.
The role of civil society is, to some extent, analyzed in the studies about social networks.
The current project takes a different approach from the previous ones concerning the type
of study, type of data, actors involved and academic approach. This study includes:
1. The analysis of nation-states considered well-consolidated democracies and hybrid
regimes (differently from the authoritarian ones and the cases of the Arab Spring). Existent
studies that focus on hybrid regimes cover government policy to act over the Internet
infrastructure (Nocetti, 2015; Vendil Pallin, 2017) but do not address Internet shutdowns
specifically
2. Besides the legal analysis of just one particular statute, this study will include a description
of the following aspects of each case-study: status of the Internet infrastructure, powers of
the executive branch in the selected case-studies, economic context, drafted bills alongside
with broader legal and constitutional frameworks and political justifications of why
shutting down the Internet was necessary (for the regimes that did it). or would be necessary
(for the ones that considered it)
The Securitization Theory is an appropriate theoretical framework because it facilitates the
analysis of different elements not contemplated in previous academic work. Although the extreme
measure, an Internet shutdown, remains the same among all case-studies, the new items to analyze
include: 1) new actors, other than members of the executive branch (f/e different parties in the
private sector, members of the military and owners of the Internet infrastructure), 2) the audience
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and why it is crucial (this will depend on each case), and 3) different notions of the concept of
national security and national interest, which rely on the specific legal and geopolitical context of
each case-study.
Finally, this study will give a step beyond the theoretical framework and previous academic
work. This study identifies the legal, political and technical factors that enable a consolidated
democratic or a hybrid regime to shut down the Internet, beyond the justifications different
governments may provide.
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3. Methods and Research Design

This chapter introduces the methods and procedures of the proposed study, including
research design, selection of case studies and justification for choice, data collection and
description of analysis.
This research is a comparative multiple-case study, which examines (1) the global scope
of the Internet shut down activity, (2) government security speeches of hybrid and democratic
regimes that justified shutting down the Internet or considered doing it in selected case-studies
and (3) the actual reasons why hybrid and democratic regimes shut down the Internet or
considered doing so also in selected case-studies. In this context, this dissertation understands as
security speeches a set of spoken or written statements that are significant in a security
framework (Securitization Theory in this case). Actors in position to define nation-state security
policies and to propose actions or responses against envisaged threats are the ones that perform
the security speeches (Dunn Cavelty, 2008)12.
The government action under discussion in this case is the Internet shut down or
considerations to do it under circumstances of national security. Actors who perform the speech,
are presidents, prime ministers, ministers, senators, members of government agencies,
administrative regulators’ members, policymakers, bureaucrats, and academics. These are public
people in their nation-states, and their statements are available as general information on the
Internet.

12
Differently political speech is defined as set of expressions, written or spoken, that comment about one or more
government actions or expected actions, that are both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation (Holmes, 2013).
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3.1.

Qualitative Research

This study follows a qualitative research design. Qualitative methods are widely used in
the social sciences and also in policy evaluation (Hoefer, 2012). The fact that data may be collected
over a sustained period makes it more powerful for studying processes, especially in historical
analysis (Miles, 1994). The term ‘qualitative’ suggests a deep analysis or emphasis on the qualities
of the entities and processes under study, differently from the intensity measurements of the
quantitative methods. When the study involves a qualitative case study, the research approach
facilitates the exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. By
following this technique, we make sure to explore the issue under study through multiple lenses, a
process that allows discovering different facets of the phenomenon (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Denzin,
Norma; Lincoln, 2005).

3.2.

Recap of Research Questions and an Overview of the Research Design

This dissertation has three purposes, which are reflected in the three research questions
(RQ) mentioned before:
RQ1: What is the global scope of the Internet shut down phenomenon?
RQ2: What justifications do democratic and hybrid regimes use to shut down or to
consider shutting down the Internet?
RQ3: What are the political, legal and technical factors that drive a government to shut
down the Internet?
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The first purpose (RQ1) is providing the global scope of the Internet shut down phenomena.
As it will be explained later, with that goal in mind, I conducted an intensive effort to collect all
relevant security discourses by public officials and legal documents in and on select cases (this is
detailed further below). For that purpose, I used keywords to identify potential and reliable sources
of information. Additionally, this section will also explain the main problems this research
encounter during this process.
To answer RQ1, we documented all known instances of considerations or execution of
government shutdowns of the Internet across the globe using publicly available materials. Those
materials include news accounts, citizen accounts via blogs, international organizations, reports,
and other social media, as well as legal or policy documents written by governmental actors and
agencies. All this information was triangulated.
The second purpose of this dissertation is identifying the rhetorical justifications that
democratically organized governments and hybrid regimes provide when considering or executing
an Internet shutdown (RQ2). The second question focuses on understanding the broad and narrow
arguments governments create to justify an Internet shutdown. For this question, I focus on the
rhetoric. Prior academic research indicates that the security discourse of democratic regimes
explains government control over the Internet infrastructure as necessary to protect what they call
the national interest and to fight against cybercrime, child pornography, and computer frauds
(Giacomello, 2005). However, as I will illustrate in this document, a uniform definition of what
the national interest is for these regimes does not exist.
Shutting down the Internet has been considered a remedy for different situations that
threaten the national interest because the protection of the national interest guarantees the survival
of the nation-state (Richards, 2012). The aim of this dissertation is examining more closely those
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arguments since governments “construct” the concept of national interest and potential threats
(Katzenstein, 2003). In doing a close analysis of the rhetoric produced by governments, I
determined the differences between hybrid and democratic regimes in building their arguments
about national security when the Internet infrastructure is involved.
To answer RQ2, I analyzed the speeches using the theoretical framework of the
securitization theory of the Copenhagen School. For this dissertation, the unit of analysis is the
securitizing agent speech that was created to convince an audience that shutting down the Internet
is necessary for national security purposes. The securitization theory defines an agent according
to his/her position as a leading politician, bureaucrat or representative of a government agency
during a specific time. The security discourses of these agents contain what we want to know, the
rhetoric of the justifications different regimes use to shut down or to consider shutting down the
Internet.
Regarding RQ3, the purpose of this question is identifying the political, legal and economic
factors that enable democratic and hybrid regimes to shut down the Internet or to consider doing
so. With this goal in mind, this document contains a description of multiple case studies and detail
of political and legal systems, telecommunications infrastructure, and critical historical or current
events to understand the factors that lead to considerations of government authority over Internet
access by citizens in a nation-state. Description of the case studies also reports efforts of their
governments to control the Internet infrastructure within their territories. Figure 06 contains a
visual representation of the research design this dissertation has followed.
RQ3 looks closely at the structural factors that enable an Internet shut down or the
consideration of it in democratic and hybrid regimes. With this purpose in mind, this dissertation
conducted a comparative case study and included cases of democratic and hybrid governments
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that have not considered or executed an Internet shutdown. By doing this, it is expected to isolate
better vital structural factors that differentiate regimes that are inclined to exert the ultimate control
of government authority as compared with those that are not.
The academic literature defines a case study as a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a
bounded context (Miles, 1994; Yin, 2009). Case studies may be individuals, organizations, small
groups, roles, communities, nation-states, and unique events, among others. As Yin suggests
(2009), research may be conducted with single or multiple case studies. Single case studies may
be helpful especially if they are extreme or unique. Extreme or deviant cases have unusual
manifestations of the phenomenon of interest, which is why they are relevant (Bailey, 2007).
Concerning policy analysis, the use of multiple case studies or comparative case studies is a way
to create policy options and also provides an opportunity to learn from the experiences of a group
of nation-states regarding the same practice (Horvath & Daly, 1989).

Figure 06.- Graphic Representation Research Design

77
3.3.

Online Data Collection: Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

The first step to identify Internet shutdown cases at a worldwide level was conducting an
Internet research process considering inclusion and exclusion criteria for the search. The exclusion
and inclusion criteria helped to identify multiple sources and to triangulate the data (Fink, 2010;
Ridley, 2008). A search was conducted in different databases and different search engine, as
described in table 02. This dissertation tried to include all possible points of view: governments,
the private sector, civil society, and academia.

Table 02.- List of Sources Used to Gather Data
Type of Data
Identified Sources
1. News, articles, websites, Academic websites: OpenNet Data Initiative, Belfer Center,
blogs, and related
MIT Technology Review, Berkman Klein Center (Harvard
artifacts (like videos,
University)
podcasts, and social
Academic Databases: LexisNexis Academic, Web of Sciences
media platforms) related Government sources: Congress.gov (U.S. Congress),
to the participation of
APH.GOV.AU (Parliament of Australia), GOV.UK (U.K.
private telecom operators Parliament), KREMLIN.RU (President of Russia-Kremlin),
or government actions
PRAVO.GOV.RU (Official Internet portal Legal Information,
over private Internet
Russia), ASOZD2.DUMA (Duma Legislative System,
infrastructure.
Russia), www4.PLANALTO.GOV.BR (Portal Planalto,
2. If available, speeches of
Brazil), www.DIPUTAODS.GOB.MX (Cámara de Diputados
securitizing agents
de la Unión, Mexico), www.SENADO.GOB.MX (Gaceta del
(which are security
Senado, México), www.OAS.org (OAS Cyber)
speeches)
Private Sector and Civil Society: Dyn (former renesys,
Measure of the Internet Performance), BGP Monitoring the
Internet, Akamai Technologies, Akamai, CloudFare,
InternetIntelligence, Internet Society (ISOC)
Search engines (Google, Yahoo, Ecosia, Bing): provided
additional sources: Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), RT,
Renesys, The Economist, The Moscow Times, Vedomosti,
BBC, BBC America Latina, The Guardian, The Washington
Post, New York Times, Lawfare Sputnik, Foreign Policy,
Foreign Affairs, Financial Times, Ars Technica,
Computerworld, ZDNet, WIRED, CNET, Instituto Federal de
Telecomunicaciones, El Universal de Mexico, Meduza in
English, American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Quartz, other
alternative sources
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I developed an inclusion criteria using the following keywords individually and in
combination: Internet, “Internet shut down,” “Internet kill switch,” “Internet blackout,” “kill the
Internet,” “cut off the Internet” government control over the Internet infrastructure, [“Internet shut
down” AND “cyber security policies”], [“Internet kill switch” AND “cyber security policies”],
[“Internet blackout” AND “cyber security policies”], [Internet shut down AND “Internet
governance”], [Internet shut down technique], [Internet outage” AND “Internet governance”],
[Politics of an Internet shut down] and [Economics of an Internet shut down]. After identifying
these keywords, I conducted a search process in three languages: English, Spanish, and Portuguese
without any assistance. As part of the search process, I add Turkish and Russian; this final stage
required the help of third parties and software assistance.
Exclusion criteria were based initially only concerning time. The parameters to collect data
started in 1991, the year when the World Wide Web (www), also known as the Web, became
available to the public. The www and the Internet are not the same; the www is the most popular
“part of the Internet” and the one that is most accessed by Internet users. Although they are not the
same thing, Internet users in general think of both terms as the same thing (Beal, 2010)13. Results
of the search also included academic papers and books. A quick review of abstracts or
introductions was helpful to determine whether they should be included or excluded. I scanned
Web pages before incorporating or discarding them. This process allowed me to identify the first
Internet shutdown: Nepal in 2005 during a time of national protests. After determining that
episode, I narrowed the timeframe to start looking for sources in 2005 and after.

13

As described at the beginning of this dissertation, the Internet is a massive network of networks that connects millions
of computers together. Any computer can communicate with another one if they both are connected to the Internet. The World
Wide Web (www) is a way of accessing the information available on the Internet. The Web uses the HTTP protocol, to allow
applications to communicate to share information. The Web also utilizes browsers, such as Internet Explorer or Firefox, to access
Web pages that are linked to each other. The web is just one of the ways that information can be distributed all over the Internet.
The Internet (not the web), is also used for email, instant messaging and FTP (file transfer protocol) (Niedrich, 2011).
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The literature about Internet shut downs increased between 2009 and 2011, presumably for
two reasons: 1) the securitization policy of the cyberspace in the U.S. and 2) the Arab spring.
However, since 2014, concepts became a challenge. In that year, and mostly from the perspective
of civil society organizations, the use of the term “Internet shut down” started referring indistinctly
to the shutdown of the entire Internet and the episodes of censorship. The last ones only affect
specific web pages or applications, such as Facebook, Twitter or WhatsApp (accessnow, 2017). In
accordance to the definition explained in the first chapter of this dissertation, stopping or blocking
the traffic of specific web pages of applications is a case of “technical blocking,” which is a form
of censorship, but not an Internet shut down.
Because of the inclusion and exclusion criteria, the conclusions of this dissertation are the
result of the analysis of approximately 4,105 different sources of data. Although until 2013 there
were no academic publications about Internet shutdowns after that year publications appeared
mostly referring to authoritarian regimes.
Finally, because this dissertation relies upon documents available on the Internet, before
including any actual statement of a potential securitizing agent as part of the data to analyze, the
same account had to be available in at least three different sources that did not refer each other.
Then I triangulated the data, a process necessary to trust in the validity of the conclusions (Miles,
1994).

3.4.

RQ1: Selection of Internet Shutdown Cases

As explained before, this dissertation concluded that Internet shutdowns started in 2005 in
Nepal by an authoritarian regime. However, consolidated democracies and hybrid regimes have
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also been active in the debate and have considered creating techniques for a potential Internet shut
down.
The process to determine whether a case is an Internet shut down is as follows:
1. I discarded cases where only applications were affected. As mentioned before, it is the
point of view of this research that stopping or blocking the traffic of specific web pages of
apps is a case of censorship. Therefore, if the source under analysis only reports episodes
related to applications, that source is discarded.
2. When I identified the report of a full Internet shutdown, then the study of the information
included some of the elements mentioned in the first chapter when the technical aspects of
an Internet occurred: a) the status or situation of the ISPs (what are their statements? Were
they threatening to stop the Internet service? Are there claims of an accident?), b)
Governments’ statements (what is going on?), c) Political opposition statement (if any), d)
Claims of the population, mainly Internet users (did they lose access to the entire Internet
or just some applications?), e) If the international Internet activity cannot be accessed, it
means the DNS has been affected or poisoned and f) information available about IP address
ranges falling off the Internet, situation known as the “Internet prefixes down”.
3.

The last situation mentioned in item 2, when the Internet prefixes are down, this means
that the BGP has been affected, which also means that ISPs cannot connect to each other
and that Internet users have problems connecting to different ISPs. If the nation-state has
one or more IXPs and ISPs cannot connect each other properly, this means that IXPs have
been affected at least partially.
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4.

Finally, the last analysis includes cases where there was not an Internet shut down, but
there was a political, legal or academic debate on the subject. This dissertation calls these
cases as “consideration to shut down the Internet”.

3.5.

RQ2: Rhetorical Analysis. Classifying Data According to Codes

This document conducted a rhetorical analysis of security discourses related to the
practice of shutting down the Internet or considerations to do it, in selected case studies and
when those speeches were available. Security speeches are available in news articles, websites,
blogs, and related artifacts (like videos, podcasts and social media platforms) about the control
over the Internet infrastructure.
To analyze speeches as a rhetorical act, Campbell (2009) suggested the following
categories:
1. Purpose: The conclusion, final product of the discussion, also known as thesis and the
answer desired by the rhetor (For this case, I will use the term rhetor as a synonym of the
speaker).
2. Audience: The receivers of the rhetorical act; this could be an intended audience, target
audience or specialized audience. For this dissertation, I will focus on what Campbell calls
“agents of change” and the “targeted audience”. The first audience (agents of change)
facilitates the changes and measures the securitizing agent requires. The second audience
(targeted audience) influences the security discourse, even if does not agree with it.
3. Evidence: Material support to build the argument
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4. Strategies: The adaptation of all the above, including language, appeals, and discussions to
shape the materials to overcome the challenges the rhetor faces
These elements are always present, and they are essential to understanding how rhetors
use, write, speak or use visual messages to invite others to assent to social truths (Campbell, 2009).
These categories will provide additional elements for judging the constructions that political actors
are making about national security events and the rationalizations of shutting down the Internet.
In practical terms, the collected documents for this project were coded and analyzed
following the previous categories (purpose, audience, evidence, and strategies) by using computerassisted qualitative data analysis software (ATLAS.ti). The process of coding consists of
classifying data into themes and codes by closely examining the data itself (Babbie, 2017). To
achieve the final conclusions, I conducted three rounds of data reading and organizing in a period
of one and a half years. Since the phenomenon of shutting down the Internet continues over time,
I continuously update the data under analysis to answer RQ1, the global scope of the Internet
shutdowns episodes. In the process of coding, we continuously used a careful interpretation to
validate existing theories by providing descriptions of a particular phenomenon (Miles, 1994).
As mentioned before, the coding process followed the categories of the rhetorical analysis
and used the Securitization Theory as a theoretical framework. Following a deductive approach,
this dissertation started with a proposition, which was that democratic or hybrid regimes shut down
the Internet or consider doing so because of reasons of national security (Babbie, 2017; J. Creswell,
2003). To have an accurate idea of the security speech to be analyzed, I separated specific
sentences under quotations from the rest of the text, so I could understand what rhetors were
saying. Accuracy of the statements was secured by triangulating the data. The rhetorical analysis
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turned to be very helpful to understand the way security discourses construct a security speech
when they address the problem of an Internet shutdown.

3.6.

RQ3: Comparative Case Study

Case studies are part of a research process related to a person, a group of people or a unit.
The purpose of a case study is to get conclusions over several units and generalize results. Another
definition considers a case study as the analysis of systems to be studied with a comprehensive
view, using one or several methods. Given this definition, the case study method is an appropriate
way to explore a setting to understand it (Cousin, 2005; Thomas, 2011). However, Creswell
provides a broader and comprehensive definition of what a case study is:

“The case study method “explores a real-life, contemporary bounded system (a case) or
multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in depth data collection
involving multiple sources of information… and reports a case description and case
themes” (J. W. Creswell, p.97, 2013).

A crucial decision for a research project is whether to conduct one or more case studies.
The second option is known as a comparative or multiple case study. The most important
difference between a single case study and a multiple case study is that when there are various
cases, researchers have the opportunity of identifying similarities and differences among cases. In
this context, the data can be analyzed within each situation and across situations. Comparative case
studies also allow to create or test a theory when the suggested cases are well grounded in several
empirical evidence (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Yin, 2003). In general, the evidence of multiple case
studies is considered more compelling and the research study more robust. By identifying
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similarities among case studies, these patterns would provide substantial support for the initial
proposition or hypothesis (Yin, 2014).

3.6.1. Why a Comparative Case Study?

A comparative case study is preferred because it provides a better understanding of diverse
processes and outcomes (Miles, 1994). More critical, case studies provide unique insight into areas
where few studies or none have been conducted, such as with the phenomena of shutting down the
Internet (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 1987). Except for very few legal analyses of U.S. bills
created between 2009 and 2011 to grant powers to the U.S. president to decide whether the Internet
should be shut down or not, little legal or social analysis exists to document democratic and hybrid
governments' efforts to implement an extreme policy of government control over the Internet
infrastructure.
Although case studies have been used to test hypotheses in quantitative research and to
generate theories, they are also useful for exploratory, explanatory and descriptive studies (Tellis,
1997)14. This characteristic of case studies is an asset, considering that this dissertation is mostly
exploratory but partially explanatory. It is expected to explain the rhetorical justifications
governments use when considering or executing an Internet shutdown, as well as to identify the
institutional and structural factors that might help to predict future Internet shut down events. In
this sense, the case study represents an ideal methodology for in-depth investigation (Tellis, 1997).

14

As defined by Yin (2009), case studies may be:
a) Exploratory cases: usually considered a prelude to a deeper social sciences research
b) Explanatory cases: used for causal investigation (that is why they are used for quantitative studies)
c) Descriptive cases: they require a descriptive theory to be developed before starting the project.
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To be more critical about the validity of the study and generalize the results, the sampling
process, which includes settings, actors, events, and processes, becomes a crucial point of the
research design (Miles, 1994). It is important to clarify that for RQ1, there are no selected cases,
but all known practices of Internet shutdowns between 2005 (when the first Internet shut down
was reported) and early 2018. I established the instances for RQ2 and RQ3 from an earlier study
that identified consolidated democracies and hybrid regimes that shut down the Internet or
considered doing so (Vargas Leon, 2015) and with the online searching process I conducted for
this dissertation. To understand governments’ arguments for shutting down the Internet, selected
cases include those that have provided a public reason or legal documents that can be analyzed.
RQ3 attempts to understand the factors or characteristics that relate to shutting down the Internet.
With this purpose in mind, cases under analysis must include governments that shut down the
Internet and considered doing so, and instances where governments did not, to make a comparison
(Please see table 03 in the next page).
The selected case studies for this dissertation were grouped into categories of types of
government regimes (consolidated democracy, young democracy, and hybrid), according to the
literature on regimes of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) classification. All the selected cases
have been involved, to some extent, in multiple episodes of government control within the last
twelve years.
I selected the case studies for this research following the criteria I explain in the next
paragraphs. Items 1 and 2 describe the selection of consolidated democracies; items 3 and 4
illustrate the choice of hybrid regimes:
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1. In case of consolidated democracies, the cases under study are the only ones this study
identified as the ones where an Internet shut down occurred or was considered legal,
politically or even academically: Australia, U.K., and the U.S.
As far as this research could identify there are no additional consolidated democracies that
were involved in an Internet shutdown or considerations to do it
2. I compared consolidated democracies with young democracies: Brazil and Mexico. Young
democracies are the ones that, although they exercise some level of control over the Internet
infrastructure (as consolidated democracies do as well), lack a discourse or practices in
favor of shutting down the Internet or to considering doing so. Brazil has denied the
possibility of any actions of this kind, and Mexico even grants constitutional protection to
the Internet infrastructure. I will address these facts adequately in the next chapters
3. In case of the hybrid regimes, something similar occurs. The cases under study are the only
ones this study identified as the ones where an Internet shut down occurred, Venezuela, or
where an Internet shutdown was considered, Russia. As far as this research could
distinguish there are no more hybrid regimes that shut down the Internet or considered
doing so.
4. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) classification does not make a distinction within
hybrid regimes as it does for democracies (between consolidated and young ones).
Therefore, for this case, as a case to compare with Russia and Venezuela, this research uses
the Turkish government. Turkey is a well-known case of a government that exercises high
levels of control over the Internet infrastructure, by blocking social networks and poisoning
the DNS, but never shut down the Internet. I will address these facts will be properly in the
next chapter.
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Selected case studies, previously mentioned, are detailed in the table below:
Table 03.- Selected Case Studies and their Particular Characteristics
NationConsolidated
Young
Hybrids
Internet Shut Down
State
Democracies Democracies
An
Government Governments
Internet
s never
and civil
Shut
Considered
society
Down
Shutting
conducted a
Occurred
Down the
political,
in this
Internet
academic or
Territory
legal debate
on the subject
Australia
x
x
U.K.
x
x
U.S.
x
x
Brazil
x
x
Mexico
x
x
Turkey
x
x
Russia
x
x
Venezuela
x
x

The purpose of this distinction is to find out why similar regimes act differently. For
example, consider two hybrid regimes, Venezuela and Turkey. The first one shut down the
Internet, and the second one did not. By identifying the circumstances of why one shut down the
Internet, and the other did not, it will be possible to determine the factors that lead a government
to shut down the Internet or to consider doing it and the ones that may prevent a government of
using this practice.
At this point, it is important to remember that the proposition for this project is that all
regimes, whether they are democratic or hybrids, shut down the Internet or considered doing so
under the justifications of a national security situation. However, as I will depict in the next
chapters, what each government understands for national security may be very different from
others, even if they are politically similar regimes.
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By having this comparative case study, it is possible to determine what government
considers the national interest, that thing that must be protected to guarantee the survival and
stability of a nation-state. By identifying the national interest, it is possible to identify the main
elements of the national security policy of a government and the reasons why that government
could consider shutting down the Internet.

3.6.2. Australia

Australia is considered a consolidated democratic regime, an OECD 15 (Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development) member, a federal parliamentary constitutional
monarchy and member of the common law. Australia is also one of the most stable and prosperous
economies in the world (Conversation, 2013; EIU, 2017; OECD, 2014). Nevertheless, despite
being a consolidated democratic regime (EIU, 2017), Australia has been involved in multiple cases
of censorship and is highly dependent on one major ISP, Telstra Corporation Limited, known
merely as Telstra (Hernandez, 2014).
In 1994, the Australian government considered imposing restrictions over the Internet
content. In that year, the Department of Communications and the Arts released a document titled
“Regulation of Computer Bulletin Board Systems”. This report detailed a list of actions and
content that was considered harmful to minors and recommended to restrict similar kinds of
content through self-regulation (Sorensen, 1996; Subramanian, 2011).

15

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an inter-governmental organization formed
by 35 nation-states, all of them democratic regimes. Created in Paris, France in 1961 the mission of the organization is to promote
policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world. OECD standards for policy matters and
quality of life are considered a referent for most democratic regimes all over the world (Beal, 2010).
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Since the year 2000, when cybersecurity became a national security issue, the Australian
government started to produce laws of censorship and control over the Internet infrastructure
(Singel, 2009). On December 31, 2007, Stephen Conroy (at the time Minister for Broadband,
Communication and the Digital Economy) announced the federal government's new policy to
censor "inappropriate material" from the Internet. According to this new system, any Australian
who subscribes to an ISP would receive a “version” of the Internet, previously approved by the
government. Justifications for this new policy were related to the protection of children from
accessing violent and pornographic websites. Later, the Australian government abandoned this
policy. However, they continue censoring sites that violate Australian laws (Deibert, Palfrey,
Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2010).
Three years later, in 2010, the Australian government created strong Internet censoring
policies (LeMay, 2010a). Moreover, when state elections took place, Internet bloggers and anyone
commenting on the state election in South Australia was required to publish their real name and
postcode when commenting on the poll (Blair, 2010).
Since 2006, the legal production of cyber security white papers (the Australian term for
bills), reviews, and strategies has increased in Australia, alongside with amendments to the
telecommunications statutes of that nation-state and individual actions of the government over the
telecommunications infrastructure. To have a comprehensive idea of these elements, please see
figure 07.
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Figure 07.- Australian Bills, Actions, and Laws about the Internet Infrastructure (2000-2016)
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Thinking about the Internet shutdown in concrete, Australians refer to it as the “kill-the
Internet power” because of the arbitrary nature of this regulation (Keane, 2012b). When it comes
to the Internet shutdown episodes, I will provide a recount of the facts in the next paragraphs.
On September 3, 2009, for one hour, from 7:50 to 8:50 a.m. Telstra international Internet
network went down (N. Farrell, 2009; Robinson, 2009). Telstra called it an accident despite
questioning of some members of the civil society. The same episode and justifications occurred in
2012 and 2016 (Danckert, 2016; Kidman & Allen, 2012) (See figure 08). It is important to note
that Telstra, a former government-owned ISP, controls 90% of the Internet subscribers; the
remaining ISPs (the ones that control the 10%) depend entirely on Telstra. Therefore, if Telstra is
down, most of the Internet service in Australia will be down (Hernandez, 2014).

Figure 08.- Timeline Australian Internet Shut Downs (2009-2016)

Despite all these instances, it is also important to point out that in 2011, after the Egyptian
shutdown, Steven Conroy (as I mentioned, the former Australian Communications Minister)
denied the use of similar policies in Australia under any circumstances (LeMay, 2011; Tuutti,
2011). Nevertheless, at the same time, Mr. Conroy argued that the Internet cannot be a space
wholly unregulated and that the government does not trust in the Australian ISPs (LeMay, 2010a).
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Legally speaking, about the government’s capacity to control the Internet infrastructure,
academics refer to the provision 581 of the Telecommunications Act of 1997. According to the
statute, the authority to act over the Internet infrastructure would be the Australian
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) and the Attorney General.
Telecommunications Act of 1997.…
Part 34—Special provisions relating to functions and powers of the ACMA and the
Attorney General in respect of telecommunications
…
581 Power to give directions to carriers and service providers
(1) The ACMA may give written directions to:
(a)a carrier; or
(b)a service provider;
in connection with performing any of the ACMA’s telecommunications
functions or exercising any of the ACMA’s telecommunications powers.
(2) This section is not limited by any other provision of a law that:
(a)confers a function or power on the ACMA; or
(b)prescribes the mode in which the ACMA is to perform a
function or exercise a power; or
(c)prescribes conditions or restrictions which must be
observed in relation to the performance by the ACMA of a function or the
exercise by the ACMA of a power.
(3) If:
(a)a person who is a carrier or carriage service provider
proposes to use, or uses, for the person’s own requirements or benefit, or
proposes to supply, or supplies, to another person, one or more carriage
services; and
(b)the Attorney‑General, after consulting the Prime Minister
and the Minister administering this Act, considers that the proposed use or
supply would be, or the use or supply is, as the case may be, prejudicial to
security;
the Attorney‑General may give to the carrier or carriage service provider a
written direction not to use or supply, or to cease using or supplying, as the
case may be, the carriage service, or all of the carriage services.
(3A) A direction under subsection (3) must relate to a carriage
service generally and cannot be expressed to apply to the supply of a
carriage service to a particular person, particular persons or a particular
class of persons.
(4) A person must comply with a direction given to the person under
subsection (1) or (3).
(5) In this section:
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security has the same meaning as in the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation Act 1979.
According to the text of the telecommunications statute, provision 581 enables the attorney
general, after consulting the Prime Minister and the Minister of Telecommunications, to direct a
request to any telecommunications carrier or service provider to stop providing service if it is
“prejudicial to security”. When “something is prejudicial to security,” that will be defined by the
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). In other words, an administrative authority,
ASIO, is the one that will decide what a matter of national security is, and the attorney general will
decide if the situation is of so much gravity that shutting down the Internet is an option. This set
of legal powers existed since 2003 when the Australian Parliament amended the statute as part of
a counter-terrorism measure (Keane, 2012b).

3.6.3. United Kingdom (U.K.)

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, commonly known as the
United Kingdom (U.K.) or Britain, is a well-consolidated democratic regime and a constitutional
monarchy with a parliamentary system. It is also the progenitor of the common law system. The
U.K. is one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UN, 2014b)
and a member of the OECD (OECD, 2014). From an economic point of view, the U.K. is the sixthlargest economy in the world and the third-largest in Europe after Germany and France (IMF,
2014).
In the past, the U.K. was involved in multiple acts of government control over the Internet.
In the mid-1990s the U.K. (alongside with Germany and France) focused on self-regulation of
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content. However, this was difficult to control. In March 1996, the British Trade and Industry
Minister claimed that the government should encourage ISPs to “voluntarily control” the content
they provided to the end-users (Sorensen, 1996).
In 2001, the U.K. government threatened to prosecute under criminal charges to ISPs for
distributing illegal adoption sites. As a consequence, by 2005 the U.K. government enacted laws
that require ISPs to remove content that was considered inappropriate or unlawful (Subramanian,
2011).
In 2010, the British government wanted to impose limitations over the ISPs to provide
pornography on an 'opt-in' basis. The same year the government ordered the ISPs to block access
to a file-sharing website Newzbin2 (Mennecke, 2010). In 2016, the British Parliament passed one
of the most controversial bills banning encryption (Lomas, 2016). Despite having these strict
policies, back in 2011, the U.K. government was highly critical of the Egyptian Internet shut down
(Clegg, 2011).
In 2011, between August 6 and 11, during the riots in London, an episode known as
“BlackBerry riots,” the British Prime Minister at the time, David Cameron, made public his desire
to have a “kill switch” for social networks platforms (Cameron, 2011b). Mr. Cameron blamed
social networks for helping to organize criminal actions during the riots in ways the police was not
able to control (Cameron, 2011b). However, what is not very well known is that previously Mr.
Cameron considered shutting down the Internet (Ghosh, 2011; Marsden, 2011).
Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary William Hague persuaded Mr. Cameron against the
use of this extreme policy because shutting down the Internet would lead to accusations of
hypocrisy over the rights of free speech in the U.K. In consequence, the British government
abandoned the plan of shutting down the Internet after possible comparisons with the Arab spring
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(with the Egyptian case in particular that happened the same year) and restrictions over the freedom
of speech as they happen in China (DH, 2011; Ghosh, 2011; Williams, 2011). The British
parliament never discussed a bill granting legal powers to the British government to shut down the
Internet.
After the debate in London about shutting down the Internet and the BART episode in the
U.S., the Chinese news service Xinhua reminded that in a speech delivered in Kuwait in February,
the British prime minister argued that freedom of expression should be respected the same “in
Tahrir Square as much as Trafalgar Square” (Xinhua, 2011, para.5). They accused the U.K.
government of hypocrisy and also claimed that the Chinese government “may wonder why western
leaders, on the one hand, tend to indiscriminately accuse other nations of monitoring, but on the
other take for granted their steps to monitor and control the Internet” (Xinhua, 2011, para.9).
Besides the U.K. government, the academic sector also discussed the subject. According
to some academics, such as David Eagleman, author of “Why the Net Matters,” Section 132 of the
Communications Act of 2003 (See Appendix 2) grants special powers to the “Independent
regulator and competition authority for the United Kingdom communications industries,” known
as OFCOM. According to section 132, OFCOM can request to any U.K.-based ISP the suspension
of the service to preserve the “public order” or in case of a massive cyberattack. This legislation is
part of the national security strategy of the U.K. (Harding, 2011; Marsden, 2011).
OFCOM has the legal authority to act on behalf of one of the ministers, most likely the
minister of culture, who would be the one who has legal power to shut down the Internet (Harding,
2011; Marsden, 2011). Along with section 132 of the Communications Act, the part 2 of the Civil
Contingencies Act of 2004 also would give to the executive branch legal authority to request to
the ISPs the suspension of the Internet service. According to part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act,
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the executive branch is entitled to create emergency regulations if the U.K. faces a national security
threat.
“Civil Contingency Act 2004”
“Part 2 Emergency powers
19 Meaning of “emergency”
“(1) In this Part “emergency” means—
(a) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare
in the United Kingdom or in a Part or region,
(b) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment
of the United Kingdom or of a Part or region, or
(c) war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the
United Kingdom.”
(…)”
“(6) The event or situation mentioned in subsection (1) may occur or be inside or
outside the United Kingdom.
20 Power to make emergency regulations
(1) Her Majesty may by Order in Council make emergency regulations if satisfied
that the conditions in section 21 are satisfied.
(2) A senior Minister of the Crown may make emergency regulations if satisfied—
(a) that the conditions in section 21 are satisfied, and
(b) that it would not be possible, without serious delay, to arrange for an
Order in Council under subsection (1).

According to the representatives of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, a
government order to shut down the Internet has to follow a grave threat, like a significant
cyberattack (Harding, 2011). Although an interested party may challenge the government’s request
in an urgent judicial review, a threat to the public order or a national security emergency is unlikely
to be overturned, and therefore all operators of telecom infrastructure must follow the government
request (C. Russell, 2011). Differently, from the opinion of this department, an academic sector
considers that, despite the powers contained in section 132, the only thing the U.K. government
can do is to serve the ISPs with a notification. In the case that one or more ISP refuse the
government’s request, the punishment is merely a fee (Winder, 2011).
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By 2017 the U.K. government identified “cyber” as one the major threats to their national
security, in particular when the U.K.’s Internet and critical national infrastructure are involved
(POST, 2017). In the same line, the current U.K. administration, led by Theresa May, is taking a
more aggressive approach when is about Internet regulation:
“Some people say that it is not for the government to regulate when it comes to technology
and the internet, ….We disagree.” (Krieger, 2017, para.4).

3.6.4. United States of America (U.S.)

The U.S. is a federal republic with a presidential system. Until 2016, the U.S. was
considered a consolidated democratic regime. In 2017, the EIU re-categorized the U.S. from being
a consolidated democracy into a “flawed” one, (or a “young” democracy using the terminology of
this dissertation). According to the EIU report, the change occurred because of the erosion of
confidence in government and public institutions (EIU, 2017). The U.S. is also an OECD member,
and its per capita GDP is one of the highest in the world (IMF, 2014).
The U.S. legislative branch had a prolonged debate to grant legal power to the president to
shut down the Internet (CDT, 2009; Phillip Reitinger, Butler, Schwartz, & Chipman, 2011;
Lieberman, 2011a). The U.S. Congress did not pass the proposed bills, partially because of the
opposition by members in civil society (CDT, 2009; MacKinnon, 2012). However, according to
members of the government, the president already has authority to shut down the Internet
according to current telecommunications laws (Lieberman, 2011a).
The case of the U.S. demonstrates how national security concerns have been the primary
reason to control the telecommunication system since the beginning of the twentieth century.
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Section 606 of the Communications Act of 193416 contains special powers for the U.S. president
in case of war. Conditions included in subsection (a) of section 606 are specific to the preferential
communications to be used during wartime (Opderbeck, 2012, 2013):
1. During the continuance of a war in which the U.S. is engaged, and
2. If the President considers that prioritized communications are required for the national
defense and security.
If these two conditions met, the president is authorized to act according to his or her
judgment and to direct the telecommunications system to protect the national security within U.S.
territory. (Medows, 2012; Opderbeck, 2012, 2013).
The provisions of section 606 are the result of a long legislative practice of controlling the
telecommunications system, long before the Internet (Horvitz, 2013). This legislative practice
started during World War I, continued during the interwar period and the World War II, until
today. Between 1951 and September 11, 2001, the history of the Presidential directives and
executive orders was focused on defense during the Cold War, specifically against nuclear attacks.
After September 11, 2001, the focus changed to terrorism and cyberterrorism, consolidating many
functions in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The content of bills and directives
changed, and it turned to include all of what today falls under the label of “cybersecurity” (Acklyn
Murray, Zeadally, & Flowers, 2012; Opderbeck, 2012, 2013). I present a timeline where I refer to
the most important laws and bills enacted between 1912 and 2001 (please see figure 09 in the next
page).

16

Successor of the Radio Act of 1912
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Figure 09- U.S. Government Control over the Telecommunications Infrastructure
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Between 2009 and 2012, the U.S. Senate was the center of debate for several bills that
attempted to give to the President legal power to shut down the Internet and take over the Internet
communications of any public or private entity (P. M. Shane, 2012; Thompson, 2012). None of
these bills passed because of the strong opposition by civil society organizations, which were
mostly concerned about two specific problems that were common to the bills’ drafts (MacKinnon,
2012; Medows, 2012; Opderbeck, 2013):
1. The potential impact on freedom of speech
Over the same packets, wires, and routers that form the Internet, travels information about
the U.S. critical infrastructure and people’s communications. Therefore, any action to
protect the critical infrastructure will affect the communication process. In this way, an
operation of governmental control would have a direct impact on civil liberties, such as the
freedom of speech, one of the cornerstones of a democratic system.
2. Limits of the President’s authority
The text of the bills never clarified the extent of the president’s authority. Additionally,
some scholars and government agencies representatives consider that the president already
has authority to shut down the Internet according to the Executive legal powers of the
Telecommunications Act of 1934.
In the next paragraphs I will provide an overview of the bills proposed within the U.S.
Senate between 2009 and 2011.
On April 1, 2009, Senator Rockefeller presented bill S.773 to the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation; from that moment, the bill became officially known as
the “Cybersecurity Act of 2010”. The goal of S.773 was strengthening the security of the
information infrastructure within the U.S. territory by “increasing the information security
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workforce, creating new authorities for the federal government, and promoting public-private
collaboration” (U.S. Senate, 2010a).
The cybersecurity act of 2010 distinguished the character of public-private relationships to
protect cyberspace (U.S. Senate, 2010a). Section 18 paragraphs 2 and 6 of S.773 attempted to give
the President legal authority to shut down the Internet within U.S. territory:
“S.773.- Cybersecurity Act of 2009”
Sec. 18. Cybersecurity responsibilities and authorities.
“The President— “
….
“(2) may declare a cybersecurity emergency and order the limitation or shutdown
of Internet traffic to and from any compromised Federal Government or United
States critical infrastructure information system or network;”
…
“(6) may order the disconnection of any Federal Government or United States
critical infrastructure information systems or networks in the interest of national
security;”

For this reason, bill S.773 was very unpopular among civil society organizations. The main
points of critique were that the bill did not provide any guidance or limits to the powers of the
president and that it did not make distinctions between the elements of the communications
infrastructure that supports free speech and those that do not (CDT, 2009). For this reason, digital
activists baptized S.773 as the “Internet kill switch” bill.
Before reporting S.773 to the Senate on December 22, 2010, sponsors of the bill removed
section 18. Despite this modification, the U.S. Senate didn't approve bill S.773 (U.S. Senate,
2010a).
On May 29, 2009, President Obama declared the digital infrastructure (the Internet
included) as a “strategic national asset” to be protected by the U.S. government and private
companies because digital technologies are vital for the prosperity of the U.S. national economy
during the 21st century (White House, 2009). Following the White House policy, on June 6, 2010,
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Senator John Lieberman (D) introduced bill S.3480, titled “Protecting Cyberspace as a National
Asset Act of 2010,” also known as PCNAA. The main purpose of bill S.3480 was to amend the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 and related laws by improving “the security and resiliency of the
cyber and communications infrastructure of the United States”. Unlike its predecessor, bill S.773,
S.3480 was an outcome of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
(Lieberman, 2010).
Senator Lieberman remarked that the Internet is constantly under attack; therefore, the
purpose of bill S.3480 was to secure the most “critical cyber networks” and to be prepared for
potential cyberwarfare and cyberattacks. As it happened with bill S.773, sponsors of bill S.3480
also expected to strengthen the collaboration between the public and private sectors to protect the
critical infrastructure. Nevertheless, S.3480 even attempted to give to the president legal power to
“impose emergency measures on a select group of the most critical infrastructure” to preserve it
(U.S. Senate et al., 2010). If approved, S.3480 would have granted to the president the capacity to
declare a national cyber emergency that eventually could force owners and operators of critical
infrastructure into immediate compliance with any emergency measure or action, including
shutting down the Internet (Thompson, 2012).
The possibility of shutting down the Internet was not included in S.3480 as it was in bill
S.773, but it was not rejected either.
“S.3480.- Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010”
Sec. 249. National Cyber Emergencies
…
‘‘(c) COMPLIANCE WITH EMERGENCY MEASURES. —
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL. —Subject to paragraph (2), the owner or operator of
covered critical infrastructure shall immediately comply with any
emergency measure or action developed by the Director under this section
during the pendency of any declaration by the President under subsection
(a)(1) or an extension under subsection (b)(2).
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Just like in the case of the previous bill (S.773), bill 3480 was also baptized as the “Internet
kill switch” bill, and many civil society organizations opposed it (MacKinnon, 2012). Alongside
the potential attributions of the president, according to the text of S.3480, owners or operators of
the covered critical infrastructure (CCI), will have to comply with any emergency measure
established by the Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Senate et al., 2010). Sponsors of bill
S.3480 never clarified the concept of “emergency measures”. Those words could mean anything,
even shutting down the Internet (Theohary & Rollins, 2011)
On the other hand, despite so much criticism, it also must be clear that Senator Lieberman
and co-sponsors of S.3480 always denied that their intention was granting to the president
attributions to shut down the Internet within U.S. territory (Lawson, 2011).
On December 15, 2010, Senator Lieberman presented the report 111-368 about bill S.3480
within the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (U.S. Senate, 2010b). The
Committee then placed S.3480 on the Senate legislative calendar under General Orders Calendar
No. 698, but the bill was not approved (Lieberman, 2010).
It is also important to note that, previously, on June 16, 2010, Representative Jane Harman
(D) had introduced Bill H.R.5548 within the House of Representatives. The full text and title of
H.R.5548 were identical to the version of S.3480. H.R. 5548 was referred to multiple subcommittees, but it was never enacted (Govtrack.us, 2010; Harman, 2010).
Finally, on February 17, 2011, again under the sponsorship of Senator Joseph Lieberman
and having as co-sponsors Senators Collins (R) and Carper (D), bill S.413 was introduced in the
U.S. Congress. Just as it happened with its predecessor (S.3480), sponsors submit S.413 to the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
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Bill S.413 was titled ‘‘Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act of 2011,’’ also known as
CIFA (Lieberman, 2011b). The official purpose of bill S.413 was (like bill S.3480) to amend the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 and related laws to improve the security and resiliency of the
communications infrastructure in the U.S., especially the Internet. The purpose of S.413, similar
to its predecessors, was also to address the growing threat of attacks against the U.S. critical
infrastructure (Lieberman, 2011).
Unlike its predecessors, bill S.413 acknowledges the fact that shutting down the Internet is
not possible in the U.S. territory because of the high level of Internet penetration rate and because
the existence of thousands of ISPs makes this technically impossible17.
At the same time, S.413 ensured that “the President cannot take any action that would limit
free speech or shut down the internet (Lieberman, 2011a). Therefore, unlike its two predecessors,
bill S.413 declares that neither the President nor any other federal employee has authority to shut
down the Internet:
“S.413.- Cyber-security and Internet Freedom Act of 2011”
“Sec. 2. Internet Freedom Act.”
“(…)
(b)FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
(…) (10) neither the President, the Director of the National Center for
Cyber-security and Communications, nor any other officer or employee of
the Federal Government should have the authority to shut down the
Internet.”

During the introduction of S.413 within the U.S. Senate, Senator Carper underlined that
S.413 contained explicit provisions to prevent the president from applying any restrictions over

17

“S.413.- Cyber-security and Internet Freedom Act of 2011”
“Sec. 2. Internet Freedom Act.”
“(…)
(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
(…) (4) the Internet has developed into a robust network within the United States, with thousands of
providers, making it technically impossible to shut down the Internet;”

105
Internet traffic. Additionally, Senator Lieberman also stated that bill S.413 only would clarify the
president’s authority to act in the event of a cyber-attack (Lieberman, 2011a). However, on this
matter, Senator Lieberman also stated that the executive branch believes that, according to the
telecommunications law from 1934 and further amendments of 1996, the president already has the
faculty to disconnect some parts of the Internet (Lieberman, 2011).
As part of the debate within the U.S. government, officials from DHS consider that section
706 of the Telecommunications Act gives attributions to the president to take extraordinary
measures to respond to a cyberattack (Lieberman et all, 2011b). On the other hand, within the U.S.
Senate, some senators have recognized that the war powers of the president, as the telecom statute
establishes, are broad and vague, so much that “in the event of a cyber-attack, the President’s
authorities are broad and ambiguous—a recipe for encroachments on privacy and civil liberties.”
(Senator Collins, 2011, p.912).
On May 23rd, 2011, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
conducted hearings about bill S.413; however, the U.S. Senate never passed S.413.
In parallel to the Senate debate, on May 12, 2011, the Obama Administration prepared a
set of recommendations for new cybersecurity legislation. One of the proposals was related to a
“Cybersecurity Regulatory Framework for Covered Critical Infrastructure” (Schmidt, 2011). I will
call this document the White House proposal of 2011.
On May 23, 2011, a hearing was conducted within the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs of the U.S. Senate to assess the White House proposal (US Senate,
2011). Both projects, S.413 and the White House initiative, agree that DHS would have the
authority to identify and decide what cyber infrastructures and critical infrastructures are, whether
they belong to the private or public sector, and act over them in the eventual case of a cyberattack.
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Like the Senate bills, the White House proposal also incorporated provisions to include the private
sector within the national security strategy (Schmidt, 2011).
The White House Proposal is broadly like the previous bills under study. About the
possibility of shutting down the Internet and why the White House proposal does not contain any
changes to the president’s powers provided in the telecommunications law of 1934, on May 23,
2011, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental affairs within the U.S. Senate
conducted a hearing. In that session, Philip Reitinger (at the time, the deputy undersecretary for
the National Protection and Programs Directorate, from DHS), stated that the White House
proposal contains the same attributions for the president established in the telecommunications act
of 1934 (Phillip Reitinger et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, Mr. Reitinger also stated that, because national security situations are
“context-driven,” any final response about how to act requires further discussion and debate among
all the stakeholders involved (Philip Reitinger, Butler, Schwartz, & Chipman, 2011). Finally, Mr.
Reitinger acknowledged that the president will use the authority conferred by law in the “right
way”. However, he did not provide any further explanation about what the “right way” means (US
Senate, 2011).
On this matter, the essential difference between the White House initiative and bill S.413
is that the White House proposal did not contain specific emergency powers as bill S.413. The
reason for this lack of emergency powers would lie in the fact that the current administration
considers that the president already has authority to shut down the Internet, according to the
Telecommunication Act of 1934 (Medows, 2012).
Figures 10, 11 and 12 shows a timeline of the introduction of the bills, the variation in the
content of the different U.S. Senate bills and the White House initiative.
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Figure 10.- U.S. Congress Internet Shutdown Bills– Timeline
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Cybersecurity Enhancement
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Coordination Act of
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Figure 11.- U.S. Congress Internet Shutdown Bills– Specific Provisions about Internet Shutdowns

U.S. Congress - Internet Shutdown Bills
2009-2010

111th Congress

2011-2013

112th Congress
S.3480
S.773
Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science,
and Transportation
S. 773
Cybersecurity
Act of 2009

2009
The President can declare
a “national cyber
emergency” and order to
shut down the Internet

Senate Committee
on Homeland
Security
S.3480 Protecting the
Cyberspace as a
National Asset
Act of 2010

2010
The President can declare
a “national cyber
emergency” and owners
and operators of critical
infrastructure must be in
compliance with “any
emergency measure or
action”

S.413

S.1353

Senate Committee on
Homeland Security

Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and
Transportation

S.413 Cybersecurity and
Internet Freedom
Act of 2011

2011
The President can declare a “national
cyber emergency” but does not have
authority to shut down the Internet
BUT …..
The NCCC Director can decide what
owners and operators of the critical
infrastructure have to do

S.1353 - Cybersecurity Act
of 2013

2012

2013
It became Public Law
113-274
Reintroduction of S.773.
There is no mention
about the capacity to
shut down the Internet
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U.S. White House Proposals
Figure 12.- U.S. White House Proposals Internet Shutdown Related
111th Congress

2009-2010

S.773
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S.3480
S.413

The White House
launches the
comprehensive
National Cybersecurity
Initiative

2009
The U.S. government
declares the cyberspace a
“national asset”

2011-2013

White House Proposal
Cybersecurity Regulatory
Framework for Covered
Critical Infrastructure

2010

2011
It keeps the President’s war
emergency—powers
The President is authorized to
direct the communications
system within U.S. territory

Presidential Policy
Directive 21
PPD 21

2012

2013
PPD 21 on Critical
Infrastructure Security and
Resilience is a national effort to
strengthen and maintain
secure, functioning, and
resilient critical infrastructure.
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Finally, in the case of the U.S., it is important to refer to an aspect not related to any type
of academic or legal debate. In the next paragraphs, I will provide details about a controversial
protocol whose content is unknown. On July 3, 2011, a BART (Bay Area Rapid Transit) police
officer shot and killed a homeless man in the Civic Center station in San Francisco. Following this
event, protestors congregated in BART stations, opposing what they considered to be an
inappropriate response to a suspected mentally ill man. Following protests, the regular
communication BART service got disrupted. To prevent future protests, and without prior notice,
BART shut down wireless communications service underground for three hours. The disruption
prevented protesters from any communication. This government action was justified in the name
of public security (Elinson, 2011; Elinson & Walter, 2011).
After the 2005 London underground bombings, U.S. authorities believed that terrorists
could detonate a similar bomb through the wireless networks in New York City. With this fear in
mind, the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee commissioned
a task force to create a mechanism for coordinating government and industry actors’ actions to
implement emergency wireless network shutdowns. The result of this commission was the
“Standard Operational Protocol 303 Emergency Wireless Protocols,” (SOP 303).
Following the BART incident, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) became
interested in SOP 303. In 2012, EPIC filed a FOIA18 request and sent to DHS questions about SOP
303 implementation, and any related guidelines or protocols (EPIC, 2012). DHS responded to the
request by turning a crossed-out-document where the only words to read were “SOP 303”
(Brownlee, 2015; DeSoto, 2015). Following the analysis of the document, EPIC and public interest

18
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a law that gives U.S. citizens the right to access information from the
federal government. The procedure to access information under the rules of the freedom of information act is known as a “FOIA
request”.
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advocacy groups, baptized SOP 303 as the U.S. protocol to shut down the Internet or the
“cellphone kill switch” (EPIC, 2011; Jacobs, 2013; Kravets, 2015b; NSTAC, 2006).
Facing these circumstances, on February 27, 2013, EPIC filed another FOIA request for
the protocol (Clabough, 2015; Ditz, 2015). It was in that moment that, official documents disclosed
in the Court described SOP 303 as an emergency wireless protocol, which purpose is “codifying a
shutdown and restoration process for use by commercial and private wireless networks during
national crises” (Whittaker, 2013, para.4). The DHS argued that they couldn't disclose this protocol
for reasons of national security, and initially the judicial branch ruled against the DHS arguments.
The DC District Court ruled that exemptions contained in the FOIA regulations don’t apply to this
case (DeSoto, 2015). The DHS appealed, and in February 2015, the DC Court of Appeals reversed
the District Court’s judgment (Kravets, 2015a, 2016; United States Court of Appeals, 2015).
In this scenario, as far as we know, the purpose of SOP 303 is preventing terrorists to
activate bombs through wireless networks. The government would be explicitly authorized to
target a "localized area," whether it is a bridge, a building or a metropolitan area (Kravets, 2015b).
However, after the BART episode, it became a question whether SOP 303 also would be used to
prevent peaceful protestors. Another issue that came up was whether cellphone and Internet access
are part of the First Amendment right and should not be taken away in national emergencies. On
January 11, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review EPIC v. DHS (Shin, 2015). Despite
the gravity of the implications of SOP 303 capabilities, nothing else is known about it.
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3.6.5. República Bolivariana de Venezuela (Venezuela)

Venezuela is a republic with a federal presidential system. Venezuela is considered a
hybrid regime because of the permanency in power of the same party since 1999, continuous
violations over the freedom of speech, and because members of rival political parties formally
contested the last elections in 2013. Additionally, since 2014, several political rivals to the current
regime have been imprisoned, and their situation remains uncertain (Brodzinsky, 2015; EIU, 2011,
2017; theguardian, 2017; Villafranca, 2013). In May 2017, the current Venezuelan President,
Nicolás Maduro, called to hold elections for a “Constituent Assembly.” The purpose of this
assembly is to write a new Venezuelan Constitution. Nicolás Maduro has disowned the authority
of the current Venezuelan Congress, where his party does not have majority. When asked about
the necessity to call for these new elections, Maduro answered that he needs to “transform that
rotten National assembly,” referring to the current Venezuelan Congress (Ore & Chinea, 2017,
para.9). On July 30, 2017, when the elections took place, Caracas (the capital city) was full of
protests, and government forces killed at least ten protestors (BBC Mundo, 2017).
Despite having numerous oil reserves, the Venezuelan economy is in crisis and is
considered one of the most corrupt and dangerous places in the world. In early 2013, Venezuela
devalued its currency due to growing shortages in the nation-state, and the economy fell into
recession. Alongside with the economic crisis, since late January 2014, Venezuela lives in turmoil
because of the national protests that demand democratic changes in the government (EFE, 2015,
2017; Naim & Toro, 2016; Pardo, 2016).
To avoid the U.S. led financial sanctions, Nicolás Maduro looked for alternatives into the
digital currency, and he announced the creation of the “petro,” a crypto currency backed by oil
reserves (Ulmer & Buitrago, 2017). The Venezuelan government has introduced “petro”,
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abbreviated as “PTR,” as the realization of president Hugo Chavez’s idea of “a strong currency
backed by raw materials.” (Greenfield, 2018, para.4).
In terms of control over the Internet infrastructure, Venezuela shut down the Internet three
times (See figure 13): (1) the first Internet shutdown took place during the time of the national
presidential elections in 2013 (See figure 13), (2) the second Internet shutdown occurred during
the nationwide protests in 2014 (and was concentrated in San Cristóbal, the capital city of Táchira,
located at the border with Colombia) (Diaz Hernandez, 2013; Mora, 2014) and 3) at the beginning
of 2015 the Internet went down again. During the last Internet shutdown, the government claimed
an accident because the government-owned CANTV, the leading Internet service provider that
handles almost entirely the number of Internet subscribers in Venezuela, had technical problems
providing the service (El Universal, 2015; Gomez, 2013).
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Figure 13.- Internet Shut Down Venezuela, 2013 Presidential Elections
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Figure 14.- Venezuela Internet Shutdowns Timeline

Venezuela has 23 internationally connected domestic providers, and these periodic Internet
shutdowns are not considered of the same magnitude as the Egyptian one. Venezuela suffered
short-term-episodes of Internet shutdown, differently from the national five-day-Egyptian case.
Additionally CANTV, the biggest government-owned-ISP has experienced loss of transit through
international providers through the years (Dyn, 2014b).
In 2000, and according to the provisions of the National Statute of Telecommunications,
the Venezuela government started drafting a law titled “Responsabilidad Social en Radio,
Televisión y Medios Electrónicos” Act (“Law of Social Responsibility in Radio, Television and
Electronic media”), also known as RESORTE law. The purpose of this new law was, according
the text of the law itself, strengthening the democratic system and to encourage the creation of
culture of respect towards human rights (Finol & Espinoza, 2015). In article 1 RESORTE
emphasizes the duties of the actors considered relevant for the Venezuelan government:
“Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio, Televisión y Medios Electrónicos
Articulo 1.- Esta Ley tiene por objeto establecer, en la difusión y recepción de
mensajes, la responsabilidad social de los prestadores de los servicios de radio y
televisión, proveedores de medios electrónicos, los anunciantes, los productores y
productoras nacionales independientes y los usuarios y usuarias, para fomentar el
equilibrio democrático entre sus deberes, derechos e intereses a los fines de
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promover la justicia social y de contribuir con la formación de la ciudadanía, la
democracia, la paz, los derechos humanos, la cultura, la educación, la salud y el
desarrollo social y económico de la Nación, de conformidad con las normas y
principios constitucionales de la legislación para la protección integral de los niños,
niñas y adolescentes, la cultura, la educación, la seguridad social, la libre
competencia y la Ley Orgánica de Telecomunicaciones …” (Asamblea Nacional
de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, p.1, 2004)

Translation:
Law of Social Responsibility in Radio, Television and Electronic media
Article 1.- The purpose of this Law is to establish, when is about the dissemination
and receipt of messages, the social responsibility for providers of radio and
television services, media providers producers, advertisers, independent national
producers and users, to promote a democratic balance between their duties, rights
and interests for the purpose of promoting social justice and contributing to the
formation of citizenship, democracy, peace, human rights, culture, education,
health and the social and economic development of the nation, according to the
constitutional norms and provisions of the legislation for integral protection of
children, culture education, social security and the National Telecom Statute …..

Initially, the law only covered radio and television, but in 2005 an amendment included the
Internet. This statute is one of the most controversial rules approved by the Venezuelan Congress
because its purpose is to control the content of what is published on the Internet and the rest of the
media. RESORTE forbids material considered “offensive,” “violent,” “disrupt public order,”
“disown pubic authorities,” and “induce homicide.” RESORTE also makes third parties, website
platforms (such as Twitter and Facebook), responsible for the content posted by Internet users. It
is of course for the government authority, the regulator, in this case, to decide when the speech
falls into the previous categories (Finol & Espinoza, 2015; Gonzalo, 2010). RESORTE is the final
product of years of efforts by former President Hugo Chavez, who vouched to regulate the Internet
when he was alive (drupy2000, 2010; El Pais, 2010).
On May 13, 2007, the Venezuelan government enacted the Presidential Decree 2849. The
decree 2849 declared a “State of Emergency,” in the entire Venezuelan territory for sixty days.
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Among the provisions of 2849, the government included the possibility of filtering and
surveillance of Internet content. The Venezuelan government justification was the existence of
local and international actors interfering in the national economy through the use of the ICT and
the cyberspace to promote the hate speech and to create distortion in the Venezuela economy
(ISOC, 2017a).
During the first quarter of 2017, the Venezuelan government blocked the sites
“DolarToday” and “Maduradas,” and attacked at least 11 independent portals and NGOs sites.
After March 28, 2017, when Maduro tried to strip Congress from power, the regulator “Comisión
Nacional de Telecomunicaciones” (CONATEL) (“National Telecommunications Commission”)
authorized the censorship of digital TVs Vivo Play, VPI Tv and the Capitolio portal TV channel.
It is common to censor websites in Venezuela, to impose restrictions on social networking
platforms and to decrease download speed of the Internet services. These are standard practices
during times of national unrest. Sites more common to censor are related to the parallel dollar
market, media and critics towards the Venezuelan government and former President Chavez
(IPYS, 2017).
On June 1, 2017, the President of CONATEL, Mr. Andrés Eloy Méndez, announced that
the government was preparing an administrative regulation that would oversee different aspects of
the Internet. Some of those aspects include the creation of email accounts, the use of IP addresses
and the identification of the author of an action (positive or negative) (Angarita, 2017; El Nacional,
2017). Mr. Méndez was also very clear about how the Venezuelan government would attempt to
identify any individual who has an account on a social platform:
“Estamos evaluando el levantamiento de información de quién abre una cuenta, de quien
ejerce un medio electrónico por la plataforma que sea: Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, el
que sea” (Angarita, para.3, 2017)
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Translation:
“We are evaluating the gathering of information from any person who opens an account,
from who uses an electronic medium for any platform, whether it is: Twitter, Instagram,
Facebook”

3.6.6. The Republic of Turkey (Turkey)

Turkey is a constitutional republic with a parliamentary system. Turkey is also a member
of the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) group (Bhalla, 2009; OECD, 2014).
Turkey's growing economy and diplomatic initiatives have led to its recognition as a regional
power (IMF, 2014).
Turkey is considered a hybrid regime because of its low levels of political participation
and government acts over the freedom of speech. The Turkish government has a strong policy to
censor Internet content and, since 2007, the court system has been active putting down multiple
sites (EIU, 2017; OpenNet, 2013). On May 4, 2007, the Turkish Grand National Assembly
(TGNA) passed the Law 5651 titled “Law No. 5651 on Regulating Broadcasting on the Internet
and Fighting Against Crimes Committed through Internet Broadcasting,” also known as Internet
Act (IA) (WIPO, 2008). Law 5651 gave more power to the Turkish regulator (TIB), to (Kizilkaya,
2014; trend, 2014):
1. Block Internet access and censor its content, if a Court approves it within 48 hours
2. Collect Internet traffic information through IP number, subscriber numbers, subscription
information form the ISPs, the type of service and the amount of data used
According to the Turkish government, the enactment of law 5651 concerns for the
availability of defamatory videos about the founder of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal

119
Atatürk through YouTube. Additional interests include increasing of child pornographic, and
Satanist content on the Internet, information about suicide, or about illegal substances deemed
harmful or inappropriate for children. This Turkish law allowed the government to censor websites
without even a court order. As consequence of the creation of this new legal statute, until December
2009 there were at least 197 court orders to censor at least 3700 websites (OpenNet, 2013; OSCE
RFOM, 2009)
In 2011, thousands of people took the streets and protested against the Turkish government
because of this new system of censoring the Internet (Arsu, 2011). The new law was criticized,
alongside with previous practices over the Internet infrastructure, for a negative contrast with the
democratic norms of the European Union (EU), an organization Turkey has been eager to
incorporate (Kizilkaya, 2014).
Between 2013 and 2014, Turkey was in turmoil because of public protests opposed to the
current government. After the police's intense reaction to tear gas, protests grew each day. With
the purpose of decreasing the demonstrations, the Turkish government censored social networks
sites, mainly Twitter and YouTube (Dyn, 2014d; Oi, 2014).
As mentioned before in this dissertation, during the 2013 protests, the Turkish regulator
was also responsible for poisoning the DNS, concretely Google’s public address (Carstensen,
2014). Recently in 2016, the Turkish regulator, TIB, ordered ISPs to block Tor and different
censorship virtual private networks (VPNs), such as VPN Master, Hotspot Shield, Psiphon,
Zenmate, TunnelBear, Zero, Vypr and Express (Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2016).
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3.6.7. The Russian Federation (Russia)

Russia is a federal semi-presidential republic and was considered a hybrid regime (EIU,
2011). Like the U.K and the U.S., Russia is also a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council (UN, 2014b) and its economy, the eighth largest in the world, has based on
Russia's extensive mineral and energy resources, the most abundant reserves in the planet. Russia
was considered a hybrid regime, but by 2017 was downgraded from hybrid to an authoritarian
regime, mostly because of Vladimir Putin’s decision of running (and being elected) for a third
presidential term, after being also three times prime minister of Russia (EIU, 2017).
Since 2000, Vladimir Putin has remained in power either as a President or Prime Minister
(Russia has both positions at the same time) and has created an oppressive policy of government
control over the Internet (Morozov, 2011). Also in 2000, Putin put a law into effect that grants
eight different security authorities direct access to all Internet transactions forcing all ISPs to
provide information as requested (Hale, 2010).
In 2005, Russian Internet Service Providers (ISPs) were forced to provide cable links to
the secret service at their own expense. Since 2006, the Russian government has implemented a
robust censoring policy, and it remains today (Duffy, 2015; Morozov, 2011). Additionally, since
2012 the Russian government enacted various laws that the Moscow Times baptized the
“Blitzkrieg laws” over the Internet infrastructure (Eremenko, 2014b). As part of this nationalist
policy approach, the Russian Internet (российский Интернет) got its own name, RuNet
(Asmolov, 2015).
At the end of 2011, Putin’s second premiership also ended after he won the Presidential
elections for a third administration. National protests in Russia characterized the transition between
Putin's second premiership and his third presidential administration. After facing massive protests,
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Putin’s attitude towards the Internet shifted to gain complete control over any activity within the
Internet (Please see figure 15) (Asmolov, 2015; Duffy, 2015).
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Figure 15.- Russian Government Isolated Actions over the Internet Infrastructure (2000-2013)

Source: Modified from Vargas Leon, 2015
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Russia has been ranked third worldwide concerning the stability of its national Internet
when facing possible breaches. Only the U.K. and U.S. networks are deemed to be more reliable.
RuNet has an extensive infrastructure: there are over 1,000 operators within Russian territory, with
dozens of them connected to foreign networks (Kolomychenko & Kommersant, 2016).
In June 2013, after the revelation of the National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance
policy19, the Russian government called for a global protest and advocated for the creation of a
U.N. body that would have regulatory control over the Internet. Mr. Ruslan Gattarov, a member
of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, proposed the creation of a new group to control
the World Wide Web (www). Mr. Gattarov justified his request, “So that everyone, not only the
U.S., has access to the master switch” (Watson, 2013, para.1). A strict interpretation of these words
would suggest that the Russian legislator thought that a “real” master switch to shut down the
Internet does exist.
However, this was just the beginning of a debate about the possibility of shutting down the
Internet and one episode within Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policy to control the Internet
infrastructure. Later, between 2012 and 2014, the Russian government passed eight laws to
regulate the Internet and freedom of expression in the Russian Internet. The Moscow Times
baptized those laws as the Russian ‘blitzkrieg’20 laws over the Internet infrastructure because of
the speed with which they were approved and the effect they had (Eremenko, 2014a).

19
In 2013, Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor leaked classified documents to The
Guardian and the Washington Post before leaving U.S. territory for Hong Kong and then Russia. Back then, reports by The
Guardian and the Washington Post reported about a program called PRISM: “collection directly from the servers” of nine U.S.
Internet companies, like Microsoft (MSFT), Yahoo (YHOO), Google (GOOG), Facebook (FB), and Apple (AAPL) (Gellman,
Blake, & Miller, 2013; Greenwald, MacAskill, & Poitras, 2013).
20
Blitzkrieg or the “lightning war,” is a military tactic designed to create disorganization and chaos among enemy forces
by using mobile forces and locally concentrated firepower. If executed successfully, military campaigns may be shortened, which
preserves human lives and limits the expenditure of artillery. During the world war II, the German forces tried out the blitzkrieg in
Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands and France in between 1939 and 1940. The German commander Erwin Rommel also used the
Blitzkrieg technique during the North African campaign of World War II, and it was later adopted by U.S. General George Patton
for his operations in Europe (History.com, 2009).
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At the beginning of 2014, the political scenario in Russia became more volatile because of
the population’s fear towards possible sanctions from the U.S. and the E.U. after the annexation
of Crimea21. Despite the fact that sanctions against Russia were enacted, by September 2014
Russian officials conducted exercises to test the stability of the Internet in Russia with the purpose
of making decisions that strengthen the sovereignty of the Russian segment of the global Internet
(Anastasis Golitsyn, 2014a).
At the end of 2014, the Russian government started analyzing the possibility of forcing
ISPs to censor content within the Internet before delivering it to Internet users. The cost of such
operation was estimated in billions of U.S. dollars and is very aligned with the accusations against
the Russian government of building a domestic version of the “Great Firewall of China” of web
censorship (Eremenko, 2014b).
In January 2015, Vladimir Putin and members of the Russian Security Council introduced
in the Russian political debate a plan that would give the Kremlin the ability to shut down RuNet
from the rest of the world when Russia faces what they call a “national emergency”. This reference
to a national emergency includes “military actions” or “serious protest actions.” In the same year,
the Russian press reported that domestic ISPs blocked the traffic from various foreign sources to
test how RuNet would work without them (Adam Taylor, 2016).
Russian representatives stated that the Security Council also would discuss a plan to give
the Russian government control of the nation-state code top-level domains (ccTLDs), the websites
ending in “.ru,” “.рф,” (Russian Federation in Cyrillic) and to a lesser extent “.su” (for Soviet
Union) (Harding, 2014; Oleg, Kulikova, Lukatsky, Makarova, & Kolesnikov, 2017; Stone, 2014a).

21
Vladimir Putin seized by force the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in early 2014. In 2016, Russia accused Ukraine of
trying to stage armed incursions, but Ukraine denied it and accused Russia of massing tens of thousands of soldiers there (BBC,
2016; Treisman, 2016).
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These domains currently belong to a non-governmental organization, the Coordination Centre of
the National Domain, and not to the government. The Coordination Centre of the National Domain
is a non-governmental organization that manages IP addresses assignments on RuNet. If Putin’s
intentions and the Russian Security Council are successful, the Internet shutdown policy could be
a previous step to force all domains in the .ru zone to be hosted in Russia.
In the same year, 2014, Russian officials initiated the idea of creating and maintaining a
“back-up-copy” of RuNet. The idea was to create a “double” (or “back-up-copy”) of the Internet
routing architecture, a database that would contain IP addresses, routing traffic and DNS system
(Nikkarila & Ristolainen, 2017).
In June 2016, the Ministry of Communication introduced the possibility of amending the
law on communication to ensure the integrity and stability of RuNet. Amendments include the
need to oblige owners of all the autonomous systems that communicate traffic with foreign
networks to “install technical means of control of cross-border traffic” (Kolomychenko &
Kommersant, 2016). Also in 2016, Vladimir Putin’s adviser German Klimenko, defended a data
localization law by warning that RuNet could be disconnected from the World Wide Web (The
Moscow Times, 2016).
On December 5, 2016, the Russian government call to “to deploy a national system of
managing the Russian segment of the internet” (Nikkarila & Ristolainen, 2017, para.1). Moreover,
Russia declared that they would develop the capabilities to disconnect RuNet from the global
Internet by 2020. The task of RuNet 2020 is to stop any dependence from external networks and
to secure that the Russian government gets full control over the different components of the
Internet infrastructure within Russian territory. This is an act with the full purpose of achieving
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what the Russians consider their digital sovereignty within the cyberspace (Nikkarila &
Ristolainen, 2017).
A year later, in July 2017, Russia banned anonymous web surfing tools. The new law
forbade forms of technology that provide access to prohibited websites in Russia. The ban covers
services that facilitate the access to virtual private networks and proxies. ISPs are required to block
sites that host these services (Deahl, 2017; Riley, 2017).
The federal website blacklist from 2012 initially only applied to sites that had content
related to illegal drugs, child pornography, and suicide, but in 2017 an amendment expanded the
coverage of the law to any material suspected of extremism. The change allows for broad and
flexible interpretation. Therefore, the Russian government can censor any view or opinion that
target its power (Deahl, 2017).
Russia has very few IXPs (29 for a vast territory) and Rostelecom, the leading longdistance-telephony-provider and close ally of the government, controls them. Previously, Russia's
attempts to control the Internet were limited to securing government communications from foreign
control, but in recent years that aspiration expanded to include the entire national Internet
infrastructure. The Russian Security Council may try to transfer the power of the .ru and .pФ
domains away from the Coordination Center of Top-Level RU Domains. The talk about shutting
down the Internet is also about how to hand over control of the .ru zone from the coordination
center to the government (Bodner, 2014).
For a long time, the Internet community considered that RuNet had a concentrated
infrastructure, but this is not the case. Such “concentration” operates to keep the control of RuNet
within Russian territory. However, RuNet also has an underlying decentralized infrastructure that
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since 2013 the Russian government has tried to control through legislative and political actions
(Golitsyna, Sergina, & Kozlov, 2016; The Economist, 2007).
In 2018, Klimenko claimed that the Russian government was ready to face a potential
scenario where they could be disconnected from the World Wide Web (The Moscow Times, 2018).
The different statements of the Russian politicians make an echo of the words Winston
Churchill had for Russia: “It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there
is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” (The Churchill Society, 1939, para.1).
The statements of Nikiforov, Klimenko and other Russian securitizing agents indicate that
Russia has at least two different approaches when considering an Internet shutdown. On one hand,
there is a concern over the foreign enemy (known as the unpredictable “West”) imposing its will
and shutting down RuNet and on the other hand, it is the perspective of an action of the Russian
government itself shutting down RuNet to protect it under circumstances of national security
(Vargas-Leon, 2018) (Please see figures 17 and 18).
In the chapter 4 of this dissertation I will develop the concept of the national interest under
the Russian terms and other hybrid and democratic regimes.
More recently, in February 2019, the Russian parliament passed the first reading of what
has been called the “digital sovereignty bill.” The purpose of this bill is to isolate RuNet from the
global Internet by creating a separate internal network where both users (end-to-end) are in Russia.
This would isolate RuNet from the global Internet, a condition that (in the Russian mindset) would
protect the traffic and would make it less vulnerable to interception. This condition also would
provide a degree of resilience against cyberattacks from a foreign power. To achieve this condition
as an independent network, RuNet would require its own DNS. and cross border mobile and
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satellite connections to ensure that the integrity of the network was maintained. By closing
international connections, traffic from abroad must be monitored and filtered (Venables, 2019).
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Figure 16.-Russian ‘Blitzkrieg’ Laws and Actions Over the Internet Infrastructure (2012-2019)

Source: Updated from Vargas Leon, 2015
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Figure 17.- Russia Internet Shutdown Bill and Further Actions (2013-2018)

Source: Updated from Vargas Leon, 2015
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Figure 18.- Russia Perception over the Shutdown of the Russian Internet (RuNet)
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3.6.1. República Federativa Do Brasil (Brazil)

Brazil is a republic with a federal presidential constitutional system and is the largest
economy in the South American hemisphere and the world's seventh largest one. Brazil also has
one of the world's fastest growing major economies, and its economic reforms gave to that nationstate international recognition and influence (IMF, 2014).
Despite its economic progress, the EIU classifies Brazil as a young democracy because of
its low levels of political participation and government actions over the freedom of speech on the
Internet as I will describe in the following paragraphs (EIU, 2011, 2017). In August 2016, the
Brazilian Congress impeached the president Dilma Rousseff, of the left-wing “Partido dos
Trabalhadores” (The “Workers’ party”) for allegations of corruption and contravening budget rules
(this case is known as the Petrobras corruption investigation). This party held power since 2003,
and Dilma Rousseff was replaced by Michel Temer, who may not see out his term of office until
end-2018 because he has also been indicted for cases of corruption (EIU, 2016).
From a technical point of view, since 2004 Brazil has taken significant steps to create a
national system of “Pontos de Troca de Tráfego” – PTTs (in English: Traffic Exchange Points),
which is a network of Internet exchange points located in every major metropolitan area. These
IXPs make easier and less expensive for Brazilian companies and Internet users to connect to the
Internet. They use the BGP routing system to allow multiple services from different ISPs, and in
that way, they reduce their dependence on a single ISP (Cowie, 2015; Dyn, 2014a).
Despite the technical progress creating a robust Internet network, in legal terms, the
situation is very controversial. Between 2006 and 2007, a court ordered to the most prominent
Brazilian ISPs to block specific sites, and later in 2007, YouTube IP addresses were blocked on
its backbone due to a court decision. Additionally, in December 2007, a court forced a journalist
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to withdraw content from an Internet site that implicated a state representative (OpenNet, 2013).
Between 2008 and 2013, multiple court orders affected the Internet, by blocking sites with
apparently defamatory and homophobic content. In the last case, the government also demanded
that hosting services divulge the identities of users who post offensive material. Within the same
period, Google was required to take down Orkut communities (the most popular social network in
Brazil at the time) that could be considered offensive to an evangelical minister (OpenNet, 2013).
Similar practices have continued until 2018.
In 2013, after the Snowden revelations, Brazil emerged as an enemy of international
surveillance practices and called for an international conference, known as NetMundial. In that
conference, the Brazilian government invited to create a global Internet governance regime where
developing nation-states should be represented (Barbara, 2013; Keating, 2013a). Additionally, the
Brazilian Congress enacted what is known as the Brazilian Internet bill of rights, the “Marco Civil”
legislation. Marco Civil includes two fundamental principles, such as the privacy online and the
network neutrality, which forbids the discrimination of the Internet packets (Moncau & Mizukami,
2014; Peralta, 2014).
After the Snowden revelations, Brazil also became a champion of the “cyber-nationalism,”
advocating for the protection of their citizens’ data by keeping it stored in servers within Brazilian
territory. At some point, there were calls to create a separate Internet from the one created by the
U.S. (Keating, 2013a, 2013b). Between 2015 and 2016, the online censoring policy in Brazil
increased, by blocking WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube multiple times, and many of
them with the assent of the Court system (Olukotun & Pallero, 2016; Pallero & Olukotun, 2015).
The main excuse for censoring the Internet content in Brazil has been the fight against cybercrime
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(ITS Rio, 2016). Since 2016, after President Dilma Rousseff was indicted, online censoring in
Brazil increased (Pallero, 2016).
On August 8, 2017, the new Brazilian administration (the Temer administration), published
a public consultation in the Official Brazilian Gazette “Diário Oficial da União” - D.O.U. (Federal
Official Gazette of Brazil - F.O.B.). The public consultation aimed at changes in the composition,
election process and powers of the Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br) (Direitos Na Rede, 2017).
CGI.br is a managing committee, an organization, composed of representatives of the government,
the private sector, civil society, and technical and academic members. CGI.br was created to
establish standards and procedures for the use and development of the Internet in Brazil and is also
responsible for defining the guidelines for all issues related to the Internet regulation (CGI.br, n.d.).
CGI.br also serves as a technical resource to legislators and the executive branch, especially
on issues related to network neutrality, data protection, universal access, and privacy online.
Because of these compelling attributions, CGI.br is considered a threat to some government
officials who would prefer less scrutiny over Internet policies (Direitos Na Rede, 2017; Segal,
2017). The public consultation has been criticized because the government unilaterally attempts to
change the composition of CGI.br, without any dialogue with the other members of the Internet
ecosystem represented in CGI.br (Segal, 2017).
At this point, it is important to note that despite so many censorship episodes and attempts
of control over the Internet infrastructure, Brazil never considered or mentioned the possibility of
shutting down the Internet. On the contrary, when the Brazilian government discussed this issue
was to deny any possibility of shutting down the Internet categorically. The discussion occurred
previously to the world soccer cup and the Olympic games to be held in Rio and other cities of
Brazil in 2014 and 2016 respectively. The Brazilian government denied any possibility of shutting
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down the Internet, and they were also preparing to prevent any chance of an Internet shutdown
provoked by a third party (Carpes, 2012; CEPROMAT, 2014).

3.6.2. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (México)

Mexico is a federal republic in North America and is the fifth largest nation-state in the
Americas. Mexico’s economy is firmly connected to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) (The Catalist, 2010). In 2000, after 71 years, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario
Institucional - Institutional Revolutionary Party) lost a presidential election to Vicente Fox of the
opposition. In the 2006 presidential election, Felipe Calderón from the “Partido de Acción
Nacional” (PAN) (National Action Party) was declared the winner, with a very narrow margin
over the leftist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador. In 2012, the PRI came back to power
with the candidate Enrique Peña Nieto (today’s President in 2017) (Miroff & Booth, 2012).
Initially, President Peña Nieto introduced himself as an active President fighting against the drug
dealing in Mexico. However, after multiple scandals of corruption and human rights violations,
his administration has been questioned and criticized by international organizations and the
international community (Ackerman, 2016; Miroff & Booth, 2012).
Mexican policy over the Internet infrastructure has been driven by stand war against drug
traffic because the cartels use the Internet and social networks to distribute the illegal narcotics
actively (El Comercio, 2016; OpenNet, 2013). Additionally Mexico also has to fight against
cybercrime and child pornography on a large scale (Comision de Atencion a Grupos Vulnerables,
2014). In 2013, the Mexican government announced that the Peña Nieto administration would
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create an intelligence strategy to identify information available on the Internet that could be helpful
to track criminals. Representatives of the government stated that:
“Esta información que se genera en la actividad cibernética (…) tiene que sistematizarse,
tiene que aprovecharse y tiene que utilizarse para poder combatir a los delincuentes”
(Montalvo, 2013, para.4)
Translation:
The information that is generated within the cybernetic activity (...) has to be systematized,
has to be exploited and has to be used to be able to fight criminals.”

In March 2014, the Mexican Executive branch prepared an amendment to the Federal
Telecommunications Law. The Executive proposed a new chapter called “Collaboration with the
Justice System”. According to the proposal, the telecom providers would be forced to provide the
geo-localization in real time of any device requested by the authorities and those authorities were
entitled to interfere with private communications (Garcia Martinez, 2014). Interception of private
communications for reasons of national security and justice is allowed if there is a previous warrant
for that purpose. However, when is about geo-localization, a warrant won’t be required if the crime
under investigation is related to crimes against health, kidnapping, extortion or the life of the victim
is threaten (Ángeles, 2013).
According to this proposal, telecom providers should keep a record of the interventions of
the communications and should keep the name of the user, domicile, type of connection, date, hour
and place of geo-localization. If authorities request, the telecom providers must suspend the service
of the mobile devices, block, inhibit or annul the telecommunication temporarily in events and
critic events when the national security is involved. This draft was the text of the article 196 of the
project, which was supposed to be amended according to the article 5 of the Mexican national
security law, which establishes that telecom providers are required to provide any information
related to any device to the authorities. In the specific case of the Internet, telecom providers were
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supposed to prevent the expansion of non-requested massive electronic communications or
“malicious traffic”. The context for this amendment, just like the justification, was the fight against
three major crimes: cyber-crime, human trafficking and drug dealing, mainly the last one. Facing
strong opposition from the civil society and the private sector, the amendment did not pass (Garcia
Martinez, 2014; Ramos, 2014).
Despite this strong surveillance policy of the Mexican government, it is also important to
note that the article 6 of the Mexican Constitution grants to the Internet the condition of human
right.
“Constitución de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos de 1917 y Modificaciones
Constitucionales del 2013”
“Título Primero Capítulo I De los Derechos Humanos y sus Garantías”
“Artículo 6o. La manifestación de las ideas no será objeto de ninguna
inquisición judicial o administrativa, sino en el caso de que ataque a la
moral, la vida privada o los derechos de terceros, provoque algún delito, o
perturbe el orden público; el derecho de réplica será ejercido en los términos
dispuestos por la ley. El derecho a la información será garantizado por el
Estado. Toda persona tiene derecho al libre acceso a información plural y
oportuna, así como a buscar, recibir y difundir información e ideas de toda
índole por cualquier medio de expresión. El Estado garantizará el derecho
de acceso a las tecnologías de la información y comunicación, así como a
los servicios de radiodifusión y telecomunicaciones, incluido el de banda
ancha e internet. Para tales efectos, el Estado establecerá condiciones de
competencia efectiva en la prestación de dichos servicios”
“…”
Translation:
Constitution of the United States of Mexico from 1917 and Amendments from 2013
First Title.- Chapter I About Human Rights and their Guarantees
Article 6.- …
The manifestation of ideas will not be subject to any judicial or
administrative proceeding, but if attacks morals, private life or the rights of
third parties cause crime or disrupts public order; the power of reply shall
be exercised in the terms established by law. The State shall guarantee the
right to information. Everyone has the right to free access to plural and
timely information, as well as to seek, receive and impart knowledge and
ideas of all kinds by any means of expression. The State shall guarantee the
right of access to information and communication technologies, as well as
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to the broadcasting and telecommunications services, including the
broadband and internet. For these purposes, the State shall establish
conditions of effective competition in the provision of such services
…

This constitutional amendment became effective in 2013 (Becerra, 2008). Regarding this
constitutional protection, which has no limit or exception, an action to shut down the Internet in
Mexican territory or law that allows it, would be both unconstitutional.
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4. Analysis and Findings

The next chapters present the results of the study conducted for this dissertation, which
aimed to answer RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3. The first section includes the global scope of the Internet
shutdowns, what governments executed an Internet shutdown and the ones that considered doing
it. The second section comprises the rhetoric of governments that shut down or considered shutting
down the Internet, the justifications they provide to apply this extreme form of government control.
To analyze these justifications, I use as a theoretical framework the Copenhagen securitization
theory. The last part includes a description of the political, legal and technical factors that enable
a government to shut down the Internet or to consider doing it.

4.1.

Answer RQ1: What is the Global Scope of the Internet Shutdown Phenomena?

The first research question of this dissertation addresses the global scope of Internet
shutdowns. I present my results in the graphics below (figures 19 and 20). The first graphic was
from 2014 when this project was at an early stage, and the second is from March 2018.

4.1.1. Internet Shutdown Cases

Considering the previous analysis, I will report the global scope of the Internet shut down
in the next figures. Results are classified into two groups:
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1. Cases when an Internet shut down occurred, and if the shutdown was national or
concentrated in a specific city. On this matter, colors differentiate the type of regime and
if the shutdown covers a town or the entire territory of a nation-state. I report these cases
in the upper part of the slide.
2. Cases where there were considerations about an Internet shut down. In this case, colors
differentiate between the type of regime and the government discourse related to the
Internet shutdown. I report these cases in the lower part of the slide.
3. Special situations to mention include the following ones: when there was an Internet shut
down, and there were government claims of an accident and when there was an Internet
shut down, and the local government claims that it was the result of an attack of cyber
warfare or if an alleged case of cutting a fiber cable existed.

141
Figure 19,- Global Scope: Internet Shut Down Cases, 2005-2012
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Figure 20.- Global Scope: Internet Shut Down Cases, 2013-March 2018
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As the previous graphics portraits, according to this dissertation, the global scope of the
Internet shut down is as it follows:
1. Approximately 18 authoritarian regimes were involved in an Internet shutdown. Some of
these regimes were engaged in more than one episode to shut down the Internet: Nepal,
Myanmar (former Burma), China, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, North Korea, Congo,
Bahrain, Ethiopia, Algeria, Gabon, Cameroon, Djibouti, Yemen and Indonesia.
2. One consolidated democracy and one young democracy, Australia, and India were
involved in an Internet shut down on more than one occasion. Australia always claimed an
accident
3. One hybrid regime, Venezuela, was involved in an Internet shut down on at least three
events
4. Three consolidated democracies, Australia, U.S. and U.K., were engaged in political, legal
or academic debate to provide power to their government authorities to shut down the
Internet
5. One hybrid regime, Russia, was involved in a legal and political debate to give power to
their government authorities to shut down the Internet
6. One hybrid regime, Russia, shut down the Internet in one of its cities (Crimea after the
annexation) alleging a cyberattack from Ukraine
7. Two dictatorial regimes, Syria and North Korea, claimed their Internet was shut down by
another nation-state
8. One young democracy, India, created administrative rules that allow the government to
shut down the Internet
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4.2.

Answer RQ2: What Justifications Do Democratic and Hybrid Regimes Use to
Shut Down or to Consider Shutting Down the Internet?

To answer RQ2, this dissertation understands as “justifications” the arguments to endorse
a particular proposal, law, policy or regulation (Vallier & D’Agostino, 2013). To identify those
arguments this dissertation conducted a rhetorical analysis of the securitizing speeches of those
who are known as securitizing agents, regarding the Copenhagen securitization theory. These
speeches are related to an Internet shutdown as an extreme measure to protect the national interest.
As mentioned before, in this context, this dissertation understands as speech a set of expressions,
written or spoken, that comment about one or more government actions, that is both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation (Niedrich, 2011).
The securitization theory describes speech in the following terms: by referring to the
urgency of action posed by an existential threat, a securitizing actor can transform (through speech)
an issue into one of security and can attempt to make anything a referent object. A referent object
is that thing that must be protected to preserve the national security and therefore, the survival of
the nation-state (Buzan, 1998).
For this dissertation the extraordinary measure is the act of shutting down the Internet. The
audience, securitizing actor and referent object vary according to the specific case under analysis.
The next paragraphs will identify these three elements of the theory in the selected case studies
and will answer RQ2.

145
4.2.1. Securitizing Actors and Speech

A securitizing actor is one who “securitizes” something, by declaring it a “referent object”.
As explained in the first chapter of this dissertation, a securitizing actor is either a person or group
who performs the security speech-act. However, this speech-act only can be performed by an actor
in an authoritative position, a person or group of people who: a) have both, authority and legitimacy
to be heard and believe for the targeted audience, and b) have the capacity to adopt measures to
deal with the “security problem”. The existence of these conditions limits potential candidates for
securitizing actors to governments, leading politicians and maybe scientific experts or technocrats.
(Buzan, 1998; Rothe, 2015).
As I established while collecting data, when is about Internet shutdowns, securitization
agents belong to different government sectors: a) leaders of the executive branch, the President or
Prime Minister. Claims also correspond to heads of national security agencies and ministers, b)
members from the legislative branch, congress members and, c) civil servants. Statements, either
written or spoken, refer to the need of having a policy like an Internet shut down and reasons to
act accordingly. In terms of national security, their role is to establish a concept of what the national
interest is because the protection of the national interest is necessary to guarantee the survival and
functionality of the nation-state. In terms of the theory, the national interest is called “referent
object,” the thing or things that, according the security agents, must be protected to guarantee the
national security of a nation-state.
Audiences vary depending on the nation-state and whether it is a hybrid or democratic regime.
The securitizing agent must convince a specific audience that they are the “agents of change,”
because without them, without their participation, is not possible to protect the national interest.
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The extraordinary measure, in this case, is the act of considering or shutting down the Internet
because there is no any other thing that can be done to protect the national interest.
To provide an example of the application of this theory, I will refer to the work of Myriam
Dunn Cavelty (2008), about the securitization of the cyberspace by the U.S. government. Dunn
Cavelty explains how cyber threats moved very quickly into the U.S. political agenda.
Cyberthreats are defined as “a rather vague notion signifying the malicious use of information and
communication technology (ICT) either as a target or as a tool by a wide range of malevolent
actors” (Dunn Cavelty, 2008, p.1).
The use of cyberthreats constitutes part of the speech-act while policy entrepreneurs and
professionals of security turned into securitizing agents because they can create or frame the
discourse. The reason for the speech-act is straightforward: cyber threats are a new threat to
national security and the foundations of developed societies. The referent object (or national
interest), according to Dunn, is formed by governments and private systems as cyber threats attack
directly to them and those systems are part of the functionality of a nation-state. Government top
decision-makers build the audience, as they are the ones who created this securitization policy over
the cyberspace. The extraordinary measure (a failed one according to Dunn) is the securitization
of the cyberspace and the use of any possible action to fight a cyberattack (Dunn Cavelty, 2008).

4.3.2

Analysis and Selection of Cases for Rhetorical Analysis

RQ1 provided this research with a global scope of the Internet shut down phenomena.
Cases under analysis to answer RQ2 are the ones that shut down the Internet or considered doing
so because they are the ones where their government representatives discussed the subject. In the

147
group of the democratic regimes are the U.S., U.K., and Australia. In the group of the hybrids are
Russia and Venezuela.
The selection criteria previously explained to include and exclude sources identified around
3,000 documents for the entire analysis. The materials corresponding to Australia, U.K., U.S.,
Russia, and Venezuela make around 2,019 (these are the nation-states that shut down or considered
shut down the Internet). I analyzed those documents using the software ATLAS.ti. For this
purpose, I created five projects within the software, one per nation-state.
Categories for analysis belong to the rhetorical analysis: 1) rhetor, 2) purpose, 3) audience,
4) evidence and 5) strategies (Campbell, 2009). The identification of these categories allowed us
to establish the elements of the securitization theory: purpose (I start by the point that a securitizing
actor must convince an audience that shutting down the Internet is necessary to preserve the
national interest), audience, why this extraordinary measure (shutting down the Internet) is
essential and the elements to support such claim (See below, table 03). I will explain the evidence
and strategies as elements of the speech.
Table 03.- Elements of the Securitization Theory and its Correlated Elements in the
Rhetorical Speech Analysis
Units of Discourse Securitization Theory Copenhagen
Categories of Analysis
School
Rhetorical Speech
Securitizing Agent
Rhetor

Speech

Grammar of Security (protection of the Referent
Object)
Threat Subject
Extraordinary Measure

Rhetorical

Purpose
Evidence
Strategy

Act

Speech

Audience

Audience:
Agents of Change
Created Audience
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After I identified each one of the categories of the rhetorical analysis, I added them to a
specific group, whether they belonged to hybrid or democratic regimes. By including these
categories into groups, it is possible to identify the elements of the security discourse that belong
to each type of political regime.
At this point, it is important to remember that, as mentioned before, this dissertation relies
upon security speeches available on the Internet. Because of this characteristic, I triangulated the
data. This process was necessary to increase the credibility of the research results (Yin, 2009). The
process to select the sources was explained in detail when presenting the exclusion and inclusion
criteria.

4.3.3. Securitizing Actors and Speech

The next paragraphs will describe the results of the analysis using ATLAS.ti. I will present
the findings of this project in the following chapters according to the type of regime (consolidated
democracy or hybrid) and the elements of the theory: securitizing actor, the audience they intend
to address and aspects of the securitizing speech (I will include evidence if any, and strategy will
here).

4.3.3.1.Audience

According to the terms of the securitization theory, the audience is formed by people or
organizations that have to be convinced by a securitizing agent that an extraordinary measure is
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required to protect the national interest (the “referent object” in terms of the theory) (Buzan, 1998).
The identity of the audience depends on the context of the securitization process and its capacity
to legitimize the actions proposed by the securitizing actor. The role of the audience is central
because securitizing actors and audiences are in constant interaction and because audiences
actively engage and have a role in the securitization process. Audience members actively
participate in the construction of the discourse interacting with the securitizing agent. While the
actions and influence of audiences vary across cases, audiences have, at least, the potential to exert
influence over securitization processes and the policies selected to address potential threats (Côté,
2016).
As mentioned before, initially the securitization theory defines the audience as those who
have to be convinced of the securitizing move to be successful (Waever, 2003). The audience also
can be defined as the individual(s) or group(s) that has the capacity to “authorize the view of the
issue presented by the securitizing actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue through security
practice” (Côté, 2016, p.548). However, audiences not always legitimize or agree with the security
speech. Audiences either: 1. Challenge the securitizing actor’s presentation of what should be a
national security issue; this forces the securitizing actor to create or modify a security narrative, or
2. They provide moral support to the securitizing move (Côté, 2016; Vuori, 2008).
In any case, audience(s) are essential because of their capacity or ability to provide what
the securitizing actor needs to accomplish or reformulate the securitization process (Vuori, 2008).
Following the terms of the securitization theory, the rhetoric classifies the audience in two types:
1. Agents of Change and 2. Targeted Audience. The individuals of the first group, the agents of
change, are the ones that can do what securitizing agents want. They are the ones who have the
power to act, whether it is political, economic, or social. The second group, the individuals of the
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targeted audience, are very likely to be responsive and may or may not share some basic
assumptions with the securitizing agent to buy the securitizing speech (Campbell, 2009; Côté,
2016; Vuori, 2008).
The analysis of this research under the terms of the securitization theory starts considering
the Internet shutdowns as an extraordinary measure, the action to be executed to protect the
national interest. Moreover, as it will be explained in the next paragraphs, for the cases under
study, the audience is always the private sector, but precisely who in the private sector is an actor,
will change depending on the type of context and regime. In the next paragraphs I will analyze
both cases, well-consolidated democracies and hybrid regimes.

4.3.3.1.1. Consolidated Democracies

Part of the academic sector has established that consolidated democracies became
increasingly worried about the protection of the critical infrastructure since the September 11, 2001
attacks in the U.S. The critical infrastructure is basic to preserve the integrity, functionality and
survival of a nation-state. It is also the case that in consolidated democracies, the private sector is
the one that owns and handles the critical infrastructure. Therefore, the private sector is a constant
actor within national security policies of democratic regimes (Eckert, 2005; Giacomello, 2005,
2016; Radvanovsk y & McDougall, 2009).
As I will explain in the next paragraphs, the private sector is also the audience to convince
when a national security emergency is in place and shutting down the Internet becomes an option.
It is important to point out the private sector this dissertation considers as the audience, in terms
of the Copenhagen securitization theory, is the private sector that owns and handles the critical
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infrastructure, so vital for the stability of the nation-states during the 21st century. I will develop
this conclusion in the next paragraphs. I will explain now each case separately.
Back in 2011, during the Arab Spring, the former Australian Minister for Broadband,
Communications and the Digital Economy, Stephen M. Conroy, denied any government attempt
to shut down the Internet in Australia:
“Australia’s a vibrant democracy, where the government doesn’t control the internet ...I
don’t think we have any of these powers — that we could pass a law to make ISP services
turn off when we want them to? I don’t think we have that power now, and I don’t think
anyone’s seeking it.” (LeMay, 2011, para.6)

Mr. Conroy pointed out to the ISPs as the ones in control to accomplish an Internet
shutdown. On this matter, it is important to clarify that, generally, consolidated democracies have
massive communication networks, nevertheless when is about ISPs, the situation has a clear
distinction: the U.K. has around 3,000 ISPs and the U.S. has between 3,500-4,000 ISPs. However,
in both cases, four big corporations have the power to control around 70% of the Internet users. In
Australia, the former-government-owned Telstra handles around 90% of the Internet subscribers
and 44 additional ISPs, that cover 10% of the remaining subscribers, depend on Telstra’s proper
functionality (Hernandez, 2014; Ryter, 2009). In all democracies, most of the Internet service is
concentrated in one or few ISPs.
In this scenario, and despite Mr. Conroy’s words rejecting an Internet shutdown, since
2011, Telstra has reported at least three Internet shutdowns. In all those three instances Telstra
claimed an accident, a human error, or denied knowing what produced the Internet shut down.
Since Telstra handles around the 90% of the Internet subscribers in Australia, almost all Internet
users in that nation-state were affected (Kidman & Allen, 2012; LeMay, 2011):
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Author: Big Pond, a
division of the
telecommunications
company Telstra
(Australia) (2011)

“We are currently having problems with the BigPond Self Care Portal.
This is affecting customers nationally. Customers may be unable to
login and manage their accounts. Technicians are treating this issue as
a priority and are working on the problem” (Didymus, 2011)

Author: Telstra
representative
(Australia) (2012)

"At this stage, we understand [Dodo] began to present an excessive
number of IP routes, and the configuration of Telstra's core network
(Telstra Internet Direct) allowed this to overload the Telstra network,"
(J. Taylor, para.5, 2012)
"Service was restored by removing the impact of excessive routes" (J.
Taylor, para.5, 2012)

Author: Telstra
representative
(Australia) (2016)

“We are aware of an issue impacting some business and enterprise
customers in Victoria,” “We are investigating the cause and working
to restore services as soon as possible” (Frankland, 2016)

Author: Telstra Chief
operations officer
Kate McKenzie
(Australia) 2016

“the failure was an embarrassing human error after a node, which
manages network traffic, malfunctioned on Tuesday morning” (Hunt,
2016)

Author: Telstra
representative
(Australia) (2016)

“A lot more than that were worked on this morning ... which is human
error” (Hunt, 2016)

Because of the large volume of Internet subscribers that Telstra handles, other ISPs also
become inoperable when Telstra is down and the international traffic also gets compromised
(Lohman, 2011).
Up to this point, Internet shutdowns in Australia seem to be the outcome of an accident, or
at least, that is what the justifications indicate. However, private companies and civil society
organizations have questioned all episodes of Internet shutdowns in Australia not only for its
frequency but also because these technical failures were never clearly explained (Chester, 2016;
Frankland, 2016; Kidman & Allen, 2012; Koerber, 2016; Stiles, 2016).
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Additionally, when the Internet shutdowns occurred in Australia, members of the private
sector questioned the functionality of Telstra and remembered the opinions about the Internet
regulation that Mr. Cameron pronounced in 2010:

Author: Former
Minister for
Broadband,
Communications and
the Digital Economy
Stephen M. Conroy
(Australia) (2010)

[The Internet] “It’s a communications system. It’s not magic. I know
there are people who like to give it magical properties, net utopians
think that it should be completely unregulated,” “This government and
many other governments around the world don’t accept that
argument.” (LeMay, 2010a, para.3)

Although Mr. Conroy opposed to any international regulation of the Internet, he never
objected a robust national regime where the government, the sovereign one, has strong policies
over the Internet infrastructure, which includes the ISPs and every single operator involved in the
Australian Internet infrastructure (LeMay, 2012).
When denying any possibility of shutting down the Internet, Mr. Conroy referred only to
the Internet service providers (ISPs) as main actors who could not be constrained or ordered by
the government to exercise that extreme policy. However, at the same time, he also claimed that
the Internet couldn’t be de-regulated. Following this line of discourse, since early 2010 until 2016,
Conroy tried to implement censoring policies within Australian territory, and he declared his
distrust publicly to the ISPs that run the Australian Internet (LeMay, 2010a, 2010b).
In 2015, following the Chinese attacks into Bureau of Meteorology’s systems 22, the
Australian government claimed that hacking costs $1 billion annually to the national economy.

22
Back in 2015, the Australian Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) claimed, after a report by the ABC about a large breach,
that its systems were fully operational. ABC claimed that the source of attack was China, but the Australian government didn’t
comment on the subject (Duckett, 2015).
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Also in 2015, the Australian government prepared a draft of legislation requiring to ISPs to
increase network protection and to increase oversight to government agencies to intervene for
national security (Duckett, 2015; Reichert, 2015).
In April of 2017, the government released a $230 million domestic cybersecurity strategy
that involved collaboration between public and private sectors. However, the private sector in this
strategy includes the owners of the Australian critical infrastructure (Yoo, 2017). Dan Tehan, the
minister of defense personnel at the time and, also responsible for assisting the prime minister in
cybersecurity issues launched the first joint cybersecurity centre. Mr. Tehan reinforced the
importance of the private sector, the owner of the critical infrastructure:
“Securing Australia’s cyberspace is not something the Commonwealth can do alone. This
collaborative approach will provide up-to-date information about the nature of cyber
threats, help partners better understand cyber risks, and allow them to collaborate on shared
challenges,” (Yoo, 2017, para.5)

As I mentioned before, audiences are essential for the securitizing agent because they
provide what the securitizing actor needs to accomplish the securitization process (Vuori, 2008).
From the words of Mr. Conroy, the control of ISPs is vital because they can grant access to the
Australian critical infrastructure through the Internet. Although the ultimate purpose of the
Australian government is not shutting down the Internet, but to protect the critical infrastructure
of that nation-state, shutting down the Internet may be one of the means to do it.
According to the government’s view, ISPs became instrumental for the final purpose. The
government needs them to accomplish an Internet shutdown as they are key for the population
connectivity (at least in Australia where Telstra controls most of the Internet market). However,
although the ISPs are instrumental in achieving an Internet shutdown, they are not the audience.
The audience in this case is the private sector, the owners of the critical infrastructure and the
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Internet infrastructure. They are the agents of change (in terms of the securitization theory) not
only because they are instrumental achieving an Internet shutdown, but also because the threats
over the critical infrastructure are the drivers of the Australian national security policy. In that
case, their situation and allegations are important components of the securitizing speech.
On the other hand, the U.K. and the U.S. have similarities in one point: both regimes, at
some end, explicitly agreed that shutting down the Internet was acceptable. The purpose of such
extreme policy is the protection of the critical infrastructure (see quotations below). As mentioned
during the description of the case studies for this project, the U.S. Senate considered three bills
when it was about an Internet shutdown: S.773, S.3480, and S.413. The White House also had its
proposal on the subject. The next paragraphs will analyze the arguments of the sponsors of these
bills and the White House representatives.
The sponsors of the referred documents stressed the fact that protecting the critical
infrastructure only can be achieved with close collaboration with the private sector because the
private sector owns and handles most of the critical infrastructure within U.S. territory. Without
the private sector shutting down the Internet cannot even be considered in a land with a massive
Internet infrastructure like in the U.S.
The first bill, S.773, was sponsored by Senator Rockefeller23 and was introduced in the
Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee of the U.S. Senate in 2009. S.773 was the most
controversial bill because it explicitly provided powers to the president to order the shutting down

23
Cosponsors of the bill include: (Civic Impulse, 2017)
Nelson, Bill [D-FL] (joined Apr 1, 2009)
Snowe, Olympia [R-ME] (joined Apr 1, 2009)
Bayh, Evan [D-IN] (joined Apr 2, 2009)
Mikulski, Barbara [D-MD] (joined Apr 22, 2010)
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of the Internet24. Because of the extreme opposition from the private sector and the civil society,
sponsors of the bill removed that provision from the original draft.
Senator Rockefeller explained that the real purpose of the bill was the creation of a
partnership with the private sector to protect the U.S. in case of a significant cyberattack over the
critical infrastructure. This partnership became critical mainly because, according to the U.S.
government, DHS was not very active preventing actions when cyberattacks occur (U.S. Senate,
2010e). Senator Rockefeller also claimed how dangerous the Internet could be:

Author: Former
Senator John
Rockefeller (U.S.),
2009
About Bill S.773

About bill S.773:
“President Obama’s chief of national intelligence, admiral Blair to
whom I respect, have labeled cyber security perpetrated through the
Internet as the number one national hazard of attack in West Virginia,
in America, in anywhere else … It really make to ask you the question
whether it was better for you never invented the Internet …”
(DarkvanM, 0:50, 2009)
“Everybody is attacked, anyone can do it…” (DarkvanM, 2009, 1:40)
“it is an act that shut this country down …” (DarkvanM, 2009, 2:05)
“[Bill S.773] … builds on the idea that cyber security is a shared
responsibility between the public and private sectors, that’s what this
whole bill is about,” (Walker, 2010, para.3)
“We are recognizing that traditional regulation will not work because
a bureaucracy simply cannot keep up with the necessary pace of
invention. Likewise, it should be clear that leaving our security solely
to the market is also a failing strategy. Neither approach can combat
the threats that we face alone and together,” (Walker, 2010b, para.6)

24
“S.773.- Cybersecurity Act of 2009”
Sec. 18. Cyber security responsibilities and authorities.
“The President— “
….
“(2) may declare a cyber security emergency and order the limitation or shutdown of Internet traffic to and from any compromised
Federal Government or United States critical infrastructure information system or network;”
…
“(6) may order the disconnection of any Federal Government or United States critical infrastructure information systems or
networks in the interest of national security;”
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“We want the private sector to take a lead. It’s very much the time to
give the private sector the tools it needs to collaborate with the
government and address this monumental challenge.” (Walker, 2010b,
para.7)

Senator Rockefeller and sponsors of the bill prepared a report where they explained the
necessity of the partnership they proposed with the private sector (Senate Report 111-384) to the
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation from the U.S. Senate. These were their
views:
“If we [the U.S.] went to war today in a cyberwar, we would lose. We're the most
vulnerable, we're the most connected, we have the most to lose.''\1\ Public and private
sector computer networks within the U.S. are increasingly subject to attack.” (U.S.
Senate, 2010d, para.5)
“The private sector owns a large percentage of the nation's critical infrastructure,
including electricity generation and transmission, water and sewer treatment facilities,
and financial markets and clearinghouses. The computers that run these systems are often
interconnected and subject to the same potential attacks as other networks. Experts
suggest that cyberattacks against critical infrastructure potentially could physically
destroy infrastructure, depriving large populations of essential goods and services for
extended periods of time and threatening lives.” (U.S. Senate, 2010d, para.5)
“… a number of reports demonstrate that DHS has not been fully effective in improving
cyber security throughout …” (U.S. Senate, 2010d, para.7)
“The primary goal of the Cybersecurity Act of 2010 is to modernize the public-private
sector relationship on cybersecurity. As a vast majority of our Nation's networks are
owned and operated by the private sector, securing cyberspace must be a collaborative
effort between our Government and the private sector.” (U.S. Senate, 2010d, para.18)

The private sector strongly opposed to bill S.773 because it was not clear what type of
authority the government would have over the private sector (McCullagh, 2009). The U.S. Senate
never passed S.773 (GPO, 2010), but the Internet shutdown debate did not stop there. In 2010,
Senator Lieberman and sponsors introduced bill S.3480 to the Committee on Homeland Security
of the U.S. Senate. Differently, from bill S.773, S.3480 did not include a paragraph that would
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grant powers to the president to shut down the Internet. Nevertheless, both bills raised similar
concern because this new legislation would force companies such as ISPs, search engines, or
software firms to comply with any emergency measure or action developed by DHS. The purpose
of the new bill was the preservation of the critical infrastructure (McCullagh, 2011a).
The bill proposed (with the support of DHS) the creation of a National Center for
Cybersecurity and Communications (NCCC). NCCC shall be headed by a Director, who shall
work cooperatively with the private sector to secure, protect, and ensure the resiliency of the
federal and national information infrastructure (Senator Lieberman, 2011b).
Like it happened with S.773, sponsors and supporters of bill S.3480 also had the intention
to build a partnership with the private sector to protect the U.S. critical infrastructure from a major
cyber-attack:

Author: Former
Representative for
California's 36th
congressional district
Jane Harman (U.S.),
2010

About bill S.3480:
“ … we face daunting challenges in tackling this problem, including:
a lack of sustained leadership, insufficient resources, authority to
enforce actions in the event of an imminent cyber attack, the need to
partner with other federal agencies and private sector entities and
insufficient education and training” (Harman, p.E1123, 2010)
“… it would create a National Center for Cybersecurity and
Communications at the Department of Homeland Security to identify
and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities. The Center would be charged with
providing situational awareness, conducting risk-based assessments of
threats, identifying vulnerabilities, managing external access points for
federal networks, overseeing operations of US-CERT, and working
with the private sector to establish security requirements to strengthen
vital components of critical infrastructure like the electric grid and
telecommunications networks” (Harman, p.E1123, 2010)

Author: Former
Senator Joseph

About bill S.3480:
“As we have seen repeatedly, from the financial crisis to the
environmental catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico, what happens in the
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Lieberman (U.S.),
2010

private sector does not always affect just the private sector. The
ramifications for government and for the taxpayers often are
enormous.
This bill would establish a public/private partnership to improve cyber
security. Working collaboratively with the private sector, the
Center would produce and share useful warning, analysis, and threat
information with the private sector, other Federal agencies,
international partners, and state and local governments. By developing
and promoting best practices and providing voluntary technical
assistance to the private sector, the Center would improve cyber
security across the nation. Best practices developed by the Center
would be based on collaboration and information sharing with the
private sector. Information shared with the Center by the private sector
would be protected” (U.S. Senate, p.S4854, 2010c)

Additionally, Senator Lieberman and the other sponsors of the bill prepared a report (U.S.
Senate, 2010d) to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs from the U.S.
Senate. Their views on the private sector are the following ones:
“The private sector owns a large percentage of the nation's critical infrastructure, including
electricity generation and transmission, water and sewer treatment facilities, and financial
markets and clearinghouses. The computers that run these systems are often interconnected
and subject to the same potential attacks as other networks. Experts suggest that
cyberattacks against critical infrastructure potentially could physically destroy
infrastructure, depriving large populations of essential goods and services for extended
periods of time and threatening lives” (U.S. Senate, para.9, 2010)
“The primary goal of the Cyber Security Act of 2010 is to modernize the public-private
sector relationship on cyber security. As a vast majority of our Nation's networks are owned
and operated by the private sector, securing cyberspace must be a collaborative effort
between our Government and the private sector” (U.S. Senate, para.13, 2010).

Regarding bill S.3480 there is one statement that was never mentioned. Back in 2010,
Senator Lieberman, while referring to an Internet shut down and attacks over the critical
infrastructure, he made the following statement:
“… And we need this capacity in a time of war. We need the capacity for the president to
say, Internet service provider, we've got to disconnect the American Internet from all traffic
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coming in from another foreign country, or we've got to put a patch on this part of it” (CNN,
2010, para.53)
“Right now, China, the government, can disconnect parts of its Internet in a case of war.
We need to have that here, too.” (CNN, 2010, para.53)

These comments made clear that ISPs play an important when it comes to stopping Internet
access. Additionally, comments about China were not welcome for the civil society in the U.S.
because, back in 2010, China use this extreme policy to silence the political rivals of the ruling
party exclusively (MacKinnon, 2012). Although Senator Lieberman made very clear that his
intention with S.3480 was not attacking the freedom of speech or the free flow of information, it
is not clear what he intended by mentioning the Chinese use of an Internet shut down.
The last bill to analyze is S.413. This time Senator Lieberman and his co-sponsors of the
bill25 took the precaution of adding a provision that forbids the president, the Director of the
National Center for Cybersecurity and Communications (NCCC Director) or any other federal
employee to shut down the Internet26. Nevertheless, the bill was still criticized because of the
potential contradiction among its provisions and the lack of clarity about the powers of the NCCC

25

Cosponsors of the bill include:
Collins, Susan M. [R-ME]* (joined 02/17/2011)
Carper, Thomas R. [D-DE]* (joined 02/17/2011)
26
“S.413.- Cybersecurity And Internet Freedom Act of 2011”
SEC. 2. INTERNET FREEDOM ACT.
(a) Short Title. —This section may be cited as the “Internet Freedom Act”.
(b) Findings. —Congress finds that—
…
(4) the Internet has developed into a robust network within the United States, with thousands of
providers, making it technically impossible to shut down the Internet;
…
(10) neither the President, the Director of the National Center for Cybersecurity and
Communications, nor any other officer or employee of the Federal Government should have the authority to
shut down the Internet.
(c) Limitation. —Notwithstanding any provision of this Act, an amendment made by this Act, or section 706
of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 606), neither the President, the Director of the National Center
for Cybersecurity and Communications, or any officer or employee of the United States Government shall have
the authority to shut down the Internet.”
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Director27. The latter one would be able to decide what owners and operators of the critical
infrastructure must do if a national emergency is declared. The NCCC Director had authority to
determine on this. For this reason, this bill also identified the private sector that owns and handles
the critical infrastructure as the audience to convince if shutting down the Internet was necessary:

Author: Senator
About bill S.413:
Thomas Carper (U.S.),
“All aspects of American society have become increasingly dependent
2011
on the internet whether we’re talking about the military, the
government, or businesses both small and large. While in most cases
this powerful technology has transformed our daily life for the better,
unfortunately bad actors – from common criminals to foreign
terrorists-- have identified cyber space as an ideal 21st century
battlefield. We have to take steps now to modernize our approach to
protecting this valuable, but vulnerable, resource. We also have to
balance our need for security in this new frontier with our democratic
values of freedom and liberty. This legislation strikes that careful
balance – providing the tools that America needs to better protect cyber
space while additionally protecting our civil liberties. It encourages the
government and the private sector to work together to address this
growing threat and provides the resources for America to be successful
in this critical effort.” (Senator Carper, para.7, 2011)

“S.413.- Cybersecurity And Internet Freedom Act of 2011”
“SEC. 249. NATIONAL CYBER EMERGENCIES.
“(a) Declaration. —
….
“(3) AUTHORITIES. —If the President issues a declaration under paragraph (1), the Director shall—
“(A) immediately direct the owners and operators of covered critical infrastructure subject to the declaration under
paragraph (1) to implement response plans required under section 248(b)(2)(C);
“(B) develop and coordinate emergency measures or actions necessary to preserve the reliable operation, and mitigate or
remediate the consequences of the potential disruption, of covered critical infrastructure;
“(C) ensure that emergency measures or actions directed under this section represent the least disruptive means feasible
to the operations of the covered critical infrastructure and to the national information infrastructure;
“(D) subject to subsection (g), direct actions by other Federal agencies to respond to the national cyber emergency;
“(E) coordinate with officials of State and local governments, international partners of the United States, owners and
operators of covered critical infrastructure specified in the declaration, and other relevant private section entities to
respond to the national cyber emergency;
…”
27
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Moreover, during a hearing before the subcommittee on cybersecurity infrastructure
protection, and security technologies, the House of Representatives, concluded that the private
sector model of action would act faster while facing a cyberattack:
“Congress must make a realistic assessment as to whether an information- sharing model
that puts the Government at the center—receiving information, analyzing it, and sharing
the resulting analysis with industry—could ever act quickly enough to respond to fastmoving threats. Though the White House cybersecurity proposal 7 and the lead Senate bill,
the Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act, (S. 413) adopt the Government-centric
approach, we have serious concerns about it. An industry-based model, subject to strong
privacy protections, would be able to act more quickly and would raise few, if any, of the
Fourth Amendment concerns associated with a Government-centric model”
(Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, p.22, 2011)

The White House cybersecurity initiative of 2011 contains a similar approach about the
private sector:
Statement for the
Record of Philip
Reitinger, Deputy
Under Secretary
National Protection,
and Programs
Directorate, DHS and
others

About the White House Proposal: Cybersecurity Regulatory
Framework for Covered Critical Infrastructure:
“Sensitive information is routinely stolen from both government and
private sector networks, undermining confidence in our information
systems, the information collection and sharing process, and the
information these systems contain” (Phillip Reitinger et al., 2011,
para.5)

I conclude that the audience for all the Internet shutdown bills in the U.S. is the private
sector, the private sector that owns and handles the critical infrastructure and the Internet
infrastructure. The situation here is very similar to the Australian case: (1) The private sector owns
and controls the critical infrastructure, (2) The private sector owns and manages the Internet
infrastructure and (3) There is a failure of national security agencies to work in a partnership with
the private sector. These are the reasons why a partnership with the private sector is a recurrent
element among these three bills and the White House proposal. An Internet shutdown cannot be
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accomplished without the private sector, and at the same time, the private sector needs to agree
because they own and handle the critical infrastructure, so vital for the U.S. The private sector not
only holds and operates the majority of the critical infrastructure, these companies are also able to
reach networks the U.S. government cannot (Germano, 2014).
Finally, the last case is the U.K. Back in 2011, after the Egyptian Internet shutdown,
representatives of the U.K. government analyzed the possibility of shutting down the Internet in
that nation-state. Specifically, representatives of the U.K. Department for Culture, Media and Sport
agree on the possibility under the following terms:

Author:
Representatives of the
Department for
Culture, Media and
Sport (U.K.), 2011

Responding a question about the possibility of shutting down the
Internet in U.K. territory:
“It would have to be a very serious threat for these powers to be used,
something like a major cyber attack. The powers are subject to review
and if it was used inappropriately there could be an appeal to the
competitions appeal tribunal. Any decision to use them would have to
comply with public law and the Human Rights Act” (Hardings, 2011).

The U.K. government officials put emphasis on the balance between freedom of
information and protection of the public, although there is no major explanation of what that
means. From the statement of the representative of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport,
the arguments in favor of an Internet shut down would be: 1. The presence of a severe threat and
2. An example of that threat is a significant cyberattack, but it is not the only case. Within the same
context, it is necessary to look at the statements of British representatives about the cyber security
policy of the U.K. back in 2011:

Former Minister of
State for the Armed

Speech in the KOKODA Foundation, Queensland, Australia:
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Forces Sir Nick
Harvey (U.K.), 2011

“The private sector has to lead in the development of improved Internet
security products, systems, services and standards in cyberspace”
(Harvey, 2011)

The U.K. cyber security policy (from 2011) itself was also very explicit about the private
sector role:
“.... working in partnership...
3.3 Though the scale of the challenge requires strong national leadership, Government
cannot act alone. It must recognise the limits of its competence in cyberspace. Much of the
infrastructure we need to protect is owned and operated by the private sector. The expertise
and innovation required to keep pace with the threat will be business-driven” (Cabinet
Office, p.6, 2011)

The new cybersecurity policy of the U.K. government, published in November 2016,
reinforced the role of the private sector as the one that owns and manages the critical infrastructure
of that nation-state:
“The cyber security of certain UK organisations is of particular importance because a
successful cyber attack on them would have the severest impact on the country’s national
security. This impact could have a bearing on the lives of UK citizens, the stability and
strength of the UK economy, or the UK’s international standing and reputation. This
premium group of companies and organisations within the public and private sector
includes the critical national infrastructure (CNI), which provides essential services to the
nation. Ensuring the CNI is secure and resilient against cyber attack will be a priority for
the Government …” (HM Government, 2016, p.40)

The new U.K. cybersecurity strategy also includes those who interact with the ones who
own and handle the critical infrastructure in that nation-state to address and prevent the risk they
may face:
“… we will work through organisations such as insurers, regulators and investors which
can exert influence over companies to ensure they manage cyber risk” (HM Government,
2016, p.23)
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So far, similarities between the U.S. and U.K. discourses are undeniable. According to their
securitizing agents, a significant cyberattack over the critical infrastructure could prompt an
Internet shutdown, one that cannot be achieved without the collaboration of the private sector.
Within this context, the private sector becomes the primary audience: (1) The private sector owns
and handles the critical infrastructure and (2) The private sector owns and handles the Internet and
the telecomm infrastructure (which is at the same time part of the critical infrastructure) to try to
achieve an Internet shutdown if the case demands it. The securitizing agents, government
legislators, expect the backup of the owners of the critical infrastructure and the collaboration of
the owners of the Internet infrastructure. Without the participation of the latter ones, the extreme
measure the securitizing agents want to concretize, an Internet shutdown, cannot be accomplished.
On this point, as mentioned before, Senator Lieberman would consider commanding ISPs, as part
of the first step to shutting down the Internet:
“ … We need the capacity for the president to say, Internet service provider, we've got to
disconnect the American Internet from all traffic coming in from another foreign
country…” (CNN, 2010, para.53)

In this way, similarly to the Australian case, ISPs also became the first actors of the chain
being instrumental in the protection of the critical infrastructure. Nevertheless, it is important to
clarify that ISPs are not the audience, but some of the operators to grant Internet access to the
Internet users.
Additionally, and differently from the U.S. and Australia, the U.K. speech has a difference.
The first time the U.K. government addressed the possibility of shutting down the Internet was
during the riots of 2011 when Prime Minister Cameron blamed the social networks, like Facebook,
Twitter and the old Blackberry message system of expanding violence (Nosowitz, 2011).

166
The riots in London took place between 6 and 11 August 2011. The riots were the outcome
of cuts into the national budget by a new government (a Conservative and Liberal Democrat
coalition), rises in tuition fees and the killing of one man by the police in a local black community
(Suleyman, 2017). For five days buildings and vehicles were smashed and get on fired, while stores
were looted. The police deployed around 16,000 police officers in London’s streets to try to stop
the violence (Alan Taylor, 2011). Back in those days, British newspapers claimed that the riots
were “fueled by social media” (Halliday, 2011, para.4). Scotland Yard warned about those calling
for violence episodes on the “140-character social network would not go unpunished” (Halliday,
2011, para.9). However, the fastest and accurate tool was a more covert social network: BlackBerry
Messenger (BBM). Unlike Twitter and Facebook, authorities could not trace BBM (Halliday,
2011a). Nevertheless, for the police any tool they could to track protesters was worthy. The police
warned of incitement to violence after a campaign on Facebook, BBM, and Twitter (Douglas,
2011).
As mentioned before in this dissertation, although Prime Minister Cameron’s public
message was that the government wanted a master switch to shut down the social networks, his
initial intention was shutting down the entire Internet. The British government dismissed this
option because of the possible impact in the international community who could compare the
British decision with the Egyptian case (DH, 2011; Ghosh, 2011; Marsden, 2011; Williams, 2011).
In any case, Mr. Cameron was very clear blaming the social networks for the riots and
questioned the use of the free flow of information. At the time, he offered to the police all the
resources they may need to track episodes they considered plots for violence in the social networks:
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Former Prime Minister Mr. Cameron’s statement to the House of Commons about the 2011
David Cameron
riots:
(U.K.), 2011
“So we are working with the Police, the intelligence services and
industry to look at whether it would be right to stop people
communicating via these websites and services when we know they
are plotting violence, disorder and criminality” …” (Cameron, para.63,
2011a)

Following the riots, Mr. Cameron called for a crackdown on social media, while Mr.
Nicolás Sarkozy (President of France back in 2011) called for a "civilized Internet" (NDTV, 2011).
Mr. Cameron also informed that Theresa May, at the time Home Secretary, would hold meetings
with Facebook, Twitter, and Research In Motion to discuss their responsibilities in cases like this
(Halliday, 2011b).
In this last case, the audience to whom governments of consolidated democracies address
when implementing cyber security policies related to an Internet shutdown is indeed the private
sector, but not the one that controls and handles the critical infrastructure. Within the private sector,
there are different audiences: (1) the one that owns and manages the critical infrastructure, (2) the
one that facilitates the free flow of information – in particular, the one that owns and operates the
social networks' platforms or massive communication means-. The case of the riots in London is
a case where the government wants to interfere in the free flow of information for social control
purposes, or as the British government stated, to keep the public order under control. Mr. Cameron
referred it is a case where free flow of information is “used for ill” (Cameron, 2011a, para.63).
In this case, social media platforms are not instrumental in shutting down the Internet. This
audience fulfills a different role. As explained previously, although actions of audiences may vary
across cases, audiences do have the potential to exert influence over securitization processes and
the policies selected to address potential threats (Côté, 2016).
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The goal of the U.K. government was to stop the riots from 2011, an action with purposes
of social control. To accomplish such mission, it was necessary to control the flow of information
that allowed spreading the violence through the social networks. In this scenario, social network
platforms are directly instrumental in controlling the flow of information. For a government, the
most common way to control such mechanisms of social participation is using disruptive policies
to regulate the Internet infrastructure, being censorship the most common one. Censorship also can
escalate to attempt to shut down the entire Internet; such decision usually belongs to the
securitizing agent depending on the circumstances (Dunn, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012; Mejias, 2013).
In the British case, the speed of the events during the riots prompted the U.K. government to
consider shutting down the Internet. If such policy was not finally applied (and nor was a
censorship policy) was because of the international context that could compare the U.K. with the
Egyptian Internet shutdown (Williams, 2011).
In this case, social network platforms, voluntarily or not, influenced the securitization
processes and the policies considered by the U.K. government to address a potential threat against
the social order. U.K. authorities saw an Internet shutdown as the way to stop the flow of
information when that nation-state was facing violent events. In this way, although not
instrumental to shut down the Internet, social platforms did influence the security speech of the
U.K. government that considered an Internet shutdown.
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4.3.3.1.2. Hybrid Regimes

Although Russian claims overt the Internet started between 2003 and 2005 during the
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), these claims became stronger after the
Snowden revelations in 2013 (Jr., Lawson, & McFarlane, 2015; WSIS, 2015).
In general, hybrid regimes became eager to protect the flow of data within their territories
and their national Internet infrastructures. Some academics call this government tendency
“cybernationalism”. Although Brazil (a young democracy) was portrayed as the main creator of
this new tendency, it would be hybrid regimes the ones who took it to the extreme (Costello, 2017;
Keating, 2013b; Messmer, 2013). After 2013, the Russian government created a group of laws
with the purpose of “align” RuNet with this idea of cybernationalism by (1) forcing operators of
websites to store all information they process and keep it available to be reviewed by Russian
authorities when required, (2) holding censoring attributions for the Russian regulator at its own
discretion, and (3) forcing private companies to store data within servers located in Russian
territory (Duffy, 2015).
As consequence of these new laws, the private sector became very critical against Vladimir
Putin’s administration. Russian bloggers and Internet experts expressed their concern that this new
set of security policies may be an attempt to restrict freedom and isolate Russia from the global
network (Zavyalova, 2014).
In the middle of this situation, Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky and deputy Prime
Minister Dmitry Rogozin were among the signatories to a statement by the Russian Military
Historical Society where they warned about a “new blitzkrieg” against Russia – “and thus against
the truth” (Demirjian, para.1, 2015). Both officials referred to the creation of a “Patriotic Internet”
that can protect Russian citizens from the U.S. espionage activities (Dolgov, 2015a). In this regard,
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Russian authorities spoke about the “unpredictable west” that can “disconnect” the Russian
Internet from the global Internet and compromise the integrity of the Internet itself and the personal
data of Russian citizens (Belousov, 2014):

Former
communications
minister Igor
Shchegolev and aide
to President Vladimir
Putin (Russia), 2014

“the actions of our partners in the United States and Europe have
recently acquired a certain degree of unpredictability and we should be
prepared for this” (Belousov, 2014)

Presidential press
secretary Dmitry
Peskov (Russia), 2014

“It is common knowledge who the main administrator of the global
internet is. Given this unpredictability, we must think of how to ensure
our national security” (Zavyalova, 2014).

As well pointed out by some cybersecurity experts in Russia, the target of the latest laws
(but not the audience) over RuNet is the social network platforms originating from abroad, such
like Facebook and Twitter. These companies handle the flow of information at a world level and
Russians citizens’ private data and Russian government data, in a way that Russian authorities
cannot control. The government new laws enacted in September 2014 also targeted cyber activism,
bloggers and market players (Hille, 2015; Zavyalova, 2014).
The new laws required all online companies to store Internet users’ personal data within
Russian territory and was expected to be in force by September 2016, but the date was later
rescheduled to January 2015 (Eremenko, 2014a; Koshkin, 2014). The preamble of the law stated
that it was created to “ensure the protection of Russian citizens’ rights to telecommunication
privacy and personal data safety” (Eremenko, 2014, para.3). In this regard, Russia’s Oversight
Communication Agency (Roskomnadzor) warned Google, Facebook, and Twitter that they must
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be registered as “organizers of information distribution” in compliance with the law (Koshkin,
2014).
The Russian scenario shows that social networks are the targets of an aggressive policy to
force them to keep the data they handle within Russian territory. In those circumstances, the key
point in this debate is the data, who owns it and how to control it (Hille, 2015; RT, 2013b, 2014a).
The importance of the data is such that, for Russian authorities, a foreign attack that can
trigger an Internet shut down is an attack from a foreign power (most likely the U.S.) that: 1) would
make the Russian government to lose control over its own data and its citizens’ and that 2) would
make the Russian government to lose control over the Internet infrastructure. The fear of Russian
authorities exists because social networks control data that the government cannot access and
cannot control (Galperina, 2016; Lunden, 2016; The Washington Post & Reuters, 2016).
According the Russian perspective, these two scenarios are only possible because of the
actions of private companies based in the U.S. that handle Russian data, such as Google, Facebook,
Twitter and LinkedIn. When considering an Internet shutdown, Russian authorities think in the
flow of information, in this way the situation turns at some extent, very similar to the one in the
U.K. Social networks are not instrumental to achieve an Internet shutdown, but they are the
receivers of the security discourse and take a role in its creation. Depending upon their positive or
negative response towards governments’ policies, the government will involve the owners and
operators of the Internet and telecom infrastructure in achieving an Internet shutdown. Just like in
well-consolidated democracies, the private owners of the Internet and telecom infrastructure are
the ones that formed the audience. If the ones in charge of the data flow don’t cooperate with the
Russian government, then the turn to act will be for the owners and operators of the Internet and
telecom infrastructure. That is the audience the Russian government needs to convince.
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When considering specifically an Internet shutdown, Russian authorities stated that, it is
not their intention to disconnect the Internet, but they must be prepared for potential unpredictable
actions of the west. Following this line of action, on October 1, 2014, the Russian Security Council
discussed the possibility of shutting down the Internet as an emergency procedure if there are
circumstances of national security. In that scenario ISPs should be habilitated to stop their services
if required by the government (Belousov, 2014; Harding, 2014; Kramer, 2014a; MacAskill, 2014;
Watson, 2013). ISPs are just some of the actors within the Internet ecosystem. They just play a
role as part of the audience, but they are not the audience. The audience as a whole is the owners
and operators of the Internet infrastructure within Russian territory, in particular the private ones.
As mentioned before, an Internet shut down is acceptable under two circumstances: (1) if
it is ordered by Russian authorities and (2) if it helps to preserve the control the Russian
government has over the infrastructure of RuNet, the government’s data and its citizens’ data
(AFP, 2014; Bodner, 2014; Kramer, 2014b). Facing this context ISPs must be ready to act
according the commands of the government and foreign companies were required to store all
Russian data in servers within Russian territory. According to the government provisions, Russian
ISPs will be required to make possible to shut down Russia's Internet access to the global Internet
during military actions or serious protest actions (Stone, 2014b). By statement of the
representatives of the State Duma (Госуда́рственная Ду́ма), the Internet could not remain as a
space free of regulation, like it was before the Snowden revelations (DUMA, 2014).

Leonid Levin,
Chairman of the State
Duma Committee on
Information Policy,
Information
Technology and

“For many years, we lived in a completely free and legal regulation
of the Internet procedures, it seemed to many that the Internet - is a
free zone, without the participation of the state. The inertia of such
sentiment was not entirely been eliminated even as a result of
revelations Snowden, and in fact they clearly showed that the Internet
in bad faith are not only organized hooligan and criminal groups of
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Communications
(2014)

hackers, but also the most developed nations of the world on the
Internet are no less hard than in other spheres, and our country must
be ready for it. State hacking is not only capable of destroying private
life or business of the individual citizen, but may well be a real threat
to the freedom and independence of our country, is a good example
of this - the situation with the protection of personal data: on foreign
servers personal information of Russian citizens are not protected,
subjected to illegal collection and use. If this was done only for
marketing purposes, and in a few cases, a network of hooliganism, it
might have been at least some reason to say that it costs the power of
freedom, however, as is conclusively proved Snowden its revelations,
personal data researched by foreign state structures that are highly
likely doing it for use against the interests of the Russian Federation,
in violation of the security of Russian citizens” (DUMA, para.45,
2014).

Nikolai Anatolyevich
Nikiforov, Minister of
Communications and
Mass Media, (Russia),
2015

Authorities were to begin testing various methods “to prevent Russia
being cut off from the Internet from abroad” (Bernard, para.2, 2015)
“We modeled what would happen if our respected foreign partners,
under the influence of the latest mood of their politicians who play
with sanctions, suddenly decide to take this or that measure against
Russia,” (Bernard, para.4, 2015)
“Our task is to do what is needed so that the Russian Internet will
carry on working independently of the opinion of colleagues,
whatever sanctions policy decisions they decide to take.” (Bernard,
para.4, 2015)

In March 2018, Vladimir Putin's Internet adviser German Klimenko sought to reassure
Russians that contingency plans are ready in case RUNET is disconnected from the global Internet.
While offering an interview about hypothetical Internet shutdown Klimenko stated that “If our
colleagues disconnect us from the switch tomorrow, I don’t know if it will be painless, though
we’ve been promised that it will be painless,” (The Moscow Times, 2018, para.3).
Before these statements, in 2014, President Vladimir Putin called the Internet a “CIA
project,” created with the purpose of weaken Russia’s government and punish that nation-state
finally. Mr. Putin also claimed that Russia needed to be protected from the Internet and that his
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administration has a duty to resist foreign influence and fight for its interests online (MacAskill,
2014).
At the beginning of 2014, Minister Yevgeny Fyodorov warned that Russia would face a
period of aggression, and therefore, they should be prepared, and its defenses should include mass
media and information. Fyodorov also advocated for the transference of all data stored in Russia
to the hands of Russian specialists appointed by the government. In this context, Fyodorov accused
Google of taking “an openly anti-Russian position” (RT, para.5, 2014a) and of signing a
cooperation agreement with the Ukrainian special services in order to transfer Russian citizens’
personal data. Additionally, Senator Lyudmila Bokova accused Google of violating the national
law on personal data by scanning users’ content, including emails. The position against Google
was so extreme that after the Snowden revelations, several Russian MP suggested that the
government should change the contracts of civil servants and forbid them of using Google and
social networks that store in the U.S. (Reuters, 2014, 2015, RT, 2014b, 2014d).

MP Yevgeny
Fyodorov
Chairman of the
factional groups in the
State Duma of the
Russian Federation
(2014)

“We hold that in due time we must see the nationalization of Google,
meaning that Google’s operations concerning Russia must fall under
Russian jurisdiction and competence” (RT, 2014b)

MP Yevgeny
Fyodorov
Chairman of the
factional groups in the
State Duma of the
Russian Federation
(2014)

“Google remains in the jurisdiction of the United States of America
and the USA is now officially seeking to weaken Russia and
destabilize the situation. This is a direct order for all organizations that
fall under its control,” (RT, 2014d)
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According to the statement of Russian policymakers the audience of the Russian
government is focus in two actors: private corporations based abroad (like Google and social
network platforms) that handle the flow of data in and out of Russian territory and the owners (and
the ones who handle) the Russian telecomm infrastructure and Internet infrastructure. The first
ones are the receivers of the speech and depending upon their response the latter ones must act.
The Russian speech points to a great fear of losing control of the data of their citizens and the
government itself and, fear of losing control of the national Internet infrastructure.
The called Blitzkrieg laws of the Russian government have increased the control the Russian
government has over the different members of the Internet ecosystem located in Russian territory.
Just to point an example, Russia may not have a unique government-owned ISP, but they do have
a set of tools and laws to control private ISPs. This is a common characteristic with Venezuela,
another hybrid regime under study. The Russia approach intends to keep their citizens’ data in
servers located within their own territory, so rival nation-states cannot have access to their
communications.
The Russian position is the case of a hybrid regime, but it is not the only one. The
Venezuelan case is slightly different from the Russian one. The audience is also focus in social
media, but for different reasons from the Russian case. As a matter of fact, the concern of the
Venezuelan government over the Internet began a few years before the world knew about the
Snowden revelations in 2013. In 2010 the former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez claimed that
“la Internet no puede ser una cosa libre” [“the Internet cannot be a free thing”] (cadsvm, 2010,
4:35) because the flow of information may be false and there is no way to control it. Chavez made
this statement while blaming the digital platform of “Noticiero Digital” [“Digital News”] of
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allowing individual citizens to post whatever they want in its webpage (cadsvm, 2010;
MrBarbacoa2011, 2010; Perfil Internacional, 2010).

Former Venezuelan
President Hugo
Chavez
(2010)

“The Internet cannot be something open where anything is said and
done. Every country has to apply its own rules and norms” (Chinea &
Daniel, 2010, para.2)

Former Venezuelan
President Hugo
Chavez
(2010)

“We have to act. We are going to ask the attorney general for help,
because this is a crime. I have information that this page periodically
publishes stories calling for a coup d’etat. That cannot be permitted”
(Chinea & Daniel, 2010, para.4; El Pais, 2010)

Following this statement, the Venezuelan government included the Internet in the “Ley de
Responsabilidad Social y Calidad de Television” [“Law of Social Responsibility and Quality of
the Television”], also known as RESORTE. According to this law, the Venezuelan regulator
(CONATEL) can decide when the content published is illegal according the circumstances
included in the law itself and the executive branch may decide the punishment for the violator.
This law also established responsibility for third parties, in particular ISPs and social network
platforms, as they are directly involved in the data management process (Finol & Espinoza, 2015;
Gonzalo, 2010)28.

28

Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio, Televisión y Medios Electrónicos
Capítulo VI. - Del Fondo de Responsabilidad Social y de las Tasas
Artículo 27
Prohibiciones
En los servicios de radio, televisión y medios electrónicos, no está permitida la difusión de los mensajes que:
1. Inciten o promuevan el odio y la intolerancia por razones religiosas, políticas, por diferencia de género, por racismo o xenofobia.
2. Inciten o promuevan y/o hagan apología al delito. 3. Constituyan propaganda de guerra. 4. Fomenten zozobra en la ciudadanía
o alteren el orden público. 5. Desconozcan a las autoridades legítimamente constituidas. 6. Induzcan al homicidio. 7. Inciten o
promuevan el incumplimiento del ordenamiento jurídico vigente.
…
Los proveedores de medios electrónicos serán responsables por la información y contenidos prohibidos a que hace referencia el
presente artículo, en aquellos casos que hayan originado la transmisión, modificado los datos, seleccionado a los destinatarios o no
hayan limitado el acceso a los mismos, en atención al requerimiento efectuado por los órganos con competencia en la materia.
Translation:
Law of Social Responsibility in Radio, Television and Electronic Media
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Differently from Russia, the Venezuelan government did shut down the Internet. As
previously mentioned, the first time was in April 2013, during the Presidential elections after
former President Hugo Chavez died. Back then, Jorge Arreaza (then vice-President) claimed that
foreign hackers attacked the Twitter accounts of the Venezuelan ruling party, “Partido Socialista
Unido” – PSUV [United Socialist Party of Venezuela], the candidate Nicolás Maduro (at the time
also interim president and today’s president) and the webpage of the Consejo Nacional Electoral
– CNE [National Electoral Council] (AVN/VTV, 2013).

Former Venezuelan
Vice President and
Minister of Science
and Technology Jorge
Arreaza
(2013)

“Un grupo de hackeadores del exterior anuncia un posible hackeo a la
página del CNE. Inmediatamente se hacen las coordinaciones con el
CNE, y para proteger la página se decide impedir que tenga acceso
desde el exterior; el acceso se deja nacional. Cualquier venezolano
entrará en la página web del CNE después que se dé el boletín y tendrá
acceso a los resultados electorales.
Bueno, desde el momento el que se tomo la decisión de bloquear desde
el exterior hasta este momento han habido 45,000 intentos, lo que pasa
es q están bloqueadas esas páginas. Si no hubiésemos hecho lo que
hicimos, esa página estaría caída porque es un hackeo que no sabemos
decir de dónde. Sabemos que no es de Venezuela, a veces ellos se
disfrazan con distintos códigos, a veces desde Estados Unidos, a veces
desde Europa. Ahora en el momento en el cual nosotros hicimos los
trámites para impedir que desde el exterior se tenga acceso a los 4
servidores del CNE, que es lo único que se hizo, se produjo en la
sintaxis en las palabras, una caída de la Internet que no duro más de
tres minutos, casi cuatro minutos en realidad, para ser sincero” (Bracci
Roa,0:41,2013; noticias24, 2013)

Chapter VI.- About the Social Responsibility Fund and Fees
Article 27
Prohibitions
In the radio, television and electronic media services, the dissemination of messages that:
1. Encourage or promote hatred and intolerance for religious, political, gender, racist or xenophobic reasons. 2. Encourage or
promote and / or advocate for crime. 3. Make propaganda for war. 4. Encourage disorder among the population or disturb the public
order. 5. Do not recognize the legitimately constituted authorities. 6. Induce homicide. 7. Encourage or promote breach of the
current legal system.
...
Electronic media providers will be responsible for the prohibited information and content previously mentioned in this article, in
those cases that they were responsible for originating the transmission, modified the data, selected the recipients or did not limit
access to them, in spite of the request made by the competent authorities.
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“Alerta que la cuenta de @NicolásMaduro ha sido hackeada! ¡Sus
últimos mensajes son falsos!” (Venprensa, 2013)
Translation:
“A group of foreign hackers announced an attack to the CNE webpage.
Immediately we coordinated with CNE, and in order to protect the
webpage it was decided to stop all access from abroad; national access
was allowed. Any Venezuelan will be able to access the CNE webpage
after the bulletin and will have access to the electoral results.
Well, since the moment we took the decision of blocking from foreign
countries until this moment there were 45,000 attempts, but those
pages are blocked. Had us not done what we did, that page would be
affected because it is a hacking that we don’t know where it comes
from. We know it is not from Venezuela, sometimes they disguise with
different codes, sometimes from the United States, sometimes from
Europe. Now, in the moment we act to stop the attack over the CNE
four servers, which was the only action, an Internet shut down took
place, which did not take more than three minutes, almost four, to be
honest”
“Alert the account of @NicolásMaduro has been hacked! His last
messages are false”

The CNE is the government agency in charge of counting electoral votes and by
constitutional mandate it should be independent from any other government institution. However,
the CNE impartiality and neutrality was questioned during the 2013 elections and is constantly
used as a communication platform by the government (Barboza Gutiérrez, 2012, 2014; Nuñez &
Ochoa, 2013). According to Mr. Arreaza, to protect the CNE webpage, the social platforms of the
ruling party (Twitter specifically) and its candidate and public agencies website from foreign
cyberattacks, the Venezuelan government decided to shut down the Internet, so foreign nationstates could not have any access. This process took around four minutes in Caracas (the capital
city) and between 20-45 minutes in the rest of the Venezuelan territory. This Internet shutdown
was highly successful because the government owns CANTV, the ISP that handles over 90% of
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the Internet subscribers in Venezuela (Bracci Roa, 2013; Diaz Hernandez, 2013; Venprensa,
2013).
Political rivals accused Mr. Arreaza and the ruling party of taking these actions to
manipulate the electoral data. Mr. Arreaza rejected the accusations stating that there was no
problem with the Internet and that they were just trying to protect the sites previously mentioned
from foreign attacks. In this case, the foreign attack has a different connotation from the Russian
one. According the statement of its own representatives, the government was trying to protect the
communication platforms of the ruling party, which include Twitter accounts and official web
pages. Venezuelan authorities claimed that attackers were foreigners living outside of Venezuelan
territory, although this was never clarified (OpenNet, 2013).
Venezuela has lived many episodes of censorship in the past and they continue, but this
was the first time the Internet was shut down (OpenNet, 2013; Reuters, 2017b). This episode was
not related to the flow of data or information, but to the communications capabilities of the ruling
party in times when its stability in power was not clear. At this point it is necessary to remember
that one of the reasons why Venezuela is considered a hybrid regime is because the same party has
been ruling since 1999 (EIU, 2017). The Venezuelan authorities at the time and even today use
their Twitter accounts and public agencies websites, the CNE in particular, as part of their
communication infrastructure or platform to address the rest of the world. As a matter of fact, the
CNE has been accused many times of lack of impartiality and of “inflating” the results during the
last election for a new assembly to rewrite the Venezuelan constitution (Barboza Gutiérrez, 2014;
BBC, 2017; Oppenheimer, 2015).
The second Internet shutdown in Venezuela took place between February 19-22, 2014,
over 30 hours, and it occurred in San Cristóbal, the capital city of Táchira, the border state between
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Venezuela and Colombia (Kerr, 2014). Since 2014, Venezuela’s inflation increased over 50% and
foreign currency valuation sites were blocked massively. However, in February 2014, when the
highest increased in inflation occurred, protests in the border state of San Cristóbal also increased.
Hundreds of blogs and sites, especially the ones containing political news, were censored (these
include Twitter and Herdict). In Táchira, the connection to Internet was not available through
CANTV (ISP owned by the government) or any other ISP (Diaz, 2014; ONG Derechos Digitales,
APC, & Varon Ferraz, 2014). Representatives of the Venezuelan government blamed protesters
of the right-wing groups for the problem and denied any responsibility in the Internet shutdown
(Frank Bajak & Sequera, 2014).

Former Venezuelan
Science and
Technology Minister
Manuel Fernandez
(2014)

When asked about the shutdown of the Internet in the city of Táchira,
he stated:
“En algunos casos se producen cortes de la fibra por accidentes, en
otros por hechos de vandalismo, pero siempre procedemos a
empalmarlos para optimizar el servicio. En esta ocasión, tuvimos
problemas en la zona norte de Táchira y dentro de San Cristóbal con
algunas tanquillas, porque se han presentado muchas quemas en la
ciudad” (Noticias24, 2014, para.3)
“.. lo que están haciendo esos grupos minoritarios, fascistas, violentos
contra la patria es una cosa inaceptable, le están quitando la
tranquilidad y la calma a los niños, hombres y mujeres de este país, y
una de las expresiones claras de esa agresión son los ataques a
CANTV…” (SOSVenezuela2014, 2014, 0:29)
Hay que recordar que Cantv le sirve a 22 millones de venezolanos,
empresa a través de la cual el Estado ofrece acceso a las
telecomunicaciones para todas y todos, sin distingo político” (AVN,
2014, para.5)
“.. los incendios van por las taquillas por dónde va la fibra óptica”
(SOSVenezuela2014, 2014, 3:37)
“163 páginas web del Estado fueron saboteadas en doce días”
(SOSVenezuela2014, 2014, 6:48)
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Translation:
“In some cases, fiber optic cables may get cut by accident, in some
others for vandalism, but we always proceed to splice them to optimize
the service. This time we had problems in the northern zone of Táchira
and inside the state of San Cristóbal with some sewers because there
were a lot of fires in the city”
“… those minority groups, fascists, violent, against the motherland is
unacceptable, they are taking the tranquility and calm from children,
men and women of this country, and one of the clearest expressions of
that aggression is the attacks against CANTV …”
“We must remember that Cantv serves 22 million of Venezuelans, this
is a company through which the government provides access to
telecommunications for everyone, without political distinction”
“Fire goes through the sewers and the optic fiber cable”
“163 web pages of the government were hacked in the last twelve
days”
Former President of
CONATEL
(Venezuelan
Regulator) William
Castillo
(2014)

When asked about the activities of the Venezuelan government over
the Internet in Táchira, before the Internet shut down, he stated:
"Bloqueamos varios de los enlaces desde donde se atacan sitios
públicos. Se mudan a nuevas direcciones. Mantenemos el monitoreo
permanente" (El Universal, para.1, 2014)
Translation:
“We blocked several links that attempted to hack public websites.
Hackers move to new addresses. We keep monitoring permanent”

Both scenarios in Venezuela are of course very different, and they provide two different
insights of what the government tried to achieve when they shut down the Internet. In the first
case, the government acknowledged that they did shut down the Internet. They also said it was to
protect the government’s social network accounts and public agencies sites, both which were used
as communications means by the government. In the second case, the government denied any
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responsibility in the shutdown and they blamed the political protesters against the administration
of Nicolás Maduro.
In both cases, 2013 and 2014, Venezuela was facing massive political protests against the
administration of Nicolás Maduro, the questioned current president29 (El Comercio, 2014;
Neuman, 2013). As the literature has suggested (for authoritarian and hybrid regimes), in both
episodes, the Venezuelan government was trying to limit the accountability of its actions by
preventing political mobilization and public protest (Howard et al., 2011; Michaelsen, 2016). As
the facts developed, during the first episode the Venezuelan government blamed a foreign hacker
of attacking their communication capabilities, and in the second they blamed protesters of
destroying the Internet infrastructure. Despite of the government explanation for the second case,
Twitter made public the Venezuelan government censored that social network (Obrien, 2014).
In both cases, audiences are not instrumental to achieve an Internet shutdown. In the first case
the government speech points out that an attempt to control the flow of information was the cause
to shut down the Internet. Actions follow what the Venezuelan government called a foreign attack,
but at the end they were trying to preserve their own communication means. In the second case,
the government censored the same platform, Twitter. In both cases, the audience is again the social
networks. Social networks are not instrumental to achieve an Internet shutdown, but they are the
“carriers” of information that the Venezuelan government wants to control since the times of Hugo
Chavez.

29
On January 23, 2019, Mr. Juan Guaidó, 10th President of the National Assembly of Venezuela, took a public oath to
serve as interim President of Venezuela. Guaido’s legal claim is based on an interpretation of Article 233 of the Constitution of
Venezuela (Herrero, 2019).
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Additionally, and not in the same terms, owners of the Internet infrastructure are also the
audience. The government-owned-CANTV controls around the 90% of the Internet subscribers in
Venezuela, however the remaining 10% have some points of international connection to move the
information abroad (Dyn, 2012, 2014b). Within this context, the government wants to control the
10% of Internet users that CANTV does not support. According RESORTE, those users are data
managers that are partially responsible for what is posted and happens online. In a sentence, they
are responsible for the information posted online and the way the information flows. In the terms
of the government representatives, these users certainly may include foreign hackers and
destroyers of the Internet infrastructure. The audience they intend to convince, using terms of
“fear,” is the segment of the Internet they cannot control, the segment that handles information the
government dislikes but that cannot control.

4.3.3.2.Referent Object

The referent object is one of the most important elements within the security discourse.
From the referent object depends the type of policy governments decide to implement, the audience
to address and the content of the speech. As explained before, there can be one or more referent
objects. The referent object is deemed worthy of survival and can be assimilated to the national
interest, that thing or things that need to be protected to guarantee the national security of a nationstate (McDonald, 2008).
At this point it is necessary to remember that the securitization theory refers to a speech act
in which an actor makes a claim that some referent object (s) is existentially threatened. The
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securitization theory justifies the use an extraordinary measure to protect the referent object by
fighting against the threat (Jutila, 2015).

4.3.3.2.1. Consolidated Democracies

The security discourse for consolidated democracies shows that the most important referent
object for consolidated democracies is the critical infrastructure, mostly owned and handled by the
private sector. As explained before, the referent object is defined as the thing or things that must
be protected to guarantee the national security. In this condition, the referent object is also the
national interest, the main element to protect within national security policies because its
protection is tied to the survival and stability of the nation-state. In this regard, I identified the
critical infrastructure as a common element of all national security policies, independently of being
a consolidated or a young democracy. However, the critical infrastructure is not the only referent
object. Consolidated democracies are also worried about the control of social network platforms
when these endanger what they consider the “public order” that the government is habituated and
can handle.
The next paragraphs will provide evidence for these conclusions. Some statements have
been previously mentioned to analyze the audience, this time they will be used to identify the
referent object.
The U.S. will be our first case. As illustrated before, during the 111th Congress, bills S.773
and S.3480 were in the middle of the debate because they would have authorized emergency
measures by the president if the U.S. critical infrastructure was threatened by a cyberattack. Similar
provision was contained in S. 413 during the 112th Congress (E. A. Fischer, 2014). These are some

185
of the statements of sponsors and supporters of the bills on the subject. All of them referred to the
protection of the critical infrastructure as the referent object, that thing that will preserve the
security and survival of a nation-state.
Former Senator John
Rockefeller (U.S.)
(2009)

About S.773
“We must protect our critical infrastructure at all costs—from our water
to our electricity, to banking, traffic lights and electronic health
records—the list goes on … if we fail to take swift action, we,
regrettably, risk a cyber-Katrina.” (Aquino, 2009, para.6)
“I know the threats we face, … Our enemies are real. They are
sophisticated, they are determined and they will not rest.” (McCullagh,
2009, para.6)

Former Senator Joseph
Lieberman, Senator
Collins and Senator
Carper (U.S.)
2011

About S.3480
“The federal government must ensure that SCADA* systems
controlling our most critical infrastructure are not just minimally
protected, but that they all maintain a high level of security consistent
with the risk that a disruption could cause catastrophic damage. To
achieve the security we need, S. 3480 would establish a collaborative,
cooperative partnership between our most critical infrastructure” (U.S.
Senate, 2010, p.9)
*Supervisory control and data acquisition

Former Senator Joseph About S.3480
Lieberman, (U.S.)
“In the event of a catastrophic cyber-attack that could seriously
2010
jeopardize public safety, our economy, or our national security, the bill
provides the President with the authority to initiate emergency measures
to protect our most critical infrastructure” (Lieberman, 2010b, p.3)

Republican staff
director and counsel
for the Senate
Homeland Security
and Governmental
Affairs Committee
Brandon Milhorn
(U.S.)

About S.413
“The point of the proposal is to assert governmental control only over
those "crucial components that form our nation's critical
infrastructure"” (McCullagh, 2011b, para.4)

186
2011
Former Senator Joseph About S.413
Lieberman, (U.S.)
"For all of its 'user-friendly' allure, the Internet can also be a dangerous
2010
place with electronic pipelines that run directly into everything from our
personal bank accounts to key infrastructure to government and
industrial secrets” (McCullagh, 2011, para.9)

In a similar way, the White House proposal also points out to the critical infrastructure as
the referent object:
Statement for the
Record of Philip
Reitinger, Deputy
Under Secretary
National Protection
and Programs
Directorate, DHS and
others (U.S.)
2011

About the White House Proposal: Cybersecurity Regulatory
Framework for Covered Critical Infrastructure:
“Our critical infrastructure – such as the electricity grid, financial
sector, and transportation networks that sustain our way of life – have
suffered repeated cyber intrusions, and cyber-crime has increased
dramatically over the last decade.” (Phillip Reitinger et al., 2011,
para.4)
“The proposed legislation is focused on improving cybersecurity for
the American people, our Nation’s critical infrastructure, and the
Federal Government’s own networks and computers” (Phillip
Reitinger et al., 2011, para.9)

I must also add that, since 2009, the White House has addressed the importance of the
cyberspace and the digital technology within the U.S. national security policies. In this regard, the
White House took a clear stand to protect what they called the “nation’s cyber infrastructure”:
President Barack
Obama
(U.S.)
2009

Remarks of President Barack Obama on Securing the Nation’s Cyber
Infrastructure, Washington DC, May 29, 2009:
“… From now on, our digital infrastructure – the networks and
computers we depend on every day- will be treated as they should be:
as a strategic national asset. Protecting this infrastructure will be a
national security priority. We will ensure that these networks are
secure, trustworthy and resilient. We will deter, prevent, detect, and
defend against attacks and recover quickly from any disruptions or
damage” (Springer, 2017, p.325)
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Although there are no explicit calls of the U.S. to regulate the Internet, this statement may
be included as a cybernationalist call.
At this point it’s important to make a parenthesis specifically about the U.S. case. As it can
be seen, all previous discourses were from U.S. government representatives were mostly related
to the protection of the critical infrastructure. However, in 2015 the discourse changed
dramatically. Back on December 7, 2015, the Presidential Republican Candidate Donald Trump
addressed a crowd of supporters in South Carolina while talking about banning Muslims citizens
of entering U.S. territory. During that appearance, Mr. Trump proposed restrictions to Internet
access for some individuals as part of a counterterror plan to fight against the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria (ISIS), also known as ISIL or Daesh, online (David, 2016; Goldman, 2015; Hautala,
2015):

“We are losing a lot of people to the Internet. We have to do something. We have to go see
Bill Gates and a lot of different people that really understand what's happening. We have
to talk to them about, maybe in certain areas, closing that Internet up in some way ...
Somebody will say, 'Oh, freedom of speech, freedom of speech.' These are foolish people,
we have a lot of foolish people, we have a lot of foolish people because they are recruiting
by thousands.” (Hernando, 0:15, 2015)

Two years after, on September 15, 2017, after an attack over the London underground by
a Crude Bomb, the already 45th President of the U.S. made a statement using his Twitter account:
“Loser terrorists must be dealt with in a much tougher manner. The internet is their main
recruitment tool which we must cut off & use better!” (Trump, 2017).
Like in his previous statement, Mr. Trump reinforces his idea of considering the Internet a
tool for terrorists as a reason for what he believes to “cut off & use better”.
Most likely Mr. Trump was not thinking to shut down the Internet entirely, but to look for
ways to deny it to ISIS and its allies (Markoff, 2015), however, what Mr. Trump believed Bill
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Gates could do is not clear (LaCapria, 2015). In any case, his speech differs entirely from the
previous ones the U.S. government offered. Mr. Trump did not refer at all to the protection of the
critical infrastructure, but to stopping the proliferation of a radicalized speech within the Internet,
in concrete, the one from ISIS. Therefore, Mr. Trump’s statement is not related to the critical
infrastructure or the possibility of the U.S. suffering a massive cyberattack; this is a case of speech
and public order.
In any case, going back to the critical infrastructure, this is a vital element also for other
democratic regimes. As mentioned before, a representative of the Department for Culture, Media
and Sport from the U.K., stated that they would consider an Internet shutdown only if the nationstate faces a “… very serious threat for these powers to be used, something like a major cyberattack” (Hardings, 2011a, para.13). In this regard, and according the U.K. government, since 2011
until today, the number of cyberattacks that increased the most and are of the most concern for the
U.K. government, are the ones related to the critical infrastructure. Having the same view as the
U.S., the critical infrastructure is also vital for the survival of the U.K. and in that way is treated
by the most recent cyber security policy of 2016 (POST, 2011, 2017).
Additionally, about the U.K., I also mentioned previously how that government considered
briefly shutting down the Internet during an event of national unrest, such as the riots of 2011.
Considering that it is possible to have one or more referent objects, it is important to point out that
in this case, the referent object was the internal public order the government is used to and is
capable of handle. Although democratic regimes are consistently and constantly worried about the
protection of the critical infrastructure, for the specific case of the U.K., the critical infrastructure
is not the only referent object. The existence of one or more referent objects is possible according
the terms of the securitization theory. In this regard, the U.K. security discourse includes two
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referent objects: the vital critical infrastructure (as I detailed before) and the internal public order.
Moreover, as it was also mentioned previously, the debate surrounding an Internet shutdown in
the U.K. stopped because of possible comparisons with practices in authoritarian regimes,
particularly China and Egypt.
Also, as mentioned previously, after these events, former British Prime Minister Cameron
tried to create a legal framework to control the social network platforms (Facebook and Twitter)
and in this way, to control the flow of information (Halliday, 2011b). Mr. Cameron referred to the
flow of information during these events, as flow of information used for ill because it helped to
coordinate activities that affected the order in the city in the way the government is used to handle
and coexist (Cameron, 2011a).
As for the last case, the Australian one, it was already mentioned the importance of the
critical infrastructure. Since 2008, former Communications Minister Steven Conroy, warned about
the dangerous of having the Internet connected to the Australian critical infrastructure: (Senator
Stephen Conroy, 2008):

Author: Former
Minister for
Broadband,
Communications and
the Digital Economy
Stephen M. Conroy
(Australia)

“The internet and wireless links can operate and control power,
water, transport and broadcasting.
…
Because of the access it can provide, it also poses a significant
risk to the protection of critical infrastructure and government
information systems” (Senator Stephen Conroy, 2008, p.9)

Following his approach, in 2009, the Australian government set as a strategic priority the
protection of the critical infrastructure (Australian Government, 2009a). Same approach would be
consolidated in the Australian cyber security strategy of 2016 (HM Government, 2016).
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4.3.3.2.2. Hybrid Regimes

Hybrid regimes fear a constant intrusion by other nation-states in their own internal affairs
and, at the same time, they deny any intention from isolating themselves from the rest of the
international traffic. However, as I will depict in this document, they also carry on activities that
show the opposite, this is that they do intend to implement policies to keep their Internet
infrastructure under government control. At the same time, if the Internet infrastructure is
damaged, hybrid regimes tend to blame a third party for that (Bernard, 2015; Costello, 2017;
Anastasia Golitsyn, Sergina, & Kozlov, 2016; RT, 2014c; SOSVenezuela2014, 2014; UN, 2014a;
Venprensa, 2013). In these cases, there are different possibilities about what the referent object is;
as I will explain, the two cases under study (Russian and Venezuela) reflect different national
interests: 1) Venezuela is concerned with the attack over the social network platforms the ruling
party uses to communicate and some public pages the government uses with the same purpose, 2)
Both, Venezuela and Russia, are concerned with the flow of information. In this regard, the next
paragraphs will provide detail of how these elements became the referent object of these hybrid
regimes that prompted them to shut down the Internet.
In 2010, when former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez was still alive, he called for a
regulation of the Internet that according to him, reports false information. As he stated: “The
Internet cannot be something open where anything is said and done. Every country has to apply its
own rules and norms” (Chinea & Daniel, 2010, para.2). In March of that year, the hashtag
#freevenezuela was largely used after several TV stations were shut down by the government
(seven of every ten people became critical of the president), Chavez declared that “the Internet is
a battle trench because it is bringing a current of conspiracy” (Hopkins, 2015, para.7).
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Facing Chavez fears, the Venezuelan government included the Internet in the law on social
responsibility on radio and television, RESORTE, as referred in previous chapters. However,
despite of this measure, in 2010 Hugo Chavez himself joined to Twitter. He would use this account
to send orders to his ministers and to respond directly to Venezuelan citizens’ tweets and therefore,
he used Twitter as its own communication platform. He also would use to anger other nation-states
with his comments. When Hugo Chavez was no longer visible, his Twitter account was still active
(Burke, 2017).
As I established in my previous analysis, in 2013 during the presidential elections, it would
be the protection of these communication platforms and the so call protection of public pages,
what prompted the shutdown of the Internet. When presenting the Venezuelan case, I reported that,
back in 2013, the Venezuelan government claimed that a foreign hacker hacked the Twitter
accounts of the current president, Nicolás Maduro, and the ruling party.
At the beginning of 2014, during the protests in Táchira, the government censored social
networking services and removed foreign channels from the Venezuelan TV cable. At the same
time, the government claimed that TV stations could be in violation of the law on social
responsibility on radio and television, RESORTE, a law that forbids any action against what the
government considers to be the public order. ISPs that conduct business in Táchira shut down their
services and the explanation of the government came from two different individuals: 1)
CONATEL’s former director, William Castillo, claimed that the government was trying to protect
public sites, that is why they censored the Internet. Exactly what he meant by “public sites” was
never clarified and 2) the former Venezuelan Science and Technology Minister, Manuel
Fernandez, blamed protesters for the entire shut down the Internet, accusing them of damaging the
Internet infrastructure and denied any responsibility of the government.
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Former President of
CONATEL
(Venezuelan
Regulator) William
Castillo
(2014)

“Bloqueamos varios de los enlaces desde donde se atacan sitios
públicos. Se mudan a nuevas direcciones. Mantenemos el monitoreo
permanente” (noticias24, para.2, 2014)
“Los ataques cibernéticos contra Venezuela continúan desde diversos
lugares del mundo” (noticias24, para.3, 2014)
Translation:
“We blocked several links from where public sites are hacked. Hackers
move to new addresses. We keep monitoring permanent”
“Cyber attacks against Venezuela continue from different places
around the world”

Former Venezuelan
Science and
Technology Minister
Manuel Fernandez
(2014)

“En algunos casos se producen cortes de la fibra por accidentes, en
otros por hechos de vandalismo, pero siempre procedemos a
empalmarlos para optimizar el servicio. En esta ocasión, tuvimos
problemas en la zona norte de Táchira y dentro de San Cristóbal con
algunas taquillas, porque se han presentado muchas quemas en la
ciudad” (Noticias24, 2014, para.3)
“.. los incendios van por las taquillas por donde va la fibra óptica”
(SOSVenezuela2014, 2014, 3:37)
“163 páginas web del Estado fueron saboteadas en doce días”
(SOSVenezuela2014, 2014, 6:48)
Translation:
“In some cases, fiber optic cables may get cut by accident, in some
others for vandalism, but we always proceed to splice them to optimize
the service. This time we had problems in the northern zone of Táchira
and inside the state of San Cristóbal with some sewers because there
were a lot of fires in the city”
“Fire goes through the sewers and the optic fiber cable”
“163 webpages of the government were hacked in the last twelve days”
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Although the director of CONATEL did not talk about an Internet shutdown but a
censoring policy, the explanation about protecting public sites is the same that former vicepresident Jorge Arreaza gave during the Internet shutdown of 2013 (Bracci Roa, 2013).
The other case under analysis, Russia, shows fear of the U.S. and its allies. Their initial
concerns started after the annexation of Crimea and got worst after the Snowden revelations
(Lipman, 2014; Madory, 2014). As depicted before, Russian authorities became very concerned
about their data, from the government itself and its citizens. This is the reason for constant claims
and legislative actions of the Russian authorities to force foreign companies like Google to keep
any Russian data in servers located within Russian territory.
Nevertheless, it is not only the data itself what Russians are worried about. They are also
worried about its management, or the flow of data, who controls and circulates it. According to
the Information security doctrine of 2016, Russia want a nation system to manage RuNet because
according to the Russian mindset the Internet is a dominant U.S. product and therefore, the free
flow of information is a threat to the Russian cultural integrity and independence (Nikkarila &
Ristolainen, 2017).
However, this fear of the Russian government is not new. In the mid-sixties, the former
Soviet Union, criminalized “the dissemination of intentionally false insinuations defiling the
Soviet state and the social order” (Lipman, 2014, para.1). Of course, the dissemination of
information back in those days was limited to the technology of the time: radio, typewriters, copy
machines among others. All these forms of communication were, with a high level of success,
intercepted or controlled by the Russian government.
In today’s time, the situation changed radically with the Internet, a tool where attribution
is not easy to determine and where free public exchange is still possible at some extent. It is this
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free exchange and free flow of information what Vladimir Putin is afraid of (Lipman, 2014). This
fear is the reason why the Russian president called the Internet a “CIA project” (MacAskill, 2014).
As I also analyzed previously, Russian authorities claimed that the “unpredictable west”
can “disconnect” RuNet from the global Internet and compromise the integrity of the Internet itself
and the personal data of Russian citizens (Belousov, 2014). Following this tendency of Russian
cyber nationalism, the new laws enacted by the Russian government, required all online companies
to store Internet users’ personal data within Russian territory and targeted cyber activism, bloggers,
market players and social networks originating from abroad, such like Facebook and Twitter
(Hille, 2015; Zavyalova, 2014).
This fear of free flow of information can be appreciated in two cases within the Russian
context:
1. Yandex, a Russian search engine, is responsible for more traffic in Russia than Google,
but Vladimir Putin accused the company of not being nationalist enough. Putin accused
Yandex for having a number of Europeans and U.S. citizens in its governing bodies
and because “they had to agree with that” without major objection (Lipman, 2014,
para.7)
2. After the annexation of Crimea, the Russians quickly joined the peninsula to RuNet.
Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev stated that “it is necessary to ensure that
[state-owned Russian telecommunications company] Rostelecom and its subsidiaries
come to Crimea as quickly as possible” because “sensitive information and documents
... are [being] relayed by foreign telecommunications companies” (D’Orazio, 2014,
para.2)
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As a logical parallel to this Russian nationalistic policy, Russia’s Oversight
Communication Agency (Roskomnadzor) warned Google, Facebook, and Twitter that they must
be registered as “organizers of information distribution” in compliance with the law (Koshkin,
2014). At the end of 2016, Roskomnadzor proposed to block LinkedIn in Russia because this social
network failed to transfer Russian user data to servers located within Russian territory, in clear
violation of the national law. This action of the regulator makes effective a court ruling from a
Moscow City Court. At the time of the LinkedIn blocking, Facebook and Twitter still kept their
data housed out of Russian territory, while Apple and Google had complied with the Russian law
(Lunden, 2016; Reuters, 2017a; Tsvetkova & Osborn, 2016).
The cases previously mentioned show how important is for the Russian government to
control the data about itself and its citizens. I concluded before, as stated by Russian authorities,
that an attack that can trigger an Internet shut down is an attack from a foreign power (most likely
the U.S.) that: 1) would make the Russian government to lose control over its own data and its
citizens’ and that 2) would make the Russian government to lose control over the Internet
infrastructure. These two scenarios are only possible because of the actions of private companies
based in the U.S. that handle Russian data.
The Russian case, differently from the Venezuelan one, presents one more referent object.
Again, I must bring into account that the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School allows
for one or more referent objects. In the same line of the democratic regimes, Russia is also
interested in the protection of the critical infrastructure of that nation-state. This became a public
claim in 2016, when the Obama administration blamed the Russians for its interference during the
2016 presidential election (Nakashima, 2016; Adam Taylor, 2016). Back then, German Klimenko,
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Vladimir Putin’s Internet adviser suggested that Russia could disconnect itself from the global
Internet during a crisis:
“In the law we are talking about the protection of critical infrastructure, which should be
located in the territory of Russia … For example, hackers can penetrate the structure of
commercial banks and steal money. This is bad, but if they enter into the system of the
Central Bank, we would be in big trouble.” (Adam Taylor, 2016, para.4; Astakhov, 2016,
para.2)

In the same year 2016, in May, a representative of Minkomsvyaz, the Russian Ministry of
Communications and Mass Media, announced plans to protect the Russian critical infrastructure:
“… by 2020, 99% of Russian internet traffic should be transmitted within the country and
that it is going to create a ‘back-up-copy’ of 99% of the ‘critical infrastructure’ within
Russia.” (Translated by Nikkarila & Ristolainen, 2017, p.2)
Klimenko also pointed out that western powers block the access of Google and Microsoft
services into Crimea after its annexation as a product of the U.S. sanctions. He advocated for an
independent Russian Internet. According Klimenko, Russia should have the possibility of shutting
down RuNet and keep it independent of the global Internet:
“There is a high probability of 'tectonic shifts' in our relations with the West, … Therefore,
our task is to adjust the Russian segment of the Internet to protect themselves from such
scenarios … critical infrastructure should be on Russian territory, "so no one could turn it
off" (Adam Taylor, 2016, para.4; Astakhov, 2016, para.2)

At this point it is important to go back to the clarifications I mentioned in the chapter three,
when describing the Russian case. The statements of the Russian securitizing agents indicate that
the government has two different approaches when considering an Internet shutdown. On one
hand, there is a concern over the foreign enemy (the “West”) imposing its will and shutting down
the Russian Internet, and on the other hand, it is the perspective of an action of the Russian
government itself shutting down RuNet under circumstances of national security (Vargas-Leon,
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2018). The two perspectives include an Internet shutdown as the result of a government action and
an Internet shutdown provoked by foreign enemies in the form of a cyberattack.
As it can be inferred as a conclusion is that, just like in the U.K. case, there is more than
one referent object for hybrid regimes: the data itself and the critical infrastructure. Hybrid regimes
tend to blame third parties for their decisions to act over the Internet infrastructure. This is the case
for Russia blaming to the U.S. government and the “West,” or Venezuela blaming foreign hackers
or internal protesters.
Tables 04 and 05 summarize the elements of the securitization theory in democratic and
hybrid regimes as they have been explained in this chapter.
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Table 04.- Elements of the Securitization Theory in Democratic Regimes
Nation-State
Australia

U.K.

U.S.A.

1. David Cameron
Former Prime Minister
2. Sir Nick Harvey
Former Minister of State for
the Armed Forces
3. Representatives of the
Department for Culture, Media
and Sport

1. Former Senator John
(“Jay”) Rockefeller
2. Former Senator
Joseph (“Joe”)
Lieberman
3. Senator Susan Collins
4. Philip Reitinger,
Former Deputy Under
Secretary National
Protection and
Programs Directorate,
DHS

Units of Discourse
Securitization Theory
Copenhagen School
Securitizing Agent

1. Stephen Conroy
Former Minister for Broadband,
Communications and Digital Economy
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Speech Act
1. Grammar of
Security
(protection of the
Referent Object)
2. Threat Subject
3. Extraordinary
Measure

1. Internet: threat to critical infrastructure,
stability of the government information
system
2. The critical infrastructure is vital for the
survival and security of the nation-state
3. Distrust towards management policies
of the ISPs
4. Internet must be regulated by national
governments. Any strong policy must be
decided by the government
5. An Internet Shutdown is not considered
explicitly, but the terminology “any
measure” may include it
6. The Internet must be regulated

1. Internet: threat to critical
infrastructure, stability of the
government information
system
2. The critical infrastructure is
vital for the survival and
security of the nation-state
3. Internet must be regulated by
national governments. Any
strong policy must be decided
by the government
4. An Internet Shutdown is
explicitly considered

1. Internet: threat to
critical infrastructure,
stability of the
government
information system
2. The critical
infrastructure is vital
for the survival and
security of the nationstate
3. An Internet Shutdown
is explicitly
considered
4. Cybernationalism: the
digital infrastructure
is a strategic national
asset

Audience
The one that needs to
be convinced to
achieve the protection
of the referent object

1. The private sector that owns and
handles the critical infrastructure

1. The private sector that owns
and handles the critical
infrastructure
2. Massive Communication
Means: f/e social network
platforms

1. The private sector that
owns and handles the
critical infrastructure

Object to Protect

Critical Infrastructure

1. Critical Infrastructure
Critical Infrastructure
2. Internal Public Order: keep
social control in the way the
government is used to handle it
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Table 05.- Elements of the Securitization Theory in Hybrid Regimes

Nation-State
Venezuela

Russia

1. Hugo Chavez
Former Venezuela President (Deceased)
2. Jorge Arreaza
Former Venezuelan Vice President and
Minister of Science and Technology
3. William Castillo
Former President of CONATEL (the
Venezuela regulator)
4. Manuel Fernandez
Former Venezuelan Minister of Science and
Technology

1. Vladimir Putin
Current President of the Russian Federation
2. Igor Shchegolev
Former Communications Minister and Aide to
President Vladimir Putin
3. Dmitry Peskov
Presidential Press Secretary of the Russian
Federation
4. Vladimir Medinsky
Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation
5. Dmitry Rogozin
Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian
Federation
6. Leonid Levin
Chairman of the State Duma Committee on
Information Policy, Information Technology and
Communications
7. Yevgeny Fyodorov
Deputy of the State Duma of the Federal
Assembly of Russia
8. Ilya Kostunov, Ruslan Gattarov, Lyudmila
Bokova
The three of them, Members of the State Duma

Units of Discourse
Securitization Theory
Copenhagen School
Securitizing Agent
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Speech Act
1. Grammar of Security
(protection of the
Referent Object)
2. Threat Subject
3. Extraordinary
Measure

1. The Internet cannot be free
2. Cybernationalim: Every nation-state should
be independent when legislating about the
Internet
3. Enemies are foreign hackers and protesters
against the regime: they are enemies of the
revolution
4. Shutting down the Internet was neccesary to
protect official “public pages” and the
communication platforms of the rulling
party, Twitter in particular
5. They deny any intention of isolating from
the international Internet traffic

Audience
The one that needs to be
convinced to achieve the
protection of the referent
object
Object to Protect

1. ISPs as data managers, they are partially
responsible for what is posted online
2. Social media platforms, Twitter in particular

Communication platforms of the ruling party

1. Cybernationalim: Every nation-state should be
independent when legislating about the Internet
2. Enemies of Russia are the U.S. and its allies, the
“impredictable west”: they are conducting a
“blitzkrieg” against Russia
3. The U.S. and its allies could disconnect RuNet
from the rest of the international Internet traffic
4. The Russian government denied any intention of
isolating RuNet from the international Internet
traffic. However, the Russian government may,
on its part, be forced to shut down RuNet in
order to protect the Russian national security
and for the protection of the critical
infrastructure
5. In order to achive its war against Russia, the
U.S. uses private companies such as Google,
Facebook or Twitter, because they can storage
data about Russian citizens and the Russian
government in servers located within U.S.
territory
6. Data of Russian citizens may be compromised
7. The Internet was crated to weaken Russian
stability, therefore Russia must have its own
Internet
1. Private companies that handle Russian citizens’
data and the government data, f/e Google,
Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn

1. Data from Russian citizens and specially the
Russian government
2. Critical Infrastructure
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4.4.

Answer RQ3: What are the political, legal and Technical factors that enable
democratic and hybrid governments to shut down the Internet or to consider
doing so?

To analyze RQ3 this dissertation uses, as explained before, a comparative case study. In
each case, and to perform a comparison, this dissertation analyzed the variables contained in the
figure 19 (see below).
Figure 19.- Variables Comparative Case Study

Before providing an answer to RQ3, it is necessary to present an overview of the variables
of each case study (Please see table 08). The subsequent paragraphs will detail and explain the
different factors that prompt a democratic or hybrid government to shut down the Internet or to
consider doing it, and therefore, they will answer RQ3.
The analysis includes regimes that shut down the Internet or considered doing so: U.S.,
U.K., Australia, Venezuela and Russia. For purposes of comparison there are similar political
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regimes (hybrids and democracies) that did not consider and did not shut down the Internet: Brazil,
Mexico and Turkey. The last three cases for comparison are highlighted in different colors.
The purpose of this comparison is to analyze similar regimes, similar in the sense of
political classification, whether they are democracies or hybrid regimes, to try identifying the real
reasons why a government would shut down the Internet. When analyzing each case, there will be
references to the information provided in the description of each case study that was presented in
previous chapters.
Sub chapters following table 08 (see in the next page) will explain the different political,
legal, technical and economic factors that enable a democratic and hybrid regime to shut down the
Internet or consider doing so, and in that way, they will answer RQ3
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Table 06.- Technical and Legal Elements to Consider in each Case-Study
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4.4.1. Political Factors (PF)

The political factors referred to a nation-state political situation within a specific time.
These factors address the governments’ leadership, decisions and debate that may affect
individuals or organizations. Some of these factors may include government policies, government
stability and upcoming regulations (PESTLE, 2015a, 2015b). Table 07 details the main political
factors this project identified.
Table 07.- Comparison Political Factors that enable Hybrid and Democratic Regimes to
Shut Down the Internet or to Consider Doing So
Internet
Shut Down:
Considered
(C),
Happened
(H),
None (N)

Fear of a
Cyberattack
over the
CI
(Cyber
PearlHarbor)

Fear of
a
Foreign
cyber
attack

x

x
x

Australia

C
H
N
C
C
H

Brazil

N

x

Mexico

N

Factor

NationState
Russia
Venezuela

Turkey
U.S.
U.K.

x
x
x

Use of Social
Platforms or
Message
Systems (by
Internet
Users) during
Times of
National
Unrest or
Public Protest

x
x
x
x
x

Claims of
National
Sovereignty
over the
Internet,
(a.k.a.
CyberNationalism)

Political
demands
to
Increase
the
Internet
Access

Facilitate
the
existence
of selfdefense
forces
and fight
against
drug
dealing

x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x

4.4.1.1. Cyberattack over the Critical Infrastructure, a.k.a. Cyber Pearl-Harbor

As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, IT professionals and members of the U.S.
government created the term “Cyber Pearl-Harbor” to describe a massive cyber-attack on nationstates’ critical infrastructure. Theoretically, the attack is supposed to be so disruptive and powerful
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that the only mechanism of protection over the critical infrastructure would be to shut down the
Internet (Weinberger, 2013). A similar term also used by politicians or academics is “Cyber
Armageddon” or “Cyber 9/11” (Valeriano & Maness, 2015).
The protection of the critical infrastructure, and therefore, the concern about the feasibility
of a cyber-attack that can damage it is a constant concern for most nation-states. In this regard, the
protection of the critical infrastructure is part of the national security policy of the U.S. and the
U.K. and other democratic and non-democratic regimes around the world (CPNI, 2017; Gurdus,
2016; Mandarino Junior & Canongia, 2010; Oppermann, 2014; Stoddart, 2016). Both nationstates, the U.S. and the U.K., have considered shutting down the Internet if the critical
infrastructure is threaten (Ghosh, 2011; Lieberman, 2010; Lieberman, 2011a; Rockefeller, 2010;
Williams, 2011).
When explaining the U.S. as a case study for this project, I addressed the fact that the main
objection against the use of the “Cyber Pearl-Harbor” concept lies in the fact that there is no
agreement about its clarity or its limits. (H. Farrell, 2013; Lawson, 2016; Weinberger, 2013).
However, governments of the U.S. and the U.K. do seem to agree that, if necessary, either the head
of the government (President or Prime Minister) or someone close in authority has the capacity to
decide and order an Internet shutdown (Marsden, 2011; Phillip Reitinger et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, despite of the common aspects there are also differences between both cases. The
U.S. has considered the possibility of shutting the Internet when the critical infrastructure is
involved. The U.K. also acknowledges the possibility of the doing the same. However, the U.K.
government also has considered shutting the Internet for social control purposes (Cameron, 2011b;
Williams, 2011). In a different, but also similar way at the same time, the U.S. government has
been accused of considering shutting down the Internet for social control purposes. Accusations
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followed the “BART episode,” related to the use of the SOP 303 protocol (Bell, 2011; Elinson,
2011).
The protection of the critical infrastructure is an element of concern also for other
democracies, like Brazil. However, the Brazilian government rejected the idea of shutting down
the Internet. The protection of the critical infrastructure has high priority within the cyber security
policy of that nation-state. However, Brazil considered all sorts of measures to avoid at all cost an
Internet shut down. Circumstances that prompt the discussion on the subject were related to the
World Soccer cup of 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016. Before these events, potential
measures to keep the Internet working in case of social protests also became part of the Brazilian
green book of cyber security (Almeida Advogados, 2015; Carpes, 2012; CEPROMAT, 2014;
Oppermann, 2014).

4.4.1.2.Foreign Cyberattack

In case of this political factor, a potential foreign cyberattack, the evidence this project
found comes from two hybrid regimes, Russia and Venezuela. Both nation-states fear a foreign
cyber-attack, however there are two differences when considering these regimes: 1) they have
different visions of what the “foreign attack” would be and 2) Russia considered to shut down the
Internet, while Venezuela did it. The next paragraphs will present each case.
After the Snowden revelations of 2013, regarding the U.S. surveillance activities
worldwide (Lawfare, 2014), two members of the Russian parliament (MPs), MP Ilya Kostunov
and MP Ruslan Gattarov, alongside with members of the executive branch, publicly expressed
their concern that RUNET (the Russian Internet) could be disconnected by the U.S. from the
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international Internet traffic. The Russian authorities even suggested a counter-measure, the
possibility of shutting down the Internet by the Russian government itself in case of what they
called a “foreign attack”. Specifically, they talked about a foreign attack from the “unpredictable
West” (the U.S. for the case) (Belousov, 2014; HTB, 2014; Lokot, 2014; Runkevich & Malai,
2014; Watson, 2013). Further statements from Vladimir Putin would reveal that the Russian
Security Council was conducting tests over RUNET to evaluate the impact of a potential foreign
attack and how to shut down RUNET if necessary (Anastasis Golitsyn, 2014b, 2014a; Lawfare,
2014).
The discussion about the Internet shut down in Russia took place while the government
enacted several new laws and regulations over the Internet infrastructure (Eremenko, 2014a).
According to the Russian authorities, the purpose of these laws was to strength the stability and
resilience of RUNET. However, the bills were created with different purposes, as it was stated in
their own text: 1) Owners and operators of websites were obligated to store all information about
the arrival, transmission, delivery, and processing of voice data, written text, images, sounds, or
other kinds of action, 2) the Russian government allowed itself legally to review all content posted
on the Internet, 3) Internet companies would be forced to locate servers handling Russian Internet
traffic and Internet users’ data inside Russian territory, 4) the regulator would be allowed to block
websites deemed extremist or a threat to public order without a court order, 5) money donations in
the Internet were restricted, 6) any individual deemed a disseminator or re-disseminator of
“extremist materials” would be imprisoned and 7) anonymous access to Internet in public spaces
was forbidden (Duffy, 2015).
All these laws belong to a whole legal framework, which purpose is to control the entire
infrastructure of the Internet, and with it, the flow of data and the communication process in and
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out of Russian territory. This also means that the U.S. (or any other government for the purpose)
surveillance activities should not get any information about the Russian government or the Russian
population. As a matter of fact, since 2008 Russia has been insisting in the creation of a domestic
Internet that recognizes only Cyrillic characters and is separated from the international Internet
traffic (Francis, 2008). In 2014, they would make the same claim again (RIA Novosti, 2014). The
Minister of culture even talked about a “Patriotic Internet” that can protect Russian citizens from
the U.S. espionage activities (Dolgov, 2015a). In 2016 the enactment of new surveillance laws
about encryption would be again an example of the control the Russian government wants to
exercise over the Internet infrastructure (Galperin & O’brien, 2016; O’Neill, 2016).
For the Russian government, the Internet is a vital part of its own identity and in this regard,
it is related to the consolidation of the Russian government power. In fact, in July 2014, Crimean
ISPs began receiving Internet services over the newly constructed submarine cable “Kerch Strait
Cable,” that connected Crimea with Russia. For international analysts the message was clear: there
was no turning back in the process of infrastructure consolidation by Russia in Crimea (Madory,
2014).
From a legal point of view, RUNET also must have its own legal framework, which means
a specific law for every government activity within the Internet. These laws were also mentioned
before in this document and they are known as the Russian “Blitzkrieg” laws over the Internet
infrastructure (Eremenko, 2014a, 2014b).
It is possible to conclude that, for the Russian authorities a foreign attack that can trigger
an Internet shut down is an attack from a foreign power (most likely the U.S.) that: 1) would make
the Russian government to lose control over its own data and its citizens’ and that 2) would make
the Russian government to lose control over the Internet infrastructure. In this regard, an Internet
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shut down is only acceptable if two conditions are met: 1) if it is done by Russian authorities and
2) if it helps to preserve the control the Russian government has over the Internet infrastructure.
Differently from Russia, the Venezuelan government has a completely different idea of
what a foreign attack over the Internet is. The first time the Venezuelan government shut down the
Internet was in April 2013, during the Presidential elections. Back then, Jorge Arreaza (then vicePresident) claimed that foreign hackers attacked the Twitter accounts of the Venezuelan ruling
party, “Partido Socialista Unido” – PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela), the candidate
Nicolás Maduro (at the time also interim president) and the webpage of the Consejo Nacional
Electoral – CNE (National Electoral Council) (AVN/VTV, 2013).
The CNE is the government agency in charge of counting electoral votes and by
constitutional mandate it should be independent from any other government institution. However,
the CNE impartiality and neutrality was questioned during the 2013 elections and is constantly
used as a communication platform by the government (Barboza Gutiérrez, 2012, 2014; Nuñez &
Ochoa, 2013). According to Arreaza, in order to protect the CNE webpage and the social platforms
of the ruling party and its candidate, the Venezuelan government decided to stop the Internet
service. This process took around four minutes in Caracas (the capital city) and 20 in the rest of
the Venezuelan territory. This Internet shut down was possible because the government owns
CANTV, the ISP that handles over 90% of the Internet subscribers in Venezuela (Diaz Hernandez,
2013; Venprensa, 2013).
Political rivals accused Arreaza and the ruling party of taking these actions to manipulate
the electoral data. Arreaza rejected the accusations stating that there was no problem with the
Internet and that they were just trying to protect the sites previously mentioned from foreign
attacks. As explained before, this was the first time (out of three) that the Internet has been shut
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down in Venezuela. In this case, the foreign attack has a different connotation from the Russian
one. The Venezuelan government was trying to protect the communication platforms of the ruling
party, Twitter accounts and an official webpage. Attackers were supposed to be foreign ones by
claim of the Venezuelan authorities themselves, although this was never clarified. Venezuelan has
lived many episodes of censorship in the past and they continue, but this was the first time the
Internet was shut down (OpenNet, 2013; Reuters, 2017b).
In this case the Internet shut down was not related to the flow of data or information, but
to the communications capabilities of the ruling party in times when its “stability” in power was
not clear. At this point it is necessary to remember that one of the reasons why Venezuela is
considered a hybrid regime is because the same party has been ruling since 1999 (EIU, 2017).

4.4.1.3. Use (By Internet Users) of Social Platform or Message Systems During Times
of National Unrest or Public Protest

The idea of shutting down the Internet to interrupt the communication process within social
platforms has been used as a reason to shut down the entire Internet, or to consider doing it, in
democratic and hybrid regimes. When this occurred, nation-states under analysis were going
through a time of national unrest. For the U.K., a consolidated democracy, this was the case during
the London riots of 2011 (Casilli & Tubaro, 2011; Ionescu, 2011) and for Venezuela, this occurred
in 2014 during the protests against the government of Nicolás Maduro (Frank Bajak, 2014). Each
case will be described in the next paragraphs.
As mentioned before, back in 2011, the U.K. Prime Minister Cameron blamed the Black
Berry message system, Facebook and Twitter for allowing rioters to organize themselves and
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create chaos and disorder in London. Moreover, and not well publicly known, Mr. Cameron
suggested shutting down the Internet completely because they could not control the
communication within the social networks (Ghosh, 2011; Nosowitz, 2011). The U.K. government
decided not shutting down the Internet because he was warned of possible comparisons with the
Internet shut down in Egypt and similarities with Chinese censorship policies (MacKinnon, 2012;
Williams, 2011). Possible comparisons with dictatorial regimes at the end were important for the
U.K. government.
The U.S. also presents a case of trying to control, not social networks, but a message
system. This case occurred during the BART episode. As this document explained before, in 2011,
all cellular service inside the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) got disrupted in San Francisco
transit stations for three hours during a mass public protest. In July 2012, the DHS accepted some
responsibility in the episode and referred to the SOP 303 emergency protocol (Brownlee, 2015;
DeSoto, 2015). Although this is just one episode, it reveals the technical means and capabilities
the U.S. government has, to control (at some extent) the Internet. Nevertheless, despite the
situation, I don’t consider the U.S. as a case of an Internet shutdown for two reasons: (1) it is not
known the real capacity of SOP 303 to affect the Internet (in terms of devices -computers, phones,
territorial extension or even the content of the protocol) and (2) since only the BART facility was
affected, any Internet user or protester who wanted to access the Internet only had to walk out of
the building.
The Venezuelan case is different. This situation started back in 2014 in the middle of public
protests against Nicolás Maduro. Local media was under censorship and the foreign press was
being harassed; in this scenario, the Venezuelan population only had the Internet as a source of
news. However, the government started a campaign of repression that started censoring social
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networks platforms, specially twitter, and ended up with an Internet shut down. These actions
concentrated in San Cristóbal, the capital city of the state of Táchira, by the Colombian border. In
San Cristóbal protests against the government were stronger and longer than in the rest of the
Venezuelan territory (Frank Bajak, 2014; Chao, 2014).
William Castillo, the director of the Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones –
CONATEL (National Commission of Telecommunications) claimed that social networks were
invaded by cyber-criminals who attack accounts and manipulate information. At the same time,
the Minister of Information, Delcy Rodríguez, claimed that social networks, specially Twitter, are
used by perpetrators of violence to create anguish in the population (Frak Bajak, 2014; noticias24,
2014). When the Venezuelan government realized they could not control the flow of information
in the social networks, they shut down the Internet for three days in San Cristóbal (Mora, 2014).
Despite of the actions of the Venezuelan government, there is an important point to make
for this case in terms of feasibility and success of an Internet shutdown. San Cristóbal is next to
the Colombian border; Colombia is one of the nation-states with better connectivity in South
America since 2002 (WB, 2017). People only had to cross the border, walking every day, to have
Internet access.
In the same year of the Venezuelan protests in Táchira, the Russian government also made
a political move. In 2014 the Russian government enacted the so call ‘Bloggers Law’. This new
law was enacted in the middle of the discussion about Internet security during national emergency
situations. As a matter of fact, a mass protest and the use of social networks was included in the
political debate as a specific example of this type of situation.
The new law established that that any site with more than 3,000 visitors per day will be
considered a media outlet and therefore, will be responsible for the accuracy of the information
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published. The law also implements scanning software that allows the Russian government to
review all content posted on the Internet, regardless of daily page hits or classification. In this
scenario, bloggers can no longer remain anonymous online. Additionally, any organization that
provide platforms for their work and communications, like search engines, social networks and
similar forums are required to maintain computer records on Russian soil of everything posted
during the last six months (MacFarquhar, 2014).
As the law was passed, there was a common believe among experts and civil activists that
the real targets were not just any social platform, but those that originate abroad, like Facebook
and Twitter. This believe also is consistent with the new Russian law that requires foreign
companies to store data within the Russian borders (MacFarquhar, 2014; Zavyalova, 2014).
Finally, a singular case also comes into place, the control over social networks by the
Turkish government. Use of social networks in Turkey has been growing, however this nationstate never considered and never shut down the Internet. Since 2007, the Turkish government
(under the ruling of the same party, AK) has blocked social media because of what the government
considers offensive content to Turkey or to Turks. The first of these episodes occurred in 2007,
when social media presented some videos insulting Ataturk (the founder of Turkey) were posted
in YouTube. The platform was blocked until videos were removed. In 2010, because of an incident
presented in a video related to Deniz Baykal, leader of the opposition, YouTube was also blocked.
In 2013, Turkish people protested again against the government in what is known as the “Gezi
park protests,” related to the re-urbanization plan for Istanbul. These protests made clear the
differences between the traditional media in Turkey and the potential created by social networks
(Dogramaci & Radcliffe, 2015).
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During social protests in 2014, before the presidential elections, YouTube and Twitter were
the target of the Turkish government control. This last situation was especially difficult because
this time the Turkish government poisoned the DNS in order to control the IP addresses of Twitter,
and the public address of Google (Sifir, 2014).

Nevertheless, again in 2015 the Turkish

government blocked Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube because these platforms circulated pictures
of a prosecutor taken hostage and killed by militants. A year later, by November 2016, WhatsApp
messaging, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube were all completely blocked again. This episode
followed the detainment of 11 Members of Parliament from the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic
Party (HDP) (Mesoznik, 2016). As these episodes show, controlling the social networks in times
of turmoil is the “modus operandi” of the Turkish government. Shutting down the entire Internet
is not part of the Turkish action or security discourse.

4.4.1.4. Claims of National Sovereignty Over the Internet, a.k.a. Cybernationalism

Constant claims of national sovereignty over the Internet are common characteristics of
hybrid and democratic regimes. As it will be explained in the following paragraphs, for
consolidated democracies such as the U.S. and the U.K., claims of sovereignty over the Internet
infrastructure are part of their national security policy. For hybrid regimes, like Russia, claims of
sovereignty over the Internet started between 2003 and 2005 during the World Summit on the
Information Society (WSIS). These claims came back into their politics after the Snowden
revelations back in 2013 and again in WSIS+10 in 2015 (WSIS, 2015).
As referred in previous chapters, on May 29, 2009, the U.S. Executive branch declared the
digital infrastructure (including the Internet infrastructure) as a “strategic national asset” to be
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protected by the U.S. government and private companies because digital technologies are vital for
the survival and prosperity of the U.S. as a nation state. President Obama’s speech declared (White
House, 2009):
“From now on, our digital infrastructure – the networks and computers we depend on every
day – will be treated as they should be: as a strategic national asset. Protecting this
infrastructure will be a national security priority”

Following the White House executive order, on June 6, 2010, Senator JoeLieberman (D)
introduced bill S.3480, titled “Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010”. Senator
Lieberman remarked that the Internet is constantly under attack; therefore, the purpose of bill
S.3480 was to secure the most “critical cyber-networks” in order to preserve the critical
infrastructure that is connected through the Internet networks and that is vital for the survival of
the U.S. as a nation-state (White House, 2009).
Two years after declaring the digital technology a national asset, on May 12 th, 2011, the
Obama Administration prepared a set of recommendations for a new cyber-security legislation
including a regulatory framework for covered critical infrastructure (Thompson, 2012; U.S. Senate
et al., 2010).
On May 23rd, 2011, a hearing was conducted within the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs of the U.S. Senate to assess the White House proposal (Schmidt, 2011).
In reference to the possibility of shutting down the Internet, (US Senate, 2011) (at the time, the
deputy undersecretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate, from DHS), referred
to the attributions for the president established in the Telecommunications Act of 1934. Mr.
Reitinger stated that, because national security situations are “context-driven,” any final response
about how to act requires further discussion and debate among all the stakeholders involved (Philip
Reitinger et al., 2011). Reitinger also acknowledged that although the Telecommunications Act
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was not designed for the current cyber-security environment, the president will “use the authority
that it brings to bear in the right way” (US Senate, 2011, para.40).
Claims of defense of national sovereignty are also available in the U.K. policy debate, but
with reference to the economic well-being of the U.K. Back in 2011, the same year of the riots in
London, Sir Nick Harvey (the Minister for the Armed Forces from the U.K.) recognized the
cyberspace as a new global domain and the Internet infrastructure, as the main element of the
cyberspace. For Sir Harvey, the economic well-being of the U.K. is aligned with the protection of
the Internet infrastructure, however, the Internet itself has created connections that do not
recognize territorial borders. This is not acceptable for U.K. authorities; for them, the well-being
of the U.K. only can be achieved if there is a balance within the Internet between personal freedom,
national sovereignty and international stability (US Senate, 2011). The words of the minister are a
call for the inclusion of governments’ national sovereignty, the one from the U.K. and other nationstates of the world.
In the case of a young democracy that never considered shutting down the Internet and
never did it, like Brazil, the cyber nationalism is also important, but in a very different way than
the U.S. and the U.K. After the Snowden revelation of U.S. surveillance at a worldwide level,
Brazil became a defender of the data protection of its own citizens and companies that circulates
within the Internet. The Brazilian President at the time, Dilma Rouseff, emphasized the Brazilians’
concern for protecting the information of their corporations because of their economic and strategic
value (Harvey, 2011). Even more, Dilma Rouseff called the Snowden revelations 1) a situation of
grave violation of human rights and of civil liberties for compromising data of individual citizens
and, 2) of invasion and capture of confidential information concerning corporate activities, and
especially of disrespect to national sovereignty (Rouseff, 2013).
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Brazil called for the creation of new IXPs in the entire South American region to “retain”
the data in the south and reduce the dependence from the U.S. IXP located in Florida. At the same
time, Dilma Rouseff called to the international community to create any potential regulation over
the Internet infrastructure with full respect to the rules of international law (Keating, 2013a).
Within this context, the idea of cyber nationalism for Brazil is the protection of the data of its
individual citizens, their private corporations and the government itself. These three elements in
the context of NetMundial (A global multi stakeholder meeting on the Internet governance hosted
by the Brazilian government in 2014) and the statements of President Dilma Rouseff are vital
pieces of the survival of any nation-state.
In the case of hybrid regimes, cyber nationalism has a different, but at some extent the
concept is like the one handled by Brazil. As I already explained in the case of Russia, the Internet
in that nation state has its own identity: it has its own name, its own mascot and a set of laws that
grant power to the government as much control as possible over the Internet infrastructure. The
idea that another nation-state controls or can manipulate is unacceptable for the Russian
government, moreover for the Vladimir Putin administration. In the same line, all data that belongs
to the Russian population, government and industry must remain within Russian territory. With
this purpose in mind, the Russian government created a legal framework that forces foreign
companies to build servers within Russian territory and keep there the data of their citizens. The
idea of a national Internet was taken to the extreme when the Russian government decided that the
possibility of shutting down the Internet is an option with the solo purpose of protecting themselves
from the U.S. and western nation-states (Keating, 2013b; Muggah, 2013).
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4.4.1.5. What Remains: Political Factors

As it can be appreciated there are some points of coincidence between the regimes that
shutdown the Internet or considered doing so, and the ones who did not: the fear of a cyberattack
over the critical infrastructure, the use by Internet users of social network platforms or message
systems during times of national unrest or public protest and claims of national sovereignty over
the Internet. From a comparative point of view, these elements are the ones that remain as political
factors for hybrid and democratic regimes to shut down the Internet.

4.4.2. Technical Factors (TF)

The technical factors referred to the crucial aspects a government may be able to
manipulate and that can have access over industry and businesses. Technical factors are important
because they define what companies and individuals may be able to do in practical terms. Table
08 details the main technical factors this project identified (Asmolov, 2015; Belousov, 2014;
Bodner, 2014; Dolgov, 2015a, 2015b).
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Table 08.- Comparison Technical Factors that enable Hybrid and Democratic
Regimes to Shut Down the Internet or to Consider Doing So
Factor
NationState

Russia
Venezuela
Turkey
U.S.
U.K.
Australia
Mexico
Brazil

Internet Shut
Down:
Considered
(C),
Happened
(H),
None (N)
C
H
N
C
C
H
N
N

One or few
ISPs
Handles
over the
70% of the
Internet
Subscribers
x
x
x
x
x
x

None IXPs,
Few IXPs or
IXPs under
Government
Control

DNS Poison: Use
of non-traditional
Alternatives of
Action over the
Internet
Infrastructure

x
x
x

x

4.4.2.1. One or Few ISPs Handle Over the 70% of the Internet Subscribers

The conclusions of the cases under study are two: (1) between one and four ISPs handle
over 70% of the Internet subscribers in hybrid and democratic regimes and, (2) only hybrid regimes
have government-owned-ISPs. In terms of the role of the ISPs, I mentioned before that by stopping
the service of one (or a few) ISP, the population served by that specific ISP, which previously had
Internet access, would not have it anymore. Controlling ISPs is part of the process governments
follow to shut down the Internet. As the evidence demonstrates, hybrid regimes and even
consolidated democracies with few ISPs seem more willing to shut down the Internet or to consider
doing so.
In terms of a specific comparison between a hybrid regime and a consolidated democracy,
both Venezuela and Australia, have suffered multiple Internet shutdowns. Both nation-states also
have a single ISP that handles over the 90% of the Internet subscribers. The Venezuela government
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owns CANTV and the Australian government is the former owner of TELSTRA (Beijnum, 2011;
Medows, 2012).
As depicted before, Internet shut downs in Venezuela referred to three different causes: 1)
back in 2013, it was a response to a foreign attack to the communication platforms of the ruling
party, 2) to control the dissemination of the information during the protests against the
administration of Nicolás Maduro (concentrated in San Cristóbal, capital city of Táchira) and 3)
an accident, when CANTV alleged that it had technical problems providing the service (El
Universal, 2015; Hernandez, 2014; HwCol, 2014; Sainsbury, 2009).
In the case of Australia, this dissertation identified at least five Internet shutdowns in
Australia between 2013 and 2016, however there are allegations that Telstra suffered at least four
episodes only during 2016. In every single case, the explanation of Telstra is that there was either
an accident, consequence of the hot weather or a human error (Diaz Hernandez, 2013; El
Universal, 2015; Espinoza, 2015; Gomez, 2013; Mora, 2014). At this point, it is important to
remember the critics of the private sector and the civil society in Australia about the Internet shut
downs in that nation-state: they are not only very frequent, but the technical failures were never
explained (Chester, 2016; Frankland, 2016; Kidman & Allen, 2012; Kiernan, 2016; Koerber, 2016;
Stiles, 2016).
As a matter of fact, Greg Bader, the chief technology officer of iiNet (the second biggest
ISP after TELSTRA) confirmed that the Australian government has the authority to enact a
directive for the ISPs to stop connectivity and shut down the Internet. According Bader, this
process would take around 30 minutes and involves shutting down equipment and routing because
of the large amount of traffic that former-government-owned TELSTRA handles (Kidman &
Allen, 2012).
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In the case of the other democracies under study:
1. Although the U.S. has over 3,000 ISPs in its territory, four corporations, Comcast,
Charter, AT&T, and Verizon, share about 76 percent of the 94.5 million internet
subscribers in the U.S (Leskin, 2017). As a matter of fact, in 2016, it was believed that
Charter could reach the 70% of the Internet subscriptions (Brodkin, 2016; Kafka &
Molla, 2017). In a similar way, although the U.K. has around 3,000 ISPs in its territory,
four corporations control most of the Internet subscribers in that nation-state: BT,
TalkTalk, Virgin Media and Sky (BT, 2017; GOV.UK, 2012).
2. In the case of Mexico, the market is mostly controlled by three ISPs: América Móvil
(also known as Telmex) controls 55% of Internet subscribers, Televisa handles the 22%
and Megacable-MCM handles the 15% of Internet subscribers. These three ISPs handle
over the 90% of the Internet subscribers and two of them over the 70%. This is a new
balance within the Mexican market and is the result of a policy of the Mexican
government to reduce the monopoly formerly controlled by Telmex (Lucas & Juarez,
2018; Martinez, 2018). More important is the distinction, despite of the fact that only
three ISPs handle over the 90% of the Internet subscribers in Mexico, this nation-state
never considered and never shut down the Internet.

4.4.2.2. No IXP, Few IXPs or IXPs Under Government Control

Controlling IXPs is the second step to attempt to shut down the Internet after controlling
the ISPs. Not always is possible to control IXPs completely as they can have an international
portion controlled from abroad. However, by controlling at least part of the IXPs, the connections
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between ISPs are affected. Since IXPs facilitate the traffic among ISPs making it faster and fluid,
by not having IXPs the Internet traffic (no matter how high the level of Internet penetration rate
is) may become extremely slow and of poor quality (Zuckerman, 2015). The more IXPs a nationstate has, they will provide a faster Internet service than the ones that do not have them and the
cost of the service decreases (ISOC, 2012; Villarroel, 2015).
At least one of the cases under study has no IXPs. The evidence in the cases under study
comes from Venezuela and at to some extent from Russia (DCM, 2015). Venezuela has a high
level of Internet penetration rate (over 60%), however it also has the slowest Internet in Latin
America, the most expensive and of poorest quality (PCH, 2015, 2017). When is about an Internet
shut down, just like I explained before, the lack of an IXP within Venezuelan territory facilitates
the process. By lacking IXPs, if the Venezuelan government wants to act over the Internet
infrastructure, they basically have to worry about controlling the ISPs, which is exactly what
happened during the three episodes that nation-state suffered (CEPAL, 2016).
Differently from Venezuela, Russia has 29 IXPs. This would not be out of the ordinary,
except for the fact that, the Russian government has an indirect control over those IXPs. In general
IXPs are handled by private corporations (Coughlin, 2015; Dyn, 2014b); however, in the case of
Russia, Rostelecom, a company with close ties to the government, mans all of them (Bodner,
2014). Before 2013, Russia's attempts to control the Internet were limited to securing government
communications from foreign control, but that aspiration expanded to include the entire national
Internet infrastructure (Dyn, 2012; Golitsyna et al., 2016; ISOC, 2012).
Again, a case apart comes from Mexico, a young democracy. Mexico has one IXP that
functions partially; in practical terms, it is not very useful because ISPs are already very integrated.
The integration started a few years ago when Telmex had a monopoly over the Internet users.
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Despite of this situation, which increases the cost of the Internet service, Mexico never considered
shutting down the Internet (Korsunskaya & Winning, 2016). As a matter of fact, this option was
not even part of the discussion within the Mexican Internet policy debate.

4.4.2.3. DNS Poisoning

Controlling the DNS in any form can deprive most of the population from getting the
information they want to access or uploading information they want to share in the Internet. As
explained in the first chapters of this dissertation, one of the forms of acting over the DNS is by
poisoning it and among all the cases under study, Turkey is the one that used this technique
(Arreola, 2014; Terra, 2014).
On March 20, 2014, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, at the time the 25th Turkish Prime Minister
(and today’s president), threatened to “root out” the social media because these platforms
published wiretapped recordings that damaged the Turkish government reputation ahead of the
local elections (Zmijewski, 2014). On March 21st, 2014, publicly manifested his dislike towards
social media. On that day, Erdoğan ordered to block different sites and also to poison the Twitter
DNS. In response to this situation, Turkish Internet users changed the settings in their devices to
use Google DNS international providers like 8.8.8.8 and 8.8.4.4 or Level 3’s at 4.2.2.1 and 4.2.2.2
(Rawlinson, 2014).
People painted the numbers in the walls in the street, so everyone could see them. Because
of this political move, Twitter’s popularity increased in Turkey but on March 22nd, 2014, the
government decided to block directly the IP address of Twitter. On March 27th, 2014, YouTube’s
domain was also poisoned. On March 29th, the Turkish government also poisoned the Google IP
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address. As a result of this, when Turkish Internet users asked a Google DNS server to connect to
a YouTube’s address, they got the IP address of a Turkish government site hosted by Turk Telecom
(Sifir, 2014).
Despite of this disruptive policy, shutting down the Internet was never part of the discourse
in Turkey. By poison multiple IP addresses, the Turkish government did it with a specific purpose:
to control social media, which has become the “modus operandi” within its Internet censoring
policy. Differently from Russia, Turkey had no interest in preserving the data of its citizens or to
preserve any means of communication.
In Turkey, social platforms directly threatened the possibility that the incumbent party
remains in power, during time of elections. In Turkey elections were going to be held a few days
after the government poisoned the DNS in 2014, because the information disseminated in the social
networks directly damaged the reputation of the AK party, Erdoğan’s party. By poisoning the
DNS, Turkey made clear that: 1) the ruling party is extremely concerned about remaining in power,
like in Venezuela or Russia, and that 2) they have an infrastructure that can give them control over
the DNS, a move very different from Russia and Venezuela.

4.4.2.4. What Remains: Technical Factors

In this section, the points of coincidence between the regimes that shutdown the Internet
or considered doing so, and the ones who did not: the existence of one ISP or very few ISPs that
handle over 90% of Internet subscribers (or at least a very big portion of it, like in the U.S.) and
the existence of few IXPs, none or IXPs under control of the government. In the case of the U.S.,
it is important to be remember that, as mentioned before, although there are over 2,000 ISPs in its
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territory, the market is dominated by four Internet service providers: AT&T, Verizon, Comcast
and Charter (Ueland, 2017).
The case of the IXPs is a distinctive point of difference. Democratic regimes that shut down
the Internet or considered doing so, have between 24 and 178 IXPs privately owned. Depending
upon specific circumstances this number would be enough to guarantee speed and quality of the
Internet traffic among ISPs. On the other hand, hybrid regimes lack IXPs, like Venezuela, or they
are under government control, like in the Russian case.
From a comparative point of view, these elements are the ones that remain as strong
technical factors between hybrid and democratic regimes.

4.4.3.

Legal Factors (LF)

The legal factors referred to laws and regulations that affect businesses and individuals in
a specific nation-state. It is expected that legal statutes change time to time (Zmijewski, 2014).
This dissertation identified one legal factor common to all the cases under study, whether they are
consolidated democracies or hybrid regimes: the existence of broad national security laws or
telecommunication laws with unclear provisions about national security and the way governments
should act. However, in the case of young democracies, there is an element that restrains
governments to shut down the Internet: a specific legal or constitutional framework that protects
the Internet infrastructure. Table 09 (see below) shows the comparison:
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Table 09.- Comparison Legal Factors that enable Hybrid and
Democratic Regimes to Shut Down the Internet or to Consider Doing
So
Internet Shut
Broad
Legal and/or
Factor
Down:
National
Constitutional
Considered (C),
Security
Restrictions to Shut
NationHappened (H),
Laws
Down the Internet
State
None (N)
Russia
C
x
Venezuela
H
x
Turkey
N
x
U.S.
C
x
U.K.
C
x
Australia
H
x
Mexico
N
x
x
Brazil
N
x
x

Authorities of the hybrid and democratic governments seem to agree in the fact that there
is a group of laws that give them power over the Internet infrastructure, to the point of shutting
down the Internet if a matter of national security is involved. These laws were mentioned
previously when explaining each case. This chapter will provide specific opinions government
authorities have about an Internet shut down when citing these laws:
1.

Australia: Telecommunications Act of 1979 and amendments of 1997 and 2003
According to the provision 581 of the statute, the attorney general (after
consultations with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Telecommunications) is
entitled to request ISPs to stop providing Internet service under circumstances
“prejudicial to security” (PESTLE, 2015b, 2017)

2.

U.S.: Telecommunications Law of 1934 and amendments of 1996. Citing the war
powers of the president, during the discussion about the new 2012 Executive Order
of the White House, Phillip Reitinger (at the time the head of the DHS) clarified
that although the executive order does not contain a provision to shut down the

228
Internet, control over the telecommunications is a prerogative of the president. Such
prerogative will be used according the specific case (Keane, 2012a, 2012b) U.K.:
Communication Act of 2003. According to the section 132 of the Communications
Act of 2003, OFCOM, the “Independent regulator and competition authority for the
United Kingdom communications industries,” can request to any U.K.-based ISP
the suspension of the service to preserve the “public order” or in case of a massive
cyber-attack. OFCOM has the authority to act on behalf of one of the ministers,
most likely the minister of culture, who would be the one who has legal authority
to “shut down the web” (Phillip Reitinger et al., 2011). Along with section 132 of
the Communications Act of 2003, the part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004
also would give to the executive branch legal authority to request to the ISPs the
suspension of the Internet service. According to part 2 of the Civil Contingencies
Act, the executive branch is entitled to create emergency regulations if the U.K.
faces a national security threat (Hardings, 2011; Marsden, 2011).
At this point it is important to make a distinction between the U.S. and the U.K.
law. Differently from the U.S. law, the U.K. law requires specific identification of
the networks concerned and compensation for loss or damage to the businesses
impacted if the Internet was shut down. Also, differently from the U.S. law, ISPs
are not required to follow immediately an order of the administration. The law
requires to serve a network operator with a suspension notice and the ISP may
actually ignore it (Hardings, 2011; Marsden, 2011).
3.

Russia: “Blitzkrieg laws” over the Internet infrastructure, 2002-2016. This is not a
law but a big group of laws the Russian government enacted between 2002 and
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2016 with the purpose of controlling completely the Internet infrastructure.
Although Russia does not have a specific law that allow the government to shut
down the Internet, the administration of Vladimir Putting has created these set of
laws between 2002-2016 (when he was either the president or prime minister) to
gain complete control over Russia’s Internet infrastructure. As understood by
policy makers and academics in Russia, these measures only prepare the RUNET
infrastructure to be able to be shut down when the government considers to do it
(Winder, 2011)
4.

Venezuela: The Law of Social Responsibility and Quality of the Television in
Venezuela of 2005 (RESORTE). RESORTE forbids content considered
“offensive,” “violent,” “disrupt public order,” “disown pubic authorities,” and
“Induce homicide”. It is the government authority (the regulator in this case), the
one to decide when the content falls into the previous categories. Actions to take
also are entirely decision of the executive branch and they may include shutting
down the Internet (Asmolov, 2015; Duffy, 2015; Krieger, 2015)

5.

Turkey: The Law 5651, “Law No. 5651 on Regulating Broadcasting in the Internet
and Fighting Against Crimes Committed through Internet Broadcasting,” gave
power to the Turkish regulator, TIB, in order to 1) block Internet access and 2)
collect Internet traffic accessing IP numbers, subscriber numbers, subscription
information form the ISPs, the type of service and the amount of data used (Finol
& Espinoza, 2015; Gonzalo, 2010). The enactment of the law 5651 is very aligned
with all the Russian laws to control the Internet infrastructure (Kizilkaya, 2014;
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trend, 2014). The difference however is that shutting down the Internet has never
been part of the Turkish policy debate or government activity
The last part of the legal analysis comes from the young democracies, Mexico and Brazil.
According their own statements, these regimes do exercise activities of control over the Internet
content for drug dealing prosecution in the case of Mexico (OpenNet, 2013; OSCE RFOM, 2009;
Zeldin, 2014) and for privacy purposes or for prosecution purposes in the case of Brazil. In the
case of Brazil, social networks have been blocked in the past because of a court ruling (Merkelsson,
2010; Norzagaray Lopez, 2008). However, the Internet shut down is not in their debate and in
cases like Brazil, the idea of using this extreme measure of control has been clearly denied (Grossi,
2014; Olukotun & Pallero, 2016; Reuters, 2007). What these two regimes have in common is the
existence of a legal or constitutional regime that protects at some extent the Internet infrastructure.
As referred before, the Brazilian Congress enacted what is known as the Brazilian Internet
bill of rights, the “Marco Civil” legislation. Marco Civil, also known as the “Internet bill of rights”
protects privacy online and the network neutrality (Carpes, 2012). Marco Civil does not contain
provisions declaring the Internet a human right, but it was built on the approach of Mr. Frank La
Rue (the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression between August 2008 – July 2014)
of having a framework for human rights within the Internet. In this regard, Marco Civil was
designed on the idea that the Internet should be an open, affordable and accessible space and never
should be shut down. This is the reason why Marco Civil does not contain generic ban provisions
regarding content in the Internet. When is about national security, Marco Civil does not address
any issues related to this subject (Moncau & Mizukami, 2014; Peralta, 2014). In Brazil, any
activity related to national security is regulated through a national strategy on cyber security
prepared to address the organize crime as a major threat to Brazilian Internet and focusing on
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military solutions in cases of warfare. However, in any case an Internet shut down was never
address or considered by this legislation (Rossini, Cruz, & Doneda, 2015). In the case of Mexico,
a modification of its constitution in 2013, gives to the access to Internet the condition of human
right, without limitation. In accordance with the Mexican government opinion and legal opinions,
shutting down the Internet would be an unconstitutional action. Therefore, no laws (not even
national security laws) can regulate or accept the possibility of shutting down the Internet (Diniz,
Muggah, & Glenny, 2014).

4.4.3.1.What Remains: Legal Factors (LF)

The common characteristic of all the cases under study is the existence of vague or broad
national security laws. From a comparative point of view, this element is the one that remain as
legal factor for hybrid and democratic regimes to shut down the Internet. On this matter, it is
important to precise that this is a common characteristic of national security legislations all over
the world. The concept is never clarified by a national legislation and this is purposely done so
consecutive administrations can clarify the concept of national security according the needs and
changes of their time.
Figure 20 shows a graphic representation of the elements I identified as political, legal and
technical factors that enable hybrid and democratic regimes to shut down the Internet for
comparison purposes.
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Figure 20.- Comparative Graphic: Political, Legal and Technical Factors that enable Democratic
and Hybrid Regimes to Shut Down the Internet
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5. Discussion

This chapter details the most important issues this dissertation identified when talking
about the policy known as “Internet shutdown”. These issues intent to enrich the Internet
governance debate about Internet shutdowns, the importance of analyzing this subject within the
sphere of democratic and hybrid regimes and, the role of national security policies when framing
this extreme policy over Internet infrastructure.

The next chapters will provide an analysis of each one of the aspects previously listed and
will highlight the importance of the securitization theory and a comparative case study research
method to analyze the results.

5.1.

Context: The Internet Kill Switch, why this Subject is Important

When the Internet in Egypt vanished from the international Internet traffic in 2011, the
world was aware by the first time that such disruptive policy could be accomplished by an
authoritarian government. The term used to describe this government action was called “Internet
shutdown”. Same policy was debated at a legislative level in the U.S. between 2009 and 2011.
However, it is not very well known that the first time the Internet was shut down was in Nepal in
2005.
Since then, this disruptive policy has become more frequent and has been used constantly
for different reasons. Most cases include authoritarian regimes trying to fight against public protest
of their own citizens. These authoritarian regimes constantly claim that the goal of the protesters
is destabilizing the incumbent government and therefore, to destroy the administrative structure of
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the nation-state. Hybrid regimes also claimed similar scenarios in their own territories. By facing
similar circumstances, hybrid regimes like Venezuela, also executed Internet shutdowns.
This is however, just one side of the problem. Differently from what most people may
think, the policy of shutting down the Internet, as controversial and extreme as it is, has also been
debated at a political, legal and academic level by well-consolidated democracies, such as the U.S.
the U.K. and Australia. Young democracies like India even approved an administrative framework
to allow the government to shut down the Internet under reasons of national security. The debate
in all those cases focused in the existence of national security circumstances, but the debate also
will put on the table two things: (1) The existence of multiple concepts of national security when
analyzing an Internet shutdown and (2) The existence of similarities in the national security
discourse of hybrid and democratic regimes.

5.2. Different Views of What an Issue of National Security is

As mentioned many times in this dissertation, national security is a theoretical concept that
is framed under specific circumstances in a specific time by the government of a nation-state
(Richards, 2012).
The security discourse in all regimes under study claims reasons of national security to shut
down or consider shutting down the Internet. However, there are different views of what an issue
of national security that may prompt an Internet shutdown is. While well-consolidated democracies
address as national security the protection of the critical infrastructure, hybrid regimes are concern
about the flow of data and national protests.
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Nevertheless, it is important to say that, although these are mainly the reasons that those
governments claim, not everything is black and white. Well-consolidated democracies are also
worried about national protests and hybrid regimes are also concern about the protection of the
critical infrastructure. The next paragraphs contain an overview and explanation about each one of
these concepts.

5.3.

A Conceptual Problem: Two Views of What an Internet Shutdown is

This project has defined the term “Internet shutdown” as the attempt to stop all Internet
activity within the borders of the territory of a nation-state. However, within the Internet
governance debate there are different definitions. As mentioned at the beginning of this project,
the Internet Society (ISOC) and an organization named Access define the term “Internet
shutdown” as “intentional disruption of Internet or electronic communications, rendering them
inaccessible or effectively unusable, for a specific population or within a location often to exert
control over the flow of information” (ISOC, 2017, para.4). ISOC also clarifies the types of
Internet shutdowns as a total shutdown (what I call and Internet kill) switch and a partial shutdown
(episodes of censorship) (ISOC, 2017).
As I developed more deeply in the first chapter of this dissertation, I agree only with the
first part of this definition. An Internet shutdown is such when it affects specific elements of the
infrastructure and services that support Internet access, like ISPS, IXPs, fiber optic cables, the
DNS and the BGP. In this regard, an Internet shutdown target is not a specific application, but the
entire infrastructure of the Internet. As the same definition of ISOC states itself, when talking about
specific applications, I refer to episodes of censorship (ISOC uses the words “content blocking”),
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whether they are technical blockings, search result removals or take down. Analyzing episodes of
censorship is also very usual in the Internet governance debate and they are more common and
constants than Internet shutdowns.
As an additional point regarding the distinction in the different views of what an Internet
shutdown is, I must bring attention over some reports of the Brooking Institution (West, 2016) and
the Global Network Initiative (GNI) (Deloitte, 2016). Both reports pointed out to the economic
cost of the Internet shutdowns for a nation-state. This is another example of the problems in the
distinction, because these reports don’t explain the difference between the costs caused for
disrupting the flow of data of specific applications and the disruption of the entire Internet
infrastructure.

5.4. The Importance of Identifying the infrastructure and services that support
Internet access

By using the elements of the TCP/IP protocol, this dissertation provided some parameters
to define what an Internet shut down is and how it can be achieved, in a way to make a clear
distinction from censorship episodes. This point is extremely important because, by having a clear
concept of an Internet shutdown as an extraordinary measure, it was possible to build our research
design through: 1. The use of a theoretical model, the securitization theory of the Copenhagen
School and 2. The use of a comparative case study.
As mentioned previously during this dissertation, shutting down the Internet is a complex
process that involves multiple stakeholders as the different elements of the TCP/IP protocol are
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owned or handled by different entities. As mentioned, the elements to control to achieve an Internet
shutdown are as follow:
1. ISPs are the first stakeholder to be controlled. If these service providers cannot perform
their activities, the population they serve will no longer have Internet access (Beijnum,
2011; Medows, 2012)
2. In the case of the IXPs, their presence is fundamental to keep a fluid traffic of the Interne
packets and they also may provide international connections (Beijnum, 2011; Medows,
2012).
3. Internet cables facilitate over 99% of the Internet traffic (Madori, 2015)
4. DNS, the protocol that translates the host names into IP addresses (Vaughan-Nichols, 2011;
Wang, 2003)
5. BGP is the routing protocol that shares the master routes of the Internet. In this way, the
BGP makes it possible for ISPs to connect to each other and for end-users to connect to
more than one ISP
Achieving an Internet shutdown means controlling all these elements, and therefore,
national security policies must be oriented to control each one of these elements if the goal of a
government is shutting down the Internet. This is a much more difficult task than only controlling
specific applications.

5.5.

Use of the Securitization Theory

The securitization theory of the Copenhagen school, also known as securitization theory,
focuses on the analysis of one of the most important pieces of the justifications to achieve an
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Internet shutdown: the national security discourse. According to the securitization theory, the
discourse is the process of taking an issue from a politicized, or even non-politicized stage, into
the security domain (Buzan, 1998; Dunn Cavelty, 2008). According to the terms of the theory, the
study of securitization aims to gain an understanding of who securitizes (the actor) which issues
(the threat subject), for whom or what (the referent object), why (the intention and purposes), with
what results (the outcome), and under what conditions (the structure) (Buzan, p.32,1998)”. Also,
according to the theory, the securitizing agent builds a speech to convince an audience that an
extreme measure must be executed to protect the referent object, which is also the national interest
(Buzan, 1998).
Previous academic work has used the securitization theory from two perspectives: 1) to
analyze U.S. policies that govern cyberspace since the attacks of September 11, 2001 (Dunn
Cavelty, 2008), and 2) to analyze other nation-states securitization policies over diverse nonInternet-related issues.
This dissertation used the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School to analyze the
speech around Internet shutdowns, as a policy implemented or considered by democratic and
hybrid regimes to protect the national security of their nation-states. The use of this theory allowed
us to identify similarities in the rhetoric of the speeches of hybrid regimes and well consolidated
democracies. This means that, at a rhetorical level, limits between hybrid and democratic regimes
national security policies are blurry when it comes to an Internet shutdown. There are similarities
in the arguments of both types of regimes. The use of the securitization theory also allowed us to
identify different referent objects (the element to be protected in terms of the theory), a concept
also identified as the “national interest”. The national interest is important because is that thing
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that must be protected in order to preserve the survival and stability of a nation-state (Richards,
2012). The referent object is the focus of every national security policy.
Additionally, the securitization theory also allowed us to examine and identify the audience
that securitizing agents intend to address. In the terms of the theory, the audience must be
convinced that an extreme measure, such as an Internet shutdown, is necessary to protect the
referent object or national interest. This dissertation concluded that the importance of the audience
in the case of Internet shutdowns is related to: 1) their capacity to act so the Internet can actually
be shut down, this is the audience that must act and has the means to shut down the Internet and
2) their ownership of that thing the government wants to protect, that thing that is portrayed as the
national interest, even if this audience cannot or refuses to shut down the Internet.

5.6.

Similarities in the Rhetoric about Internet Shutdowns between Hybrid and
Democratic Regimes

As mentioned before, findings show that there are no clear and “sharp” distinctions
between the justifications why hybrids and democracies shutdown the Internet or consider doing
it. Figure 22 (see below) shows a representation of the similarities and differences in the speech of
these two types of regimes. The next paragraphs will provide an overview of the similarities and
the meaning of each one.
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Figure 21.- Comparison Between the Elements of the Security Discourse (Securitization Speech)
in Democratic and Hybrid Regimes
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In this graphic I count the number of cases per element of the security discourse. The “Y’
axe contains the element of discourse, while the “X” axe contains the numbers of nation-states
(democracies and hybrids) under study that used this element in their speech. In this way I could
compare how many regimes cited an element. In the next paragraphs I will provide an overview
of the way these elements interact. The order of the elements corresponds with the frequency I
identified them in the discourse. I also will explain differences among some of these concepts.
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5.7.

Cyberattacks (Cyber Pearl-Harbor) and the Protection of the Critical
Infrastructure

The critical infrastructure is vital for the survival of any nation-state in the world,
democratic or hybrid regimes. Its protection is also a matter of constant concern, especially in
times when cyberattacks have increased (Seals, 2018). After the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the different systems of the critical infrastructure were interconnected through the Internet, which
eventually became a vulnerability because if one sector is under attack the rest may be affected
too. Being this the situation, any national security policy over the Internet infrastructure must
include the protection of the critical infrastructure (Radvanovsky, 2006).
The interconnection of the critical infrastructure was a decision adopted by hybrid and
democratic regimes and today is also a matter of concern for both (Astakhov, 2016; MacKinnon,
2012; Pynnöniemi, 2012a, 2012c). This is an argument conveyed in the rhetoric of all the regimes
analyzed in this case study. The cyberattack that can damage greatly the critical infrastructure is
described as one of great magnitude, reason why well consolidated democracies called it “cyber
Pearl Harbor”. However, neither democratic nor hybrid regimes can establish some parameters to
identify a cyber-Pearl Harbor; in other words, they don’t know how to characterize this massive
cyberattack.
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5.8.

Internet must be regulated by Governments: Applying Cybernationalism to
the Internet Infrastructure

Nation-states under study have pretensions to create national regulations over the Internet
infrastructure. Democratic regimes agree on the fact that the Internet must be regulated by their
governments, without meddling from the international community (Krieger, 2017; LeMay, 2012).
Similarly, in the case of Venezuela and Russia, both regimes also call for an absolute national
regulation.
Hybrid regimes created one or many laws to control every single aspect that is relevant for
the government administration, such as the flow of information, child pornography,
intermediaries’ responsibility, data storage, terrorism, bloggers’ activity and anonymity. While
Russians created different legal bodies named as “Blitzkrieg laws” over the Internet infrastructure,
Venezuelans decided to amend the body related to the telecom infrastructure, the Law on Social
Responsibility in Radio, Television and Electronic Media (RESORTE Law).
All these Russian attempts to control the Internet infrastructure were taken to an extreme
at the end of 2017. By then, Russia announced its intention of creating an independent Internet for
the BRICS30, developing for the purpose a parallel and independent DNS system (Macdonald,
2017).
Although controversial, well consolidated democracies have had similar attempts to
control the Internet infrastructure, but not all them became legal statutes like in hybrid cases. In
any case, after 2001, well consolidated democracies also drafted bills to give governments more
control over the Internet infrastructure. In the U.S. the debate about the securitization of the

30
The acronym BRIC was publicly known in 2001 in a report written by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill. At the
time, the four nations it referred made up just 8% of the world’s total economy. The term initially included Brazil Russia, India and
China. Later, South Africa also would be included and the term would change from BRIC to BRICS (Timmons, 2015).
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cyberspace started (which included the Internet shutdown bills discussed in previous chapters).
Additionally, the Australians tried to pass at least three white papers (the equivalent to U.S. bills)
to give more control to the government over the critical infrastructure, created a blacklist of
websites, changed twice the cybersecurity strategy and amended the telecommunications law to
fight against child pornography. Like the Russian strategy, in 2015 the Australian parliament
changed the telecom law to force companies to retain Internet users’ records for two years and a
court determined that Google was liable as a secondary publisher in a defamation case.
In this context of overwhelming production to control the Internet infrastructure, hybrid
and democratic regime discussed or executed an Internet shutdown.

5.9.

Concerns over the Free Flow of Information and Social Control Purposes

The free flow of information is a matter of concern for democracies and hybrid regimes,
and, although controversial, justifications also overlap. In the case of Venezuela, concerns about
the flow of information without any filter or control was first expressed by late President Hugo
Chavez. Back in 2010, the Venezuelan government did not exercise so much power over the social
networks, but Hugo Chavez blamed them because he claimed that individual citizens were posting
whatever they wanted even if it was not true. According to Chavez this disinformation had as a
purpose to create instability within his administration. In defense of his efforts to curtail Internet
access, Chavez claimed that every nation-state should apply its own rules over the Internet (Chinea
& Daniel, 2010).
British authorities had similar concerns during the London riots in 2011. They were
certainly worried about the way information circulated by the protesters, while they were not able
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to control, oversee it or stop it. If they did not shutdown the Internet was only because of the
possible international repercussions of being compared with authoritarian practices (Williams,
2011). At some extent similar concerns are present in the U.S. during the BART episode, when
the phones of protesters were silenced on the grounds of national security and safety. The content
of the alleged mechanism to silence protesters and that may shut down the Internet, SOP 303 (an
emergency wireless protocol), was never made public (EPIC, 2015).
In a different scenario, the Russian government is concerned over the flow of information
that may compromise the data of the government itself or the data of the Russian citizens. As a
matter of fact, this is the main argument for two potential scenarios related to an Internet shutdown:
1) a Russian government doing: to implement a shutdown of RuNet when the nation-state faces a
national security threat , or 2) foreign enemies doing: to be prepared in case the U.S. and its allies
attempt to attack RuNet and cut it off from the rest of the international Internet traffic (MacAskill,
2014; Russia Beyond the Headlines, 2015; Zavyalova, 2014).

5.10.

Distrust towards ISPs

ISPs are an important element of the TCP/IP protocol, the first one to control if a
government wants to shut down the Internet. This also manifests the importance of its role within
the Internet ecosystem and the Internet governance debate.
The speech of both regimes, well consolidated democracies and hybrids, shows the lack of
trust towards ISPs as providers of the Internet service. In case of Australia, Minister Conroy
declared publicly what he considered the lack of cooperation from Australian ISPs when adopting
Internet policies. He was referring to a specific censorship policy the Australian Parliament was
discussing at the time (LeMay, 2010b). At the same time, the Venezuelan government declared its
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distrust toward ISPs and made them liable as part of the process of information flow and include
them in the law of social responsibility over the telecom infrastructure (Gonzalo, 2010; LeMay,
2010a, 2010b; YouTube, 2014).
Additionally, and more similar are the Russian and U.K. policy when it comes to the
communications within their territories. Russia created legislation that forces ISPs to 1) store all
information they process and keep it available to be reviewed by Russian authorities when required
and 2) keep censoring attributions for the Russian regulator at its own discretion (Duffy, 2015).
On the other hand, since 2009, ISPs in the U.K. are forced to keep information about every
electronic mail sent or received in the U.K. for a year (A. Crawford, 2009).

5.11.

Foreign Enemies Attack over the Internet Infrastructure

Differently from previous considerations, “foreign attacks” over the Internet infrastructure
are a matter of concern explicitly for hybrid regimes. While well-consolidated democracies talk
about attacks over the Internet infrastructure in a general way, hybrid regimes focus in the character
of “foreign”.
The concept of a “foreign” enemy (without distinction of the entity, whether is a
government, corporation or individual) belongs only to the hybrid speech (Belousov, 2014;
Venprensa, 2013). This rhetoric, although not new, became more powerful after the Snowden
revelations, as a constant for hybrid regimes of blaming foreign powers for their problems. Russia
would talk about the “unpredictable west”. The foreign enemy can be either another regime or
government administration, such as the U.S. in the case of Russia, or an unknown individual like
in the case of Venezuela (Belousov, 2014; MacAskill, 2014; noticias24, 2013).
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5.12.

National/Local Enemies Attack over the Internet Infrastructure

Local enemies attacking the Internet infrastructure are explicitly referred to in only one
case of a hybrid regime, Venezuela. That nation-state has been in turmoil since 2013 and, in at
least one episode of an Internet shutdown at the beginning of 2014, local authorities blamed
“internal enemies,” specifically political rivals of the current administration as responsible for this
act. This episode is the result of violent protests in the city of San Cristobal, where the Internet
service was suspended for several days (Delgado, 2014; Mora, 2014; SOSVenezuela2014, 2014).

5.13.

Similarities in the Audiences

As analyzed previously, according to the terms of the securitization theory, audiences can
either: 1. Challenge the securitizing actor’s presentation of what should be a national security issue,
or 2. They provide support to the securitizing move (Côté, 2016; Vuori, 2008). In any case,
audience(s) are important because they can provide what the securitizing actor needs to accomplish
or reformulate the securitization process (Vuori, 2008). In these terms, audiences have the capacity
to accomplish what the securitizing agents want (they have the means to do it) or differently,
audiences may not share some basic assumptions with the securitizing agent in order to buy the
securitizing speech (Campbell, 2009; Côté, 2016; Vuori, 2008).
One of the conclusions of this dissertation is that the audience is always the private sector,
but exactly who in the private sector is an actor, will change depending on the type of context and
regime.
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Figure 22 (see below) shows a representation of the similarities in the audiences democratic
and hybrid regimes want to convince that an Internet shutdown is necessary. Like in the previous
graphic, the “Y’ axe contains the specific audience to address, while the “X” axe contains the
numbers of nation-states (democracies and hybrids) under study that addressed these audiences in
their speech. In this way we can compare to whom democratic and hybrid regimes try to convince
that an Internet shutdown is necessary to protect the national interest.

Figure 22.- Comparison Between Audiences Democratic and Hybrid Regimes Intent to Convince
that an Internet Shutdown is necessary
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The main audience for consolidated democracies is the one that owns and handles the
critical infrastructure, because this is the national interest, the element to protect to preserve the
survival of a nation-state. The protection of the critical infrastructure became critical after the
attacks of 2001 in the U.S. because the critical infrastructure is interconnected by the Internet.
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When it is about the Internet shutdown, they need the support of the private sector to
achieve a successful national security policy because the private sector is capable of legitimate (if
they agree) the security discourse. Moreover, within the owners of the critical infrastructure, there
are the owners of the Internet and telecom infrastructure, and their help and support are needed to
any attempt to shut down the Internet. In concrete, well consolidated democracies, have mentioned
that their legal statutes should be able to command ISPs, as the first audience to address, to shut
down the Internet by command of the executive branch (CNN, 2010; Hardings, 2011; LeMay,
2010a).
In case of hybrid regimes, they have as a targeted audience the private sector that controls
the information they cannot control and that they would like to handle. References in Venezuela
and Russia have the same pattern: initially they make ISPs accountable because they have a hand
in the control of what is posted and how the information flows, which makes them legally
responsible. However, IPSs are just the first block in the chain. Governments want to control the
rest of the Internet stakeholders that handle the Internet infrastructure. These includes IPSs they
don’t own and the international connections they handle. Moreover, they also want to control the
rest of the private sector in the information flow, social networks and private companies located
abroad.
Social network platforms such as Facebook, Twitter or similar have been used to circulate
information in some way governments cannot control. Social network platforms were accused of
spreading false information by hybrid regimes like Venezuela and, they also were accused of
spreading “ill information” by well consolidated democracies like the U.K. In both scenarios there
is an important element, governments lack of control over the flow of information that circulates
within the social networks. Social networks cannot achieve an Internet shutdown, as a matter of
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fact they tend to be against this policy. However, they are a key element framing the securitization
policy because of their solo existence. Social network platforms own that thing the government
wants to control: the flow of information, either because they consider it false or because the
government wants to stop it.

5.14.

Different Views of the Referent Object

As mentioned in previous chapters, theoretically speaking, national security is a set of
policies a nation-state develops to protect what they consider the national interest, that thing that
needs to be protected to preserve the survival of a nation-state. Different national security policies
exist because there are different conceptions of what the national interest should be (Richards,
2012). In terms of the Copenhagen securitization theory, the national interest is called a referent
object.
Figure 24 (see below) shows a representation of the different referent objects in hybrid and
democratic regimes. The “Y’ axis contains the different referent objects this dissertation identified,
while the “X” axis contains the numbers of nation-states (democracies and hybrids) under study
that used this element in their speech. In this way we could compare how many regimes cited an
element. The order of the elements corresponds with the frequency they are used in the security
discourse.

250
Figure 23.- Comparison Between the Referent Objects in Democratic and Hybrid Regimes
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Critical Infrastructure

Consolidated democracies consider the critical infrastructure the main object of their
national security policies, and its protection frames the elements of the securitizing speech of those
governments. In the view of these governments, the destruction or misuse of a critical
infrastructure asset would have an impact on the health, safety, welfare, or economic security
within a nation-state (Radvanovsky, 2006). As such, it requires protection, including an extreme a
measure as shutting down the Internet. As a matter of fact, the term Cyber Pearl Harbor, a potential
massive cyberattack over the critical infrastructure, is a constant fear policy makers address when
they create national security policies (H. Farrell, 2013). The critical infrastructure has been the
main object of protection and point of debate during the last eighteen years in the national security
policies of the U.S. government, especially when it is related to the Internet (Chalfant, 2017; Dunn
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Cavelty, 2008). The U.K. and Australia have very similar national security policies focused in the
critical infrastructure (HM Government, 2016; Senator Stephen Conroy, 2008).
For hybrid regimes, specifically Russia, the critical infrastructure is also a very important
part of their national security policies. However, the levels of concern are addressed differently
from two different points of view: ownership and potential threats.
As mentioned many times in this document, the main concern for democratic regimes is
the existence of a cyberattack (a.k.a. cyber Pearl Harbor). Concerns of the democratic governments
are such because the critical infrastructure is mostly owned and controlled by the private sector,
not only the government. Therefore, the private sector always must be included as part of every
national security policy.
In hybrid regimes the situation is different. In Russia, the control of the critical
infrastructure is mostly in hands of the government or in hands of private entities with close
connections to the government or under its control. Also, differently from the democratic
approach, the Russian government has three focuses of concern (instead of only one): terrorism,
climate change and cyberattacks. Nevertheless, the critical infrastructure is as important for hybrid
regimes as it is for democratic ones. That is the reason why the Russian government developed
and is constantly updating a national security policy on this subject (Pynnöniemi, 2012b).

5.16.

Internal Public Order

Part of the academic literature has suggested that the governments of hybrid and
authoritarian regimes may try to disrupt the Internet traffic to prevent political mobilization and
public protest (Howard et al., 2011; Michaelsen, 2016). However, this research has shown that
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democratic regimes also may try similar policies when facing a public protest that goes beyond
what authorities can handle. This was the case during the riots of London in 2011. Although the
initial government position of shutting down the Internet moved to a softer one of shutting down
the social networks, the purpose remains the same, what the British government was aiming to
protect was the internal public order (Williams, 2011). As mentioned before, public order refers to
the operations of a society and the ability of its people to function efficiently or at least in the preestablished order or a specific status quo.
When the British government initially considered to shut down the Internet, they did it to
preserve the internal public order. According to that government mindset, the internal public order
was threatened by the split of information within social networks in a way the government could
not control.
A very similar approach was adopted by Venezuela in 2014 during the protests in the city
of Táchira, when the Venezuela government blamed the social platforms as well for spreading the
violence in a way they could not stop. Differently from the British case, the Venezuelan
government also blamed the protesters for damaging the Internet infrastructure (Mora, 2014;
Noticias24, 2014).

5.17.

Communications Platforms of the Ruling Party

Although the academic debate has focused in the importance hybrid regimes put on the
flow of information, this has never been considered as a reason to shut down the Internet. This
dissertation identified the protection of the communication of the means of the ruling party as a
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reason to do it. The reason lies in the governments’ loss of control over the spread of information
online.
Venezuela shut down the Internet twice to protect public sites that, although should remain
neutral, have been used as communication platforms by the government. This occurred at the time
that also other social network platforms were hacked, specifically the Twitter accounts of Nicolás
Maduro and the ruling party. In these conditions these platforms present information that was false
or ridiculed Nicolás Maduro. The government was not able to control any of the things that were
made public. Moreover, they lost the capacity of communicating whatever they wanted to the rest
of the world.
In the first episode, the presidential elections of 2013 and the protests of 2014, the
Venezuela government shutdown the Internet and blamed third parties because of this situation
(Diaz, 2014; El19, 2013).

5.18.

Data from Citizens and the Government

As analyzed before, after the Snowden revelations in 2013, the Russian administration
became highly concerned about the possibility that foreign governments access data from Russian
citizens and the Russian government. The possibility of this foreign access is an essential element
of the securitizing speech of the Russian national security policy to justify an Internet shutdown.
In this regard, the Russian approach contemplates the policy of an Internet shutdown in a way the
Internet governance debate has not done yet.
First, Russians propose to shut down the Internet to protect their critical infrastructure from
what they call “the unpredictable” actions of the U.S. government and their allies, or “the
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unpredictable west”. In other words, they fear that foreign powers have access to the government
and citizens’ data. However, the novelty comes from a defensive approach. The government must
be

able

to

disconnect

RuNet

from

the

rest

of

the

international

d, but also must be ready to face a scenario where foreign powers disconnect RuNet as a form of
foreign cyberattack. Alleged cases of an Internet shutdown because of a foreign attack are not
many. I identified two cases, North Korea and Syria, although in none of them there is evidence.
The Russian government seems to be preparing for a potential case like this, although not much
detail has been revealed.

5.19.

Beyond the Theoretical Framework: The Use of a Comparative Case Study

The theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School allowed us to analyze the rhetoric
behind the use of a disruptive policy like an Internet shutdown. However, rhetoric and real causes
and contexts to apply a policy are not necessarily the same. This is the reasons why besides
studying the speech by hybrid and consolidated democracies, I also analyzed the political,
technical and legal factors that enable a hybrid regime or a democratic one to shut down the
Internet.
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5.19.1. Political Factors

As mentioned in previous chapters, political factors are important because they address the
type of government leadership, decisions and debate that may affect individuals and organizations
within a nation-state in a specific period (PESTLE, 2015a, 2015b).
I identified political factors that are constantly manifested in the public debate and context
and are part of the national security policies in the cases under study.
Figure 24 (see below) shows a representation of the different political factors that may
prompt hybrid and democratic regimes to shut down the Internet. The “Y’ axis contains the
different political factors this dissertation identified, while the “X” axis contains the numbers of
nation-states (democracies and hybrids) under study that used this element in their speech. In this
way we could compare the similarities among different regimes.

Figure 24.- Comparison Between the Political Factors that Enable Democratic and Hybrid
Regimes to Shut Down the Internet
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The fear of a cyberattack over a critical infrastructure has been in the political debate since
the attacks of September 2001 and they are the main concern in all cyber security policies created
since those days. This is a common element between hybrid and democratic regimes. An important
distinction between these regimes is the ownership and control over the critical infrastructure.
While democratic regimes need (and call to create partnerships) the private sector in national
security policies because they own and control the critical infrastructure, hybrid regimes
circumstances are different. The critical infrastructure in Russia is mostly owned or controlled
indirectly by the Russian government and it has been part of the national security strategy since
2000, during Vladimir Putin first presidential administration. The Russian approach is a top-down
approach of controlling the entire Internet infrastructure; this is the reason for the creation of the
so call “Blitzkrieg laws” over the Internet infrastructure that I mentioned in past chapters.
Differently, democracies like the U.S. or the U.K. attempt to have the private sector as a partner,
rather than as a subordinated.
The idea of a foreign attack is part of the hybrid regimes constant claims that they are the
victims of foreign powers. This could be seen in the Russian scenario when, after the Snowden
revelations of 2013, they made clear they were preparing for a foreign attack of the U.S. and its
partners. Similarly, the Venezuelan government blamed foreign hackers of attacking the Twitter
accounts of Nicolás Maduro and the ruling party and public sites (AVN/VTV, 2013; Belousov,
2014). While the process of trying to assert sovereignty over the Internet started after WSIS, the
idea of fear of a foreign attack increased after the Snowden revelations.
A different scenario, shutting down the Internet because of the use of use of social network
platforms or message systems during times of public protest, has been the subject of study when
considering authoritarian regimes so much for academia like for civil society organizations. I
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identified that hybrid regimes and well consolidated democracies have also similar concerns on
this matter.
As referred many times, in 2011 during the London riots, Prime Minister Cameron blamed
the Blackberry message system, Facebook and Twitter for allowing rioters to organize themselves
and create chaos and disorder in London. As a result Cameron would call to shut down the entire
Internet (Marsden, 2011; Nosowitz, 2011).
The U.S. also presents a case of trying to control, not only social networks, but also a
message system. As this document explained before, all cellular service inside the Bay Area Rapid
Transit (BART) got disrupted in San Francisco transit stations for three hours during a mass public
protest and a year later, the DHS accepted some responsibility in the episode and referred to the
SOP 303 emergency protocol (Brownlee, 2015; DeSoto, 2015).
In Venezuela the scenario is different. Censorship was common in Venezuela since Hugo
Chavez was in power, however since 2013 local media has been under censorship and harassment
over the foreign press became very common. The government started a campaign of repression to
censor social networks platforms, specially twitter, and ended up with an Internet shutdown (Frank
Bajak, 2014; Chao, 2014). Venezuelan authorities show a constant fear of a foreign attack they are
not able to control. From their perspective, foreign criminals invaded social networks to attack
accounts and manipulate information. At the same time, they also claimed that social networks,
specially Twitter, are used by perpetrators of violence to create anguish in the population (Frak
Bajak, 2014; noticias24, 2014). This last comment is a speech very similar to the British comments
of “ill information” circulating within the social networks.
The Russian case came covered by a different political veil. Back in 2014, the Russian
government enacted the so known as “bloggers law”. As I explained before, this new law
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established that that any site with more than 3,000 visitors per day would be considered a media
outlet and would be responsible for the accuracy of the information published. Because the law
also implemented scanning software that allows the Russian government to review all content
posted on the Internet, bloggers can no longer remain anonymous. As the law was passed, there
was a common belief among experts and civil activists that the real targets were the social network
platforms that originated abroad, like Facebook and Twitter (MacFarquhar, 2014; Zavyalova,
2014).
Finally, I will refer to the claims of national sovereignty over the Internet infrastructure
and the flow of information, a tendency known as cyber nationalism. Despite of being so different
between each other, constant claims of national sovereignty over the Internet are common
characteristics of hybrid and democratic regimes. When it comes to the Internet, it is possible to
find strong nationalisms subsisting even in different administrations within the same nation-state
government. For consolidated democracies such as the U.S. and the U.K., claims of sovereignty
over the Internet infrastructure are part of their national security policy. For the Australians, it
means absolute competency of national authorities to regulate the Internet without foreign
intervention. These claims became stronger since 2009 when the U.S. government declared the
digital technology, the Internet included, a national asset.
For hybrid regimes claims of sovereignty over the Internet became a very important part
of their politics after the Snowden revelations back in 2013, although they had nationalistic
tendencies since early stages of the 21st century with the beginning of the administration of Hugo
Chavez in Venezuela and Vladimir Putin in Russia. The Brazilian administration was the
“standard-bearer” defending the cybernationalism when Dilma Rousseff (President at the time)
recommended the increase of IXPs to keep the data flow within Brazilian territory. This put on the

259
table governments’ efforts not only to protect their data and their citizens, but also to subordinate
the Internet infrastructure to national legislations (Costello, 2017; Keating, 2013b; Messmer,
2013). The clearest expression of cybernationalism is the production of the “Blitzkrieg laws” over
the Internet infrastructure, the strongest effort of a government to keep the Internet completely
under government control (Bodner, 2014). In a more colloquial but representative way, it is
important to remember that Russian policymakers called to create a Patriotic Internet to fight
against the west (Demirjian, 2015).

5.19.2. Technical Factors

Technical factors referred to the aspects a government may be able to manipulate and that
can have access over industry and businesses. In this regard, technical factors define what
organizations and individuals may be able to do in practical terms with the technology they have
and the regulation in place (PESTLE, 2017). In the case of technical factors this dissertation
identified two elements related to the state of the Internet infrastructure that are relevant to a policy
like an Internet shutdown.
Figure 25 (see below) shows a representation of the technical political factors that may
prompt hybrid and democratic regimes to shut down the Internet. The “Y’ axe contains the
different technical factors this dissertation identified, while the “X” axe contains the numbers of
nation-states (democracies and hybrids) under study. In this way I could compare the similarities
among different regimes.
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Figure 25.- Comparison Between the Technical Factors that may enable Democratic and Hybrid
Regimes to Shut Down the Internet
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In this dissertation, I identified two technical factors that enable democratic and hybrid
governments to shut down the Internet, ISPs and IXPs. These are the elements governments have
tried to control to achieve an Internet shutdown within their own borders. Circumstances around
these elements show coincidences and differences between hybrid and democratic regimes.
One of these elements is a coincidence between hybrid and democratic regimes: the
existence of one ISP or few ISPs that handle over 70% of the Internet subscribers. This means, in
both democratic and hybrid regimes, the Internet service is provided by a group of a few
companies. In case of hybrid regimes those ISPs are mostly owned or controlled by the government
and in the case of democratic regimes they are owned and controlled by the private sector. Despite
their ownership, the reduced number of ISPs makes them vulnerable to governments’ national
security policies. As a matter of fact, this situation makes things even more critical because the
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remaining ISPs that control between 10% and 30% of the Internet subscribers depend of the
companies that control the other 70%.
As mentioned before, this scenario is distributed in this way: 1. In the case of Australia and
Venezuela, one ISP handles around 90% of the Internet subscribers, 2. In the case of the U.S. and
the U.K., fours ISPs control over 70% of the Internet subscribers, and 3. In the case of Russia,
fours ISPs control over 70% of the Internet subscribers and the existent 13 ISPs (a very small
number for a big territory as the Russian one with over 100’000,000 Internet subscribers) are under
government control.
The second element is related to the control of the IXPs. Hybrid regimes may have none
IXPs or few ones under control of the government or may have none. Democratic regimes tend to
have multiple IXPs owned and managed by the private sector, and that hold multiple international
connections.
The ownership and management of IXPs is also the only aspect where there are no
similarities between hybrids and democracies when it comes to analyze the factors that may
prompt those governments to shut down the Internet and is probably one of the most important
conclusions this dissertation identified. The reason for this is that national government cannot
control the international connections of complex IXPs designs.
IXPs are not ISPs. An IXP is a structure where Internet networks get together to peer or
exchange traffic between their networks. IXPs don’t sell Internet connectivity, but they improve
it. Any network that wants to peer with other networks can connect to an IXP. In terms of
management, different organizations may operate IXPs, either members who connect to the IXP
or commercial organizations.
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Most common customers of IXPs are ISPs. Some IXPs use more complex designs and
therefore, they connect multiple networks using different protocols to carry the traffic. In this way,
IXPs usually have multiple international connections. Having multiple IXPs privately owned with
multiple Internet connections facilitates the Internet traffic to re-route, which means that even if a
government tries to control an IXP, it cannot control it completely. This is the big difference
between hybrid and democratic regimes; by having multiple IXPs privately-owned in their
territories, the U.K., U.S. and Australia have a massive Internet infrastructure very difficult to
control. This means shutting down the Internet is very unlikely.
Hybrid regimes are different. They lack of enough IXPs like Russia or have none like
Venezuela. This makes the traffic very vulnerable if there is a need to re-route. Depending upon
the level of government control, international connections may increase or no. This is the reason
why in August 2017, the Russian government announced its plans to minimize the flow of Russian
Internet traffic that runs through foreign-based IXPs. According to the Russian government, this
plan intents that U.S. intelligence agencies don’t get access to any sensitive data that runs through
international connections. The new Russian bill proposes limiting foreign ownership over IXPs to
20%. This proposal follows the similar criteria of limiting Russian media holdings, a provision
approved in 2014. If the bill is approved, it should get in force by July 2018 (Kantyshev & Sergina,
2017; The Moscow Times, 2017).
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5.19.3. Legal Factors

Legal factors referred to laws and regulations that affect businesses and individuals in a
specific nation-state. It is expected that legal statutes change time to time. This dissertation
identified one legal factor common to all the cases under study, whether they are consolidated
democracies or hybrid regimes: the existence of broad national security laws or telecommunication
laws with unclear provisions about national security and the way governments should act.
National security laws are vague and unclear because they don’t specify what the national
interest is or the limits of the presidential authority to act when there is a national security threat.
This ambiguity or lack of clarity is done on purpose, following the basic guidelines of what
national security is. As I referred many times in this document, national security is a concept that
refers to a set of policies created to protect the national interest and preserve the stability and
survival of a nation-state (Bobbitt, 2002; Richards, 2012).
According to this logic, the national interest constantly changes as the geopolitical factors
of a nation-state also change. In these circumstances, incumbent administrations create the set of
national security policies after defining what the national interest is. Therefore, it is not strange
that national security laws are broad and unclear because specific considerations or interpretations
will be developed as the preferred geopolitical situations change and new enemies are created.
Table 09 (see next page) provides an overview of the main laws cited by the nation-states under
study.
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Table 09.- Legal Provisions Used or Cited to Grant Powers to the Government Authorities to Shut Down the Internet
NationState

Legal Statute

Specific Provisions

Australia

Telecommunications Act
of 1979 and amendments
of 1997 and 2003

According to the provision 581 of the statute, the attorney general (after consultations with
the Prime Minister and the Minister of Telecommunications) is entitled to request ISPs to
stop providing Internet service under circumstances “prejudicial to security”

U.S.

Telecommunications
Law of 1934 and
amendments of 1996.

According to the representative of the U.S. government, control over the
telecommunications is a prerogative of the president in fulfillment of the war powers of the
telecom act (47 U.S. Code § 606). Such prerogative will be used according the specific case

U.K.

Communications Act of
2003

According to the section 132, OFCOM, the regulator, can request to any U.K.-based ISP the
suspension of the service to preserve the “public order” or in case of a massive cyber-attack.
OFCOM has the authority to act on behalf of the minister of culture, the one who has legal
authority to “shut down the web”

U.K.

Civil Contingencies Act
of 2004

Part 2 also would give to the executive branch legal authority to request to the ISPs the
suspension of the Internet service. For this purpose, the executive branch is entitled to create
emergency regulations if the U.K. faces a national security threat

Russia

The “Lugovoi Law” of
2014

It authorizes the prosecutor general to block access to media that disseminates calls for mass
riots, extremist activities, or participation in unsanctioned mass public events. Limits to what
should be blocked are not specified

Russia

First Anti-Terrorist Law
of 2014

It stipulates that owners and operators of websites and services are required to store
information at request of the government. They are obligated to store all information about
the arrival, transmission, delivery, and processing of voice data, written text, images, sounds,
or other kinds of action

Russia

Bloggers Law of 2014

It requires all web-based writers with posts that exceed 3000-page views to register with the
government, as they are considered media outlets. The law also implements scanning
software that allows the Russian government to review all content posted on the Internet
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Russia

Law about Data
Retention and Data
Mining of 2014

The law requires foreign-Internet-companies to locate servers handling Russian Internet
traffic inside the country and to store Russian users’ data on these locally based servers for
a minimum of six months

Venezuela

The Law of Social
Responsibility and
Quality of the Television
in Venezuela of 2005

RESORTE forbids content considered “offensive,” “violent,” “disrupt public order,”
“disown pubic authorities,” and “Induce homicide”. It is the regulator the one to decide when
the content falls into the previous categories. Actions to take may include shutting down the
Internet
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Despite any similarity, in the case of young democracies there is an element that is worth
paying attention to even if young democracies are included in this study only with comparative
purposes. Young democracies have specific legal and constitutional frameworks that refrain
governments of shutting down the Internet. As I can remember the two young democracies under
study, Brazil and Mexico, have specific provisions that protect the Internet: Brazil enacted the law
known as “Marco Civil,” which gives to the Internet legal protection and Mexico declared the
Internet a human right and granted to it constitutional protection.
This is a characteristic that only can be appreciated within young democracies.
Nevertheless, although they cannot shut down the Internet, this doesn’t mean that they cannot
apply other limitations over the Internet infrastructure.
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6. Conclusions

In 2005, a small group of academics was involved in something known as OpenNet
Initiative reported that the Internet had been shut down in Nepal, a small nation-state located in
South Asia (OpenNet Initiative, 2005). At the time, the king of Nepal, King Gyanendra, declared
a “state of emergency” in Nepal and shut down all communications means, including the Internet.
However, because the number of Internet users in Nepal was less than 1% of habitants, the entire
world barely noticed what happened. The situation was dramatically different in 2011 when the
Egyptian Internet shutdown occurred. Egyptian Internet users counted for over 30% of its
population, and Egypt had a more sophisticated Internet infrastructure than Nepal. After this event,
the world questioned the importance of having the Internet in times of national unrest. Since those
days, there have been multiple publications (academic and non-academic) about the actions of
authoritarian regimes to control the Internet during times when there are protests against them. As
a result, members of the academic sectors and activists credited the Internet of being a catalyzer
for democratic change.
For some time, this extreme form of government control, baptized as an Internet shutdown,
Internet kill switch or Internet blackout, was assumed to exist or to be considered only by
authoritarian regimes. I concluded in this dissertation that this is not the case. In this project, I
proposed to look at other regimes (not the authoritarian ones), the well-consolidated democracies
and hybrid regimes. Therefore, I drafted the following research questions that guided this
dissertation:
RQ1: What is the global scope of the Internet shut down phenomenon?
RQ2: What justifications do democratic and hybrid regimes use to shut down or to
consider shutting down the Internet?
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RQ3: What are the political, legal and technical factors that enable a government to shut
down the Internet?
To answer these research questions, this project combined two areas of research: law and
social sciences. The purpose of this combination is using social sciences theories and
methodologies to analyze legal documents, political and security speeches related to the action of
shutting down the Internet, and news and articles to contribute greater objectivity and accuracy to
legal opinions.
The next paragraphs will develop the mains conclusions of this dissertation.
Despite any justification, hybrid and democratic regimes have considered an Internet
shutdown, they executed one or claimed an accident. In both types of regimes, they believed that
legal or political debate was worth to discuss the issue. Regarding the kind of regime, governments
never discarded this extreme form of government control over the Internet and, this one remains
as part of the mindset of all government authorities of the nation-states under study.
By framing different concepts of national security within different speeches, hybrid and
democratic regimes try to justify the inclusion of an Internet shutdown within their national
legislation. When authorities deliver a speech, the securitization theory (theoretical framework for
this dissertation) points to the importance of the “referent object,” within the terms of that speech.
I identified the referent object with the national interest, that thing that needs to be protected to
preserve the survival and stability of a nation-state.
This dissertation has concluded that hybrid and democratic regimes have different referent
objects in mind: the critical infrastructure, the public order and national data (from governments
and citizens). However, there are areas of overlapping. In this scenario, there are several
conclusions to draw:
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1. Hybrid regimes are concerned about the critical infrastructure like the wellconsolidated democracies are,
2. Well-consolidated democracies are as concern about the internal public order and the
use of social network platforms to disrupt it, as hybrid regimes are,
3. Hybrid regimes are particularly concerned about the flow of data and the idea that all
attacks that may affect them are “foreign” ones
The achievement of these conclusions comes after the analysis of government
representative speeches following the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School, alongside
with legal, political and technical indicators specific to the nation-states selected as case studies.
As a result, it is possible to see that even when is about technical, legal and political factors
that enable a government to shut down the Internet, there are strong similarities between hybrid
and democratic regimes.
Concerning audiences to address, when considering the national security policy of any
regime, the private sector is a pivotal partner to analyze. In well-consolidated democracies, the
private sector is the owner of the Internet infrastructure and the critical infrastructure. In hybrid
regimes, the private sector is the one responsible for the data flow in and out of the territory of
those regimes. In both cases, the private sector can reach and maintain networks governments
cannot. It is the presence of the private sector and the multiple international connections the private
sector allows, what makes the difference whether actions to shut down the Internet can or cannot
be successful.
About this situation, it is important to remember that, in all cases, under study, the Internet
service is concentrated in a few companies, ISPs that handle between the 70% and 90% of the
Internet subscribers. As concluded, this is not only a similar element but also one that needs
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attention. Although it is true that the private sector controls ISPs in well-consolidated democracies
and, in the case of hybrid regimes they are under government control (even if the government does
not own them), it is not in their ownership where the danger is. The risk of having so few ISPs in
control of the Internet service is because then the Internet itself becomes more vulnerable to
government control, whether this occurs in extraordinary circumstances or because the
government tries indeed to control the Internet. In other words, no matter the type of regime, it is
easier to manage a few ISPs because those few companies handle over the 70% of the Internet
subscribers.
As this research pointed out before, although hybrid regimes have created a set of laws to
control every aspect of the Internet, democratic regimes have demonstrated that they don’t trust in
their ISPs either. This lack of trust was the case during the debate of some control policies the
Australian government wanted to impose and during the Internet kill switch debate in the U.S.
Given these governments’ concerns, the current scenario shows this panorama:

Table 10.- ISPs that control between 70%-90% of Internet Subscribers in Hybrid and
Democratic Regimes
Nation-State
Companies
Percentage of the market they
control
Australia
Telstra
It controls around the 90% of the
market of the Internet service
U.S.
Comcast, Charter, AT&T, and
They control around 76% of the
Verizon
market of the Internet service
U.K.
BT, TalkTalk, Virgin Media, and
They control around the 90% of the
Sky
market of the Internet service
Russia
Known as the “Big Four”:
They control around 90% of the
MTS, VimpelCom, MegaFon, and
market of the Internet service
Tele2
Venezuela
CANTV
It controls over 90% of the market of
the Internet service
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The situation is even more critical because the ISPs that control the remaining traffic
depend on the ones that control most of the traffic for their proper functionality.

6.1.

Reasons to Not Shut Down the Internet

It was not one of the goals of this dissertation identifying the reasons why hybrid and
democratic regimes did not shut down or did not considered doing so. However, during the analysis
of the case studies selected for this project, I could identify the factors to keep the Internet on (to
not shut it down). Such factors can be appreciated in the specific circumstances of the Internet
infrastructure that surround the case studies I used for comparison purposes.
In the case of the democratic regimes, the evidence comes from Mexico concretely. When
it comes to political factors, Mexico has a significant public debate to increase the Internet
connectivity and improve its quality and speed, more than in any of the other cases under study.
This situation is critical in Mexico for the lack of IXPs and the very few ISPs that nation-state has.
This combination has Mexico in a an awkward position: (1) Mexico is the nation-state with one of
the slowest Internet speed in North America and (2) has the last place among the 35 members of
the OECD (Castanares, 2017).
Additionally, among political factors, Mexican authorities have used the Internet to
facilitate the protection of self-defense forces and fight against drug dealing activities. Drug
dealing is one of the most dangerous illegal operations in Mexico, and the government has not
been able to create successful policies to fight against it.
From a legal point of view, Mexico and Brazil, young democracies under study, have
both included in their national legislation provisions to protect the Internet. These provisions don’t
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forbid actions that affect the Internet, such as acts of censorship. However, any new regulation to
shut down the Internet would be an unconstitutional or illegal one.
Finally, from a technical point of view, the evidence comes from a hybrid regime, Turkey.
Turkey is one of the few nation-states that had poisoned the DNS. Poisoning the DNS slows down
or prevents the access to web pages and services. Most likely mail and remote file systems may be
inaccessible. This disruptive activity implies that any external communication is at risk when the
DNS does not work correctly. By poisoning the DNS, governments are using a disruptive
technique to tackle specific sources of information they don’t want their citizens to have access.
However, what makes this technique more pervasive than censorship actions is the perception for
Internet users that nothing is wrong. As I pointed out before, DNS cache poisoning diverts the
Internet traffic away from legitimate servers towards fake ones. In this regard, not only prevents
to Internet users to access what they want but also it is dangerous because it can spread from DNS
server to DNS server. The Turkish experience and evidence tell us that the government of that
nation-state prefers to use more disruptive techniques of Internet instead of the Internet kill switch.
It is possible to hypothesize that tools to control the Internet, other than the kill switch, serve better
to the government’s goals.

6.2.

Limitations

This section will describe a specific set of constraints and vulnerabilities this project had
to address.
1. Internet shutdowns started in 2005, and they continue until the moment this project was
created. Although RQ1 discusses the global scope of the problem, it is possible that by
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the time of submitting this dissertation, there are more cases of Internet shutdowns than
the ones initially reported.
2. At the time of presenting the dissertation proposal for this project, young democracies
remained aside of the consideration or the use of Internet shutdowns as control policies.
For this reason, I did not include them as comparative cases studies. However, in 2016,
the government of one young democracy (India) shut down the Internet in several cities
and created an administrative regulation to allow the government of that nation-state to
shut down the Internet under specific circumstances. Despite this episode, I preserved
the original research design and, young democracies remained as case studies of nationstates that did not shut down the Internet and never considered doing it.
3. This study proposed a multiple case study. This project had as a proposition that by
comparing cases of similar regimes, it was expected to identify related factors that
surround the shutdown of the Internet, for hybrids and well-consolidated democracies.
However, this study did not find clear distinctions between both types of regimes. On
the contrary, this study identified common elements rather than distinguish differences
among the factors that enable hybrid and democratic regimes to shut down the Internet.
4.

Regarding the language barriers these clarifications are required:
I did not need any assistance to search and analyze text in English, Spanish and
Portuguese. In the Turkish and Russian cases, it was necessary to recruit help for the
translation of sources in their respective language from software, friends and fellow
students fluent in those languages.
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6.3.

Directions for Future Study

This study was an exploratory research project about the Internet shutdowns in wellestablished democracies and hybrid regimes. Research findings followed the order of the research
questions:

1.

The global scope of the Internet shut down phenomena,

2.

Main elements of the securitizing speech that government agents use to justify an
Internet shutdown,

3.

Political, legal and technical factors that enable a democratic or hybrid government to
shut down the Internet.

These findings extend the current literature about Internet shutdowns that has devoted to
studying mostly authoritarian regimes. However, I believe future research needs to analyze a few
issues this dissertation identified:
1.

Young democracies are also considering shutting down the Internet and at least one
young democracy, India, has done it. Therefore, more research is needed to determine
if these regimes include new legal, political, and technical factors that enable a
government to shut down the Internet (different from the ones established for hybrids
and well-established democracies). About authoritarian regimes, updated research is
also necessary as they continue applying this extreme policy over the Internet and
recently they are using different reasons not related to national security (f/e avoid
cheating in school examinations).

2.

This study concluded in the middle of what is considered a re-born of the nation-states
as main entities of international law and the election of nationalist governments. These
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two elements are considered part of a new order where government actors present the
globalization process present as a “failure” and nation-states retake the control over
the telecommunications systems and therefore, from the Internet infrastructure
(Grygiel, 2016; Mazower, 2014). It is possible to anticipate that this “new order” will
bring new policies of “cybernationalism” which may include the possibility of shutting
down the Internet. This new context and its policies require attention for the future.
3.

This project was limited to analyze Internet shutdowns at a national level only. In the
future, studies need to be conducted to examine the same extreme policy from different
points of view, such as a) the response of the international legal system to Internet
shutdowns, b) the response of the Internet community (represented by ICANN) and c)
Internet shutdowns as a tool of cyberwarfare.

4.

Trying to control the Internet within the borders of a nation-state implies, to some
extent, that governments also try to control resources beyond their territory, especially
for the multiple connections the Internet can create. Although the governments'
practice of trying to extend their sovereignty is not new, the new element, in this case,
is the Internet, and this is a whole further aspect to study. Moreover, this is an element
that needs more discussion after the creation of non-binding agreements to use already
existent international law frameworks over the Internet infrastructure, such as the law
of the sea and space law.
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6.4.

Lessons from this Study and Why the Conclusions are Important

The possibility of shutting down the Internet implies a higher level of government control,
especially from the Executive branch or a new government body created with that purpose. In this
regard, Internet shutdowns are opposed to two essential aspects related to the Internet itself: 1) the
multi stakeholder model and 2) the open architectural design of the Internet.
These two elements, a form of governance and a characteristic of the Internet, keep the
latter without a single point of control. They both succeeded, to some extent, during the ICANN
transition that operated in 2016. However, this model faces challenges of those nation-states that
advocate for a government-based-model to regulate the Internet or that pretend to have
independent Internets. Among those nation-states, it is possible to find governments that
considered the Internet shut down as an acceptable policy within their legal systems. Among those
governments, there are also well-consolidated democracies.
Despite the type of government, it is important to remember that no matter what nationstate executes an Internet shutdown, there is always an impact over the international Internet
traffic, especially, for neighbor nation-states. This potential consequence is one of the reasons why
Internet shutdowns have consequences at a global level. Multiple national economies and human
rights could be altered in more than one nation-state.
In Latin America, there is an old phrase that says, “When the United States sneezes, Latin
America gets pneumonia”. This phrase refers to the effects specific problems or policy decisions
the U.S. may go through and how they affect its neighbor nation-states in the south. Parallels
scenarios exist in the rest of the world. This situation also has unpredictable consequences that
may revert to the U.S. when the economies of Latin America find themselves affected by policy
decision taken by that government.
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As the last statement for this project, it is essential to make a point related to the
policymakers who can to decide if an Internet shutdown must be executed or included in their
national legislation. As far as this research could identify, and just to point an example, no study
is conclusive as what could happen with the critical infrastructure after an Internet shutdown takes
place. On this subject, it is essential that policy makers remember that, according to what they
want to accomplish, their job is not curing the disease by killing the patient but curing the disease
to save the patient.
All case-studies in this project pointed out that shutting down the Internet is a remedy to
prevent different diseases, such as attacks over the critical infrastructure, attacks over the
communication means of the ruling party and attempts to destabilize what governments consider
the internal public order. However, no evidence supports the fact that shutting down the Internet
is a remedy to all these “diseases.” On the contrary, and from an economic perspective, previous
studies account for the negative effects of Internet shutdowns on the GDP (GNI, 2018; Rydzak,
2017). From a technical perspective, varying opinions refer that isolating or disconnecting
individual sectors, like electrical utilities and telecommunications lines from the Internet, is a
technique to protect the critical infrastructure (Knapp, 2011).
Finally, I will refer to what this disruptive policy of shutting down the Internet may bring
for the future. As mentioned before, the disconnection of the local Internet brings consequences
over the international Internet traffic. How much? It depends of the nation-state that suffers the
disconnection. When it comes to the freedom of expression, or what some people call the digital
speech, I would like to use a quote from Professor Balkin from the Information Society Project at
Yale (ISP) (Balkin, 2018, p.1153):
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“The digital speech flows through an elaborated privately-owned infrastructure of
communication. Today our practical ability to speak is subject to the decisions of private
infrastructure owners, who govern the digital spaces in which people communicate with
each other.”

If we depend on the decision of private corporations, what would happen when the
decisions of these private corporations are constraint by unclear national security policies?
And finally, shutting down the Internet (as analyzed so far) implies the concentration of
power in one government authority: the one who decides that the Internet should be shut down.
We live in a time of a reborn of the concept of nation-states as the main actors of international law
and the only sources of laws and public governance. What are the implications of a disruptive
policy, such as shutting down the Internet, in this new international scenario over the multi
stakeholder model and the open architecture design of the Internet? The latter one guarantees that
there is no a single point of control for the Internet and the first one is a governance model that
involves multiple stakeholders when it comes to the decision making about the Internet
infrastructure.
When trying to foresee the future, the Internet community must consider three elements
and the implications over an open and free Internet, as we have become to know.
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7. Appendixes
The following chapters contain all the documents previously mentioned during the development
of this dissertation as part of the appendixes.

7.1.

Appendix 1: U.S. Constitution, Article II

Section 1.
The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold
his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same
term, be elected, as follows:
Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors,
equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in
the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under
the United States, shall be appointed an elector.
The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one
at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves. And they shall make a list of
all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify,
and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of
the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having
the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole
number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an
equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one
of them for President; and if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list the
said House shall in like manner choose the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall
be taken by States, the representation from each state having one vote; A quorum for this purpose
shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states
shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the President, the person having
the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain
two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them by ballot the Vice President.
The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall
give their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the United States.
No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible
to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty five years, and been fourteen Years a
resident within the United States.
In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to
discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President,
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and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both
of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such
officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a compensation, which shall neither
be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall
not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.
Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation:--"I
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United
States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States."
Section 2.
The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; he may require
the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any
subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves
and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.
He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the
Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest
the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts
of law, or in the heads of departments.
The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the
Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.
Section 3.
He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and
recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he
may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in case of
disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such
time as he shall think proper; he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States.
Section 4.
The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors.
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7.2.

Appendix 2: U.K. Communications Act 2003, Section 132

An Act to confer functions on the Office of Communications; to make provision about the
regulation of the provision of electronic communications networks and services and of the use of
the electro-magnetic spectrum; to make provision about the regulation of broadcasting and of the
provision of television and radio services; to make provision about mergers involving newspaper
and other media enterprises and, in that connection, to amend the Enterprise Act 2002; and for
connected purposes.
132.- Powers to require suspension or restriction of a provider’s entitlement
(1) If the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to do so—
(a) to protect the public from any threat to public safety or public health, or
(b) in the interests of national security, he may, by a direction to OFCOM, require them to give a
direction under subsection (3) to a person (“the relevant provider”) who provides an electronic
communications network or electronic communications service or who makes associated facilities
available.
(2) OFCOM must comply with a requirement of the Secretary of State under subsection (1) by
giving to the relevant provider such direction under subsection (3) as they consider necessary for
the purpose of complying with the Secretary of State’s direction.
(3) A direction under this section is—
(a) a direction that the entitlement of the relevant provider to provide electronic communications
networks or electronic communications services, or to make associated facilities available, is
suspended (either generally or in relation to particular networks, services or facilities); or
(b) a direction that that entitlement is restricted in the respects set out in the direction.
(4) A direction under subsection (3)—
(a) must specify the networks, services and facilities to which it relates; and
(b) except so far as it otherwise provides, takes effect for an indefinite period beginning with the
time at which it is notified to the person to whom it is given.
(5) A direction under subsection (3)—
(a) in providing for the effect of a suspension or restriction to be postponed, may provide for it to
take effect only at a time determined by or in accordance with the terms of the direction; and
(b) in connection with the suspension or restriction contained in the direction or with the
postponement of its effect, may impose such conditions on the relevant provider as appear to
OFCOM to be appropriate for the purpose of protecting that provider’s customers.
(6) Those conditions may include a condition requiring the making of payments—
(a) by way of compensation for loss or damage suffered by the relevant provider’s customers as a
result of the direction; or
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(b) in respect of annoyance, inconvenience or anxiety to which they have been put in consequence
of the direction.
(7) Where OFCOM give a direction under subsection (3), they shall, as soon as practicable after
doing so, provide that person with an opportunity of—
(a) making representations about the effect of the direction; and
(b) proposing steps for remedying the situation.
(8) If OFCOM consider it appropriate to do so (whether in consequence of any representations or
proposals made to them under subsection (3) or otherwise), they may, without revoking it, at any
time modify the terms of a direction under subsection (3) in such manner as they consider
appropriate.
(9) If the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to do so, he may, by a direction to OFCOM,
require them to revoke a direction under subsection (3).
(10) Where OFCOM modify or revoke a direction they have given under subsection (3), they may
do so—
(a) with effect from such time as they may direct;
(b) subject to compliance with such requirements as they may specify; and
(c)to such extent and in relation to such networks, services or facilities, or parts of a network,
service or facility, as they may determine.
(11) It shall be the duty of OFCOM to comply with—
(a) a requirement under subsection (9) to revoke a direction; and
(b) a requirement contained in that direction as to how they should exercise their powers under
subsection (10) in the case of the required revocation.
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7.3.Critical Infrastructure: A Comparative Approach
Table 11.- Critical Infrastructure: Comparative Definitions and Sectors Involved
U.S.
European Commission
Australia
Brazil
Definition According to the USA
According to the Document
According to the Australian
According to the Brazilian
Patriot Act of 2001 ((42 COM (2004) 702 final, the
Government book of
Green Book of CyberU.S.C. 5195c(e)), the
critical infrastructure is
Cybersecurity Strategy of
security, the critical
critical infrastructure
defined as “physical and
2009, the critical
infrastructure is related to
refers to “systems and
information technology
infrastructure “are the
“installations, services,
assets, whether physical facilities, networks, services systems which, if rendered
goods and systems that if
or virtual, so vital to the and assets which, if
unavailable or otherwise
destroyed, it would have a
United States that the
disrupted or destroyed,
compromised, could result in serious, social, economic,
incapacity or destruction would have a serious impact significant impacts on
politics, environmental,
of such systems and
on the health, safety, security Australia’s economic
international over the
assets would have a
or economic well-being of
prosperity, international
national security and the
debilitating impact on
citizens or the effective
competitiveness, public
society” (as cited by
security, national
functioning of governments
safety, social wellbeing or
(Almeida Advogados, p.8,
economic security,
in the Member States.
national defense and
2015)
national public health or Critical infrastructures
security.
safety, or any
extend across many sectors
The identification of systems
combination of those
of the economy, including
of national interest is not a
matters” (Klemm &
banking and finance,
static process and a flexible
Johnson, 2010; U.S.
transport and distribution,
approach is required to
Congress, 2001)
energy, utilities, health, food enable the Australian
supply and communications, government to respond to the
as well as key government
changing environment–in
services” (European
terms of technology, usage,
Commission, p.3, 2004)
threat and risk. It is for this
reason that the identification
of systems of national
interest must be informed by
an ongoing assessment of
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risk” (Australian
Government, p.12, 2009)

Sectors
involved

According to the
Presidential Policy
Directive from 2013
(PPD-21), sectors
involved within the
critical infrastructure
classification are:

According to the document #
COM (2004) 702 final from
the European Commission
titled “Critical Infrastructure
Protection in the fight
against terrorism,” critical
infrastructure includes:

1. Chemical
2. Commercial
Facilities
3. Communications
4. Critical
Manufacturing

1. Energy installations and
networks
Communications and
Information Technology
2. Finance
3. Health Care

According to the Attorney
General, critical
infrastructure can be defined
as “physical facilities, supply
chains, information
technologies and
communications networks
which, if destroyed, degraded
or rendered unavailable for
an extended period, would
adversely impact on the
social or economic wellbeing of the nation or affect
Australia's ability to ensure
national security” (Wilson,
p.702, 2014)
According to the Australian
Government book of
Cybersecurity Strategy of
2009, critical infrastructure
includes:
1. Electricity grids,
2. Water storage and
distribution, Aviation and
maritime transport,
Telecommunications
networks
3. Systems of high economic
value that support

According to the Brazilian
Green Book of Cybersecurity, critical
infrastructure includes:
1. Energy
2. Transportation
3. Water supply
4. Telecommunications
5. Finance
6. Information
(Almeida Advogados,
2015)
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5. Dams
4. Food
6. Defense Industrial
5. Water
Base
6. Transport
7. Emergency Services 7. Production, storage and
8. Energy
transport of dangerous
9. Financial Services
goods
10. Food and
8. Government
Agriculture
(European Commission,
11. Government
2004)
Facilities
12. Healthcare and
Public Health
13. Information
Technology
14. Nuclear Reactors,
Materials, and Waste
15. Transportation
Systems
16. Water and
Wastewater Systems
(DHS, 2013)

electronic transactions and
hold sensitive intellectual
property and commercial
data associated with major
international trade
negotiations
(Australian Government,
2009b)
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